Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-93-202
Thursday
21 October 1993

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FBIS-SOV-93-202

CONTENTS

21 October 1993

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Lukin on Ties With U.S., Political Plans *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 24 Oct]* 1
U.S. Secretary of State on Aims of Visit to Russia *[ITAR-TASS]* 2
Strobe Talbott Views Context of Moscow Summit *[IZVESTIYA 21 Oct]* 2
Financial Corporation Head on U.S. Investment *[Russian TV]* 4
Kozyrev on Two-Day Official Visit to France *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Holds Talks With Mitterrand *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Talks With French Premier *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Discusses Elections *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Signs Accord on Dismantling Nuclear Arms *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Comments on Bilateral Talks *[ITAR-TASS]* 6
Further on Visit *[cross-reference]* 6
Kozyrev Writes on Russian-French Relations *[IZVESTIYA 20 Oct]* 6
Kozyrev Writes on Country's National Interests *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 24 Oct]* 8
Grachev Visit to Finland 'Coming to a Close' *[Moscow Radio]* 9
Holds News Conference in Helsinki *[ITAR-TASS]* 9
Favors Part Repayment of Debt by Arms *[Radio Rossii]* 10
Rules Out Military Intervention in Georgia *[Moscow TV]* 10
Paper Views Tokyo Talks, Prospects for Ties *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 20 Oct]* 10
Yeltsin's Japan Visit Centers Interest on Primorye Region *[ITAR-TASS]* 12
Greenpeace Sea of Japan Radiation Level Claims Denied *[INTERFAX]* 12
More on Japanese Protest *[IZVESTIYA 20 Oct]* 12
Krishkin on Dumping *[Moscow International]* 13
Dumping 'Lesser of Two Evils' *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 13
Inspectorate Chief Comments *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 14
Difficulties in Burying Radioactive Waste *[ITAR-TASS]* 15
Government To Cancel Next Dumping *[Tokyo KYODO]* 15
Protests Said 'Politically Motivated' *[ITAR-TASS]* 16
Official Admits Rules Were Broken *[Russian TV]* 16
Protest in Seoul Against Dumping of Nuclear Waste *[Moscow Radio]* 17
Shevardnadze's Appeal Treated With 'Prudence' *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 17
Defense Ministry Denies Troop Redeployment to Georgia *[Moscow TV]* 17
Troops To Help in Delivering Essentials to Georgia *[ITAR-TASS]* 17
Shevardnadze Held 'Secret Talks' With Russian General *[Russian TV]* 18
Georgian Intelligence Agents Released From Custody *[ITAR-TASS]* 18
Joint Forces May Use Force Against Georgia's Gamsakhurdia *[INTERFAX]* 18
Chernomyrdin, Tajikistan's Abdullodzhanov Hold Moscow Talks *[INTERFAX]* 18
Chernomyrdin, Moldovan Delegation Agree on USSR Assets *[INTERFAX]* 19
Official Comments on Latvia Troop Withdrawal Talks *[ITAR TASS]* 19
Interior Minister Returns to Moscow From India *[Moscow Radio]* 19
Yeltsin Approves Naval Exercise With Kuwait *[INTERFAX]* 19
Kolosovskiy Transferred From Washington to Geneva *[INTERFAX]* 20
Prospects for Bosnia 'Remain Vague' *[INTERFAX]* 20
Potapov on Possible Extension of NATO, Russia's Position *[Moscow International]* 20
Kozyrev on Russia's Attitude Toward NATO *[Moscow Radio]* 21
Commentary Views West's Responsibility After Coup *[IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 21

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Impending 'Reorganization' of Government Viewed *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 24 Oct]* 23
Rumors of Security Services' Shakeup 'Well Founded'

[NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA 20 Oct] 23
Government Leaders' 19 Oct Activities Reported *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 20 Oct]* 24
White House Trial Attorneys Will Be 'Familiar Faces' *[IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 24
'White House Snipers' Said Security Ministry Staffers
[NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA 20 Oct] 24
Official Comments on Investigation of Recent Events
[NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA 19 Oct] 25
Presidential Defense Adviser Views Oct Events *[St. Petersburg TV]* 26
Soldiers Missing in 3-4 Oct Events Found *[ITAR-TASS]* 28
Former Deputies Stand Firm in Fight for Housing *[ITAR-TASS]* 28
Filatov on Government Members Holding Deputies Posts *[INTERFAX]* 28
'Final Text' of Constitution To Be Ready Early Nov *[Moscow Radio]* 29
Report on Latest Developments in 1991 Coup Plotters Trial *[Russian TV]* 29
First Part of Indictment Announced *[ITAR-TASS]* 29
Shakhray's PRUC Party Offers To Support Chernomyrdin *[INTERFAX]* 29

Election Issues

Yeltsin Not To Postpone Parliamentary Elections *[ITAR-TASS]* 30
Filatov on Preparations for Federal Assembly Elections *[Moscow TV]* 30
Chubays, Yavlinsky Explain Position of Election Blocs *[ITAR-TASS]* 31
Ryabov Interviewed on Election Preparations *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 20 Oct]* 31
Gaydar, Kostikov on Election, Political Blocs *[KURANTY 20 Oct]* 33
Commission Receives Parties' Candidate Lists *[INTERFAX]* 34
Sobchak Says Election Rules Being Amended Out of Necessity *[KURANTY 20 Oct]* 34
Chernomyrdin Not To Head Shakhray's Unity Party *[ITAR-TASS]* 34
Six Parties To Remain Barred From Elections *[INTERFAX]* 35
Suspended Parties' Approach to Elections Viewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Oct]* 35
Communist Party Participates in Pre-Election Campaign *[INTERFAX]* 36
Communists Call For Boycott of Elections *[Moscow TV]* 36
Revised Statute on Elections Criticized *[IZVESTIYA 12 Oct]* 36
Democratic Russia's Members Unhappy With Party Chiefs
[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 20 Oct] 38
Socialist Workers Party Sets Up Opposition Bloc *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 38
Republican Party Discusses Joining Election Bloc *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 38

Media Issues

Press Secretary Promoted to Ministerial Rank *[Moscow TV]* 39
Moscow To Look Into Media's Role in 3-4 Oct Events *[ITAR-TASS]* 39
Government Says Papers 'Suspended,' Not Banned *[Moscow TV]* 40
PRAVDA To Be Known as PUT PRAVDY Under New Editor
[NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA 20 Oct] 40
Viktor Loshak To Head MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 24 Oct]* 40
SOVETSKIY PATRIOT To Sue Censors *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Oct]* 40

Economic Issues

Fedorov Discusses Financial Stabilization *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 20 Oct]* 41
Leaked Draft Edict Sparks Protests in Insurance Industry *[IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 42
Official Relates Privatization Figures *[ITAR-TASS]* 43
Sales of Antonov Heavy Transport Planes Defended *[Russian TV]* 43

Regional Affairs

Yeltsin's Edict on Regional Governments Previewed *[SEGODNYA 19 Oct]* 44
Discussions of Dissolving Local Soviets Continue 44
Chukotka Local Soviets Dissolved *[IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 44
Kabardino-Balkarian Discusses Reform *[NEZAVISMAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 45
Amur Oblast Soviet Suspended *[Radio Rossii]* 45
Samara Regional Soviet Dissolved *[INTERFAX]* 45

Muscovites Polled on Economic Situation *[KURANTY 20 Oct]* 45
Majority of Muscovites in Poll Support Army's Actions *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 46
Reshuffle in St Petersburg City Government Reported *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 20 Oct]* 46
Ryabov Urges Regions To Postpone Local Elections *[ITAR-TASS]* 47
Political Situation in Dagestan Reviewed *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 47
Buryatia Prepares for Elections, Referendum *[ITAR-TASS]* 47
Yeltsin Appoints Komornik Representative in Sakhalin *[Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk TV]* 48
Sakhalin Administration Takes Over Executive Functions *[Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk TV]* 48
Sakhalin Soviet Session Postponed for Lack of Quorum *[Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk TV]* 48
Sakhalin Military Holds Exercise for Oblast Leaders *[Russian TV]* 48
Deputy Prime Minister Yarov Visits Northern Fleet Base *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Oct]* 49
Government Delegation Visits Northern Region *[Moscow TV]* 49

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Kiev Protests Detention of Vessels on Danube by Serbs *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 19 Oct]* 50
Kravchuk, Clinton May Meet Before Year's End *[INTERFAX]* 50
Government, UN Officials Discuss Rapid Deployment Force *[UNIAN]* 50
Experts Sign Intentions Protocol on Nuclear Arms *[URYADOVYY KURYER 19 Oct]* 50
Parliamentarian on Pressure To Sign Nuclear Treaty *[Kiev International]* 51
Sevastopol Coastal Defense Chief on Division's Status *[KIEVSKIYE NOVOSTI 8 Oct]* 51
Black Sea Fleet Officer Refutes Dissolution Report *[UNIAN]* 52
Official on Gas, Oil Supplies From Russia, Debt *[POST-POSTUP 7 Oct]* 52
Trade, Economic Links Discussed With Uzbekistan *[ITAR-TASS]* 52
Interior Ministry Signs Agreement With Turkey *[UNIAN]* 52

National Affairs

Supreme Council Continues Plenary Session 53
National Bank Head Addresses Council *[Kiev International]* 53
Economy Minister Addresses Council *[Kiev International]* 53
Landyk, Onopenko Address Council *[UNIAR]* 54
Report on Afternoon Session *[UNIAN]* 54
Plyushch Urges 50-Seat Limit *[UNIAN]* 55
Council Decides To Maintain Chernobyl *[Kiev International]* 55
Protocol on Demarcation of Powers Signed with Crimea *[IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 55
General Supports Calls for Armed Forces Reduction *[UNIAR]* 55
Defense Minister Supervises Command, Staff Training *[URYADOVYY KURYER 19 Oct]* 56
Nationalists Urge Kravchuk To Recognize, Arm National Guard *[UKRAYINSKI OBRIYI Oct]* 56
President Kravchuk's Preelection Tactics Viewed *[KHRESHCHATYK 9 Oct]* 56
Article Views Prospects for Presidential Candidates
[UNIAN OHLYADY, KOMENTARI, PROHNOZY 18 Oct] 57
Justice Ministry Registers New Party in Crimea *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 58

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Shushkevich Leaves Bulgaria After Two-Day Visit *[ITAR-TASS]* 60
Kravchenko Hopes Japan Will Aid Removal of Nuclear Arms *[INTERFAX]* 60
Shushkevich Comments on Banning Communist Party *[BELORUSKIY RYNOK Oct]* 60
Myasnikovich Briefs Foreign Envoys on Economic Reform *[RESPUBLIKA 14 Oct]* 60
Opposition Popular Front Holds Rally To View Moscow Events *[DOBRY VECHAR 11 Oct]* 60
Deputy Outlines Proposals for Supreme Soviet *[NARODNAYA GAZETA 28 Sep]* 61
Experts View Outlook for Economic Union *[FEMIDA 4 Oct]* 62
Shushkevich Adviser Views Absence of Reform Program *[EVROPEYSKOYE VREMYA Oct]* 64

Moldova

Commander of 14th Army Gen Lebed Departs for Moscow *[BASAPRESS]* 65
Tiraspol Supreme Soviet Opposes Lebed's Resignation *[BASAPRESS]* 65
Snegur Appeals to Dniester To Help Enhance Independence *[BASAPRESS]* 65
Politicians Discuss Resolving Dniester Issue *[BASAPRESS]* 66
Official Urges Political Dialogue With Dniester *[IZVESTIYA 19 Oct]* 66
Tiraspol Regards Tau's UN Speech as Anti-Dniester *[BASAPRESS]* 67
Reintegration Party's Druc Foresees Union With Romania
[Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA 16 Oct] 67
Parliament Session Adopts Election Law *[BASAPRESS]* 68
Production Declines, 11-Percent Unemployment *[BASAPRESS]* 68

CENTRAL ASIA

Kyrgyzstan

Iraa's Rafsanjani Arrives in Bishek From Uzbekistan *[Tehran IRNA]* 69
Meets With Akayev *[Tehran Radio]* 69

Tajikistan

Troops Killed in Battle With 'Islamic Opposition' *[INTERFAX]* 70
Russian Border Guards Detain 8 'Infiltrators' *[INTERFAX]* 70
Prime Minister Abdulfodzhonov Meets Officials in Moscow *[Dushanbe Radio]* 70
State Monopoly on Sales and Production Increases *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 70

Turkmenistan

Article Questions Official Version of Afghan Bombing *[SEGODNYA 19 Oct]* 71
Niyazov Discusses Security With Russian Commander *[ITAR-TASS]* 72
Niyazov Confirms Date of Introduction of Currency *[INTERFAX]* 72

Uzbekistan

Iranian Leaders Continue Visit in Tashkent *[IZVESTIYA 20 Oct]* 72
Velayati Meets Mutalov, Asymov *[Tehran TV]* 73
Documents Signed *[UZBEKISTAN APN]* 73

CAUCASUS

Armenia

Parliament Discusses Economy, Security Aid for Georgia *[Yerevan Radio]* 74
President May Send Aid Unilaterally *[SNARK]* 74
Official: UN Resolution on Karabakh 'Acceptable' *[ARMENPRESS]* 74
Karabakh Leader Welcomes UN Resolution, Faults Wording *[ARMENPRESS]* 75
Further on Objections *[SNARK]* 75
Positive Assessments Made of President's First 2 Years *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]* 75

Georgia

Fighting With Gamsakhurdia Forces Continues in West 75
Attack Launched Toward Tskhaltubo *[IBERIA]* 75
Clashes in Khoni Area *[Radio Rossii]* 76
Lanchkhuti Recaptured From Zviadists *[ITAR-TASS]* 76
'Rebels' Capture Tskhaltubo, Gvishtibi *[Paris AFP]* 76
Karkarashvili in Kutaisi *[IBERIA]* 77
Zviadists Attack Kutaisi, Gvishtibi *[Tbilisi TV]* 77
State Troops Reportedly Recapture 3 Towns *[Moscow TV]* 77
Recapture of 3 Towns Denied *[Russian TV]* 78

Shevardnadze Appeals for Neighbors' Military Aid *[IZVESTIYA 20 oct]* 78
Gugushvili Urges Neighbors Not To Intervene *[INTERFAX]* 79
Shevardnadze's Press Service Statement on Situation *[Tbilisi TV]* 79
Tbilisi Officials Hold News Conference in Moscow 79
Tbilisi Ready To Talk With Abkhazians *[Moscow TV]* 79
Tbilisi Presents Terms for Settlement *[Moscow Radio]* 80
Envoy Supports Joining CIS *[ITAR-TASS]* 80
Human Rights Leader Comments *[ITAR-TASS]* 80
Adzharian Chief Adopting Militant Neutrality in Talks *[Moscow Radio]* 81
Warrants Issued for Arrest of Gamsakhurdia, Others *[Tbilisi TV]* 81
UN To Send Human Rights Group to Abkhazia, Tbilisi *[Paris AFP]* 81

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Foreign Minister Velliste Pays Visit to India *[ETA NEWS BULLETIN]* 82
Returns From Trip *[ETA NEWS RELEASE]* 82
Laar Discusses Cooperation With NATO Officials in Brussels *[BNS]* 82
Government Signs Free Trade Protocol With Finland *[BNS]* 82
Interior Minister Expresses Support for Russian Counterpart *[BNS]* 82
Official Says Estonia Has No Territorial Claims on Russia *[INTERFAX]* 83
Sweden Sends Aid Consignment for Defense Forces *[BNS]* 83
Kaitseliit Aims To Become 'Military' Organization *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Oct]* 83
Finance Ministry Says 1994 Budget Balanced *[BNS]* 83

Latvia

Yeltsin Invites Legislators To Observe 12 Dec Elections *[BNS]* 84
Yeltsin Thanks Ulmanis for Support During 'Crisis' *[INTERFAX]* 84
Ulmanis Objects to Russian Use of Radar Base After Pullout *[INTERFAX]* 84
Ulmanis Says NATO Membership Not Priority Issue *[INTERFAX]* 84
President Ulmanis Discusses First 100 Days in Office *[IZVESTIYA 20 Oct]* 85

Lithuania

Brazauskas Views German Support for Integration Into Europe *[Hamburg DPA]* 86
Brazauskas Nominates Linkevicius Defense Minister *[INTERFAX]* 87
Brigade Leaders on Fall Draft, Problems With Reenlistment *[TIESA 6 Oct]* 87
Former Military Chief Comments on Mutiny by Volunteers *[TIESA 28 Sep]* 87
Seimas Leader Views Results of 'Preventive Detention' Law *[RESPUBLIKA 21 Sep]* 89
Security Committee Head Explains Resignation *[TIESA 1 Oct]* 90

Lukin on Ties With U.S., Political Plans

MK2010141593 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 43, 24 Oct 93 (signed to press 19 Oct) p A15

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, Russian ambassador to Washington, by Yuriy Sigov in Washington; date not given; "specially for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI: "Vladimir Lukin: Cooperate But Not at the Expense of One's Own Interests"]

[Text] [Sigov] It seems that the tragic events in Moscow have substantially changed the Americans' attitude to Russia. In spite of the support by the Washington administration for Boris Yeltsin, increasingly voices are being heard in the United States that a return to dictatorship is occurring in Russia....

[Lukin] In the days of the political crisis in Moscow our embassy in Washington was constantly briefing the U.S. Administration about the situation in Russia and also sought to ensure moral support on the part of the United States for the democratic changes in our country. Apparently this has helped generally to preserve in America the image of Russia as a state seeking a just social system. In other words, the majority of Americans supported the president's actions during the latest events in Moscow. Yet I cannot call this support unqualified. The United States expects Boris Yeltsin to fulfill in the very near future all of his promises about free elections, the legalization of political parties (with the exception of the openly fascist ones), and so forth. What will happen in the future? How is one to relate to the fact that sometimes America tells Russia how it should live? When this is done in the form of a wish, all right, but when it is presented in the form of mandatory recommendations, here self-respect must be shown. After all, we in Russia need democracy far more than the Americans do.

[Sigov] During the "parliamentary standoff" the anti-American mood rose sharply in Russia. The Chernomyrdin government was being accused of open collusion with the CIA and that Moscow was dominated by U.S. advisers. How do you account for these attacks against a country that is probably our main ally?

[Lukin] It seems to me that the people of Russia as a nation have now been strongly traumatized psychologically. We have been accustomed to being a superpower, and at present Russia's prestige abroad is extremely low. Hence the irritation against the other thriving superpower (which, incidentally, has plenty of its own problems). This negative attitude, however, is promoted by the not always tactful nor discreet position toward Russia on the part of the Americans themselves.

Sometimes U.S. representatives try as much as to lead transformations in Russia. This, undoubtedly, traumatizes the Russian side, but unfortunately we also have people suffering from romantic masochism, who have frozen in a tender kiss with America. I am sure that cooperation with America can and should be promoted but not to the detriment of our own political and economic interests.

[Sigov] For a long time you have been a member of the Russian parliament and head of one of its committees. How did you react to its dissolution and was this move by Boris Yeltsin inevitable?

[Lukin] The dissolution of parliament is a normal thing in principle but not in the way it was undertaken. Everything that happened I perceived as a tragedy, although not an unexpected one. Back when Khasbulatov was being elected to the post of chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet I raised the question about his incompetence, although Democratic Russia on the contrary supported him. My opinion about the Russian parliament remains the same—it should be not an alternative power branch but a constructive partner and opponent of the executive branch. In his turn, the speaker must become the organizer of parliamentary activities and not an alternative leader of the country.

Unfortunately, at present Russia is going through a period of negative precedents, but now at last a chance has emerged to create a normal parliamentary structure. Maybe this is our last opportunity to take a major stride toward real democracy, and it would be a crime to miss it.

[Sigov] Nearly all the Russian papers have recently reported your resignation. Are you not going to leave Washington and join the political struggle in the face of the upcoming elections in Russia?

[Lukin] I believe that one can quite successfully work as ambassador (like, for instance, Yuriy Ryzhov in Paris) and have one's own political views. I liked my job in parliament and I was appointed ambassador at the president's will, not as a result of "career efforts." In contrast to many "pseudo-democrats," I have never revised my views; I am an anti-revolutionary democrat and I support the reforms but without social upheavals.

As for the persistent rumors about my independent position which allegedly differs from the position of the Russian leadership, I am an ambassador and I simply may not start "claiming my rights in America" [kachat prava]. Let them show me just one word or action that differs in its content from the president's views. My thesis about "enlightened patriotism" has always been supported by Yeltsin and therefore it is hardly correct to regard me as an "outsider" in the Russian diplomatic corps abroad.

Now about by removal from the post of ambassador. I am not being summoned back to Moscow—I am going there for vacation and also to take part in the Constitutional Assembly, of which I am a member. In any event I cannot possibly be intimidated by my Motherland, but I am concerned over the fate of parliamentarianism in Russia. I will contest elections to new power structures.

but I am not going to form my own political party. If I am affiliated with one of the political parties, I will not be seeking leadership in it.

Why? As Anatole France said: "I do not want to trim my brains by joining some political party." I want reforms for my country but I do not want it to be a country for reforms. Russia cannot be squeezed into the framework of other systems; all of us should show greater tolerance to each other and less conceit. At the same time, I would not like our generation to "pass away with sadness and repentance"—it can still do a lot for Russian reforms and I hope that this time around the new ideas will not, as before, hang in the air but will be implemented consistently.

U.S. Secretary of State on Aims of Visit to Russia

LD2010213993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1837 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Korolev]

[Text] Washington, 20 Oct—U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has declared in an exclusive interview to an ITAR-TASS correspondent and to the Ostankino Radio and TV Company that the upcoming negotiations in Moscow will be "a talk between friends" about what is happening in your country at the present time. He left today for an official visit to Russia and some other independent states. He had agreed to meet the Russian journalists on the eve of his visit in order to tell them about the aims of this visit.

"I am going to Moscow at this historical moment in order to confirm the support for democracy in Russia, for market reforms, and for President Yeltsin, that President Clinton has already declared many times during the last several months," the head of the foreign policy department noted. At the same time "I want to express anxiety over the process of democratization as well as your economy."

Russia, he explained, is seeking a way "out of the very difficult situation," that arose as a result of the fact that its government "faced a challenge from people attempting to displace it." Now, however, there is to be seen a "lowering of tension, some of the harsh measures are being lifted, and to a great extent, life is returning to normal."

W. Christopher said that one of the central topics on the agenda of his talks in the Russian capital will be preparations for a possible summit between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who "are becoming good friends." I spoke of this with President Clinton and I "can say that he is very much looking forward to this meeting." A specific date for it has not yet been set, but it seems that the summit talks "could take place in the first half of January next year," the secretary of state indicated. The U.S. President, he said, wants first and foremost, to demonstrate in this way the United States resolute support for the process of democratization and market reforms in Russia, and also to discuss with its leader "a lengthy list of international and bilateral problems and regional issues."

In addition to this, the most important themes of the Moscow discussion will be the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the new independent states, Russia's progression toward democracy, our country's economic development, and transition to the market system. In this connection, the issue of how U.S. aid is used will be discussed and, finally, regional peace and stability, in which context "Nagorno-Karabakh will be discussed, as well as the possible expansion of NATO" by bringing in countries of former Eastern Europe. The secretary of state made a point of stressing that this problem "should be settled taking account of the concern Russia is showing." We want to assure Russia that it is not excluded from this process, he said. It is important that "friendship between the United States and Russia becomes stronger, flourishes, and is not clouded by some disagreements or other."

On the issue of the prospects of developing economic cooperation, Warren Christopher said that U.S. private business wants to invest money in Russia but needs to see that it has become a stable country. He expressed the hope that the coming elections "would help create a climate in which U.S. business would not have to worry about its investments," or about a sudden flare-up of violence, ruling out any possibility of them receiving their profits—which are the prerequisite for development of any serious business contacts. "I think that the recent events in Russia could create the foundations for a more stable economic climate, which could draw bigger U.S. investment," the state secretary emphasized.

Replying to an "Ostankino" correspondent's question whether a meeting with representatives of the Russian-speaking community in Latvia, scheduled by the visit, was meant to be a certain signal to the leaders of the Baltic states, the head of the foreign policy department said: "Yes, this is one of my aims." At the recent meetings with the presidents of the three Baltic states at the UN General Assembly in New York, Bill Clinton was talking about the necessity of more flexibility with regard to the Russian-speaking citizens, and I will be talking along the same lines, he noted. It is important that "the human rights of the Russian population in the Baltic states are fully observed, and this problem should be tackled with tact and flexibility," Warren Christopher added.

Strobe Talbott Views Context of Moscow Summit

PM2110075593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Nadein report on interview with special ambassador Strobe Talbott: "What Bill Clinton Will Say to Boris Yeltsin When He Comes to Moscow"]

[Text] Washington—"President Clinton is greatly looking forward to going to Moscow," special ambassador Strobe Talbott, the main architect of the present

U.S. Administration's policy with regard to the countries of the former Soviet Union, said.

The task and aims of Bill Clinton's visit, planned for the beginning of next year, will be discussed during U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's talks with the Russian leaders when he goes to Moscow at the end of this week. Ambassador Talbott does not see any serious obstacles in the way of his president's trip to Russia, we just need to set a "date that is convenient for both sides."

In reply to a question about the reasons for the U.S. Administration's resolute support for President Boris Yeltsin, Ambassador Talbott chose first to give the general picture as he sees it.

"My feeling is that the trends in your country are generally favorable—first and foremost favorable for the Russians themselves. I think that is true both for the political sphere and for the economic sphere."

Where does Washington start from when assessing the situation in Russia? Strobe Talbott described the criteria in the most general terms:

"As far as possible from dictatorship and as near as possible to democracy."

"As far as possible from a command economy and as near as possible to a market economy."

"As far as possible from the kind of foreign policy that typified the old Soviet Union and as near as possible to what we call 'live and let live.'" In other words, Talbott said, clarifying the last point, Russia's respecting its neighbors' independence and sovereignty.

On all three points Russia has made obvious progress over the past year, the ambassador said, expressing the U.S. Government's position.

Allow me to make some more general observations connected with the perception of the events of this remarkable year, Talbott said before answering a question about the U.S. Administration's assessment of events in Russia after 3 October. If you look at these events in an abstract way, out of context, then very many Americans, indeed many Russians as well, would certainly not support them. In March President Yeltsin effectively imposed the 25 April referendum on parliament. On 21 September he suspended parliament, and, essentially, the Constitution as well.

But things which in normal circumstances would have caused protests and objections from the Americans appeared to them in the particular conditions to be worthy of support.

Strobe Talbott explained the reasons for this apparent ambiguity as follows:

In both cases, in March-April and then in September-October, President Yelsin went directly to the people. He demolished the impasses that had caused the government so much harm, but he demolished them in such a way that all the points at issue were presented for the citizens of Russia to judge directly. The March-April impasse was resolved via a referendum. The September-October impasse via the 12 December elections.

It was this criterion "we applied when we met in the White House or State Department and discussed what our position should be in connection with President Yeltsin's speech on 20 March or 21 September," Talbott said.

Each time the answer was: A step has been taken toward democracy, "and that is why we support President Yeltsin."

According to Talbott, some promising events have occurred since 3 October: "The state of emergency has been lifted. Preparations continue for the 12 December elections, and, apparently, they are very serious preparations for real elections."

"This very morning," the ambassador said, "I received information from my colleagues in Moscow about a number of groups and parties that have already announced their intention to participate in the elections, and also about politicians that have put their names forward. They all represent a very broad spectrum of political views."

But, Talbott remarked, there are, of course, some measures adopted by the authorities since 3 October "which we are keeping a very close eye on. We in the United States attach special importance to freedom of the press. We regard freedom of the press as an essential part of democracy."

Strobe Talbott, who worked as a journalist in the Soviet Union, wrote several books about it, and has a good command of the language, believes that it has been a very special year in Russian history:

"We knew and you knew that a difficult road lay ahead, and that there were potholes in that road, but the problems turned out to be serious. There was bloodshed. It was a human tragedy of major proportions, but the faces and words of those who rebelled against the government are unforgettable. They were a reminder of the terrible past."

Asked by your correspondent whether the United States would adjust its practical policy if the early presidential elections were postponed or called off, which is something some of Boris Yeltsin's colleagues often talk about, Strobe Talbott replied:

"Our position is that the holding of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 12 December is the most important thing. Of course, we are following the debate that is taking place in your country in connection with presidential elections. We believe, however, that it is for the

Russians themselves to conduct this debate. We do not think we can express our view or comment on what option is to be preferred."

As far as everything connected with the elections is concerned, we do not see anything that would make us doubt the need to continue to support President Yeltsin, special ambassador Strobe Talbott told IZVESTIYA.

He also spoke highly of the Russian authorities' intention to invite international observers to the elections and gave assurances that there would certainly be U.S. representatives among them.

Talbott was troubled by Russian laws that do not guarantee the protection of private property and foreign investments. Although he noted that the Americans must do just as much to lower the barriers in the way of mutually advantageous contacts.

"When President Clinton goes to Moscow," Talbott said, "he will try to tell President Yeltsin about as many relics of the cold war as possible that are now (or will be by then) part of the past."

Financial Corporation Head on U.S. Investment

LD2010165493 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0525 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Report by unidentified correspondent interspersed with recorded remarks by Andrey Nechayev, president of the Russian Financial Corporation; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The United States of America has granted $2.5 billion worth of credit. This has been approved by the U.S. Congress. The funds are going toward direct investment in Russian industry.

[Correspondent] The functions of agent of the Council of Ministers—the government of the Russian Federation—for the mobilization and targeted use of resources for financing top priority investment programs have been entrusted to state enterprises of the Russian Financial Corporation [RFC]. The RFC has already held talks with many U.S. state agencies responsible for backing American investments abroad.

[Nechayev] As a rule, the American type of investment involves direct participation rather than giving credit. In other words, they directly supply equipment or provide financial resources, but become co-owners of the given enterprise.

[Correspondent] Major American banks have applied to the RFC requesting assistance in finding and selecting highly effective investment projects. Offers from all Russian structures have already started to come in.

[Nechayev] Of course, we will give preference to medium-sized projects that will ensure rapid recoupment, a rapid payback, rather than to gigantic projects. Now we are cooperating openly. In addition, it appears that at last the Russian Government is going to implement its earlier decision to set up an investment fund of the corporation. So, I think that very soon we will have the opportunity to tackle precisely those tasks for which the corporation was set up, in other words, to provide proper support for investment projects in top priority sectors.

[Correspondent] In spite of the typical view that enterprises of gas and oil production and refining industries are highly profitable, there are also very interesting projects in timber processing and the processing of agricultural produce and considerable attention ought to be paid to textile enterprises. Many foreign companies are already ready to invest funds in them.

Kozyrev on Two-Day Official Visit to France

LD2010080293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0710 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow, 20 Oct—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev left Moscow for Paris this morning.

During this two-day official visit to France, dedicated to the centenary of the Russian-French union, the head of the Russian Foreign Policy Department is expected to have talks with Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, President Francois Mitterrand, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, and other officials.

It is expected that two agreements—on the issue of dismantling Russia's nuclear weapons and on cooperation in ensuring reliability and safety in transporting nuclear weapons in Russia—will be signed.

Holds Talks With Mitterrand

LD2010144093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1412 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Andrey Krasnoshchekov, Viktor Khrekov, and Igor Shchegolev]

[Text] Paris October 20 TASS—Visiting Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met with French President Francois Mitterrand in Paris on Wednesday [20 October] to discuss bilateral relations and a wide range of international issues.

Meeting with journalists, Kozyrev stressed that further development and strengthening of bilateral relations will be based on the Russian-French treaty signed during President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Paris in February 1992.

Among the key topics discussed was Europe's future and ways to ensure that "Russia and other states do not be left outside the European processes, but on the contrary find their place, worthy and independent, in the European concept." "This is what lends special significance

to the Russo-French treaty about a cordial accord the 100th anniversary of which will be marked this year," Kozyrev said.

Galina Sidorova, the Russian foreign minister's political adviser, explained on Wednesday that the main purpose of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's current official visit to France is to continue the Russo-French dialogue in the new conditions, to contribute to the implementation of the Russo-French treaty, and to discuss key international problems.

During the visit, the sides are expected to sign two intergovernmental agreements—on cooperation in dismantling Russian nuclear weapons, and on cooperation in ensuring the dependability and safety of nuclear weapons transportation in Russia.

"Much attention," the adviser noted, "will be devoted to preparations for the upcoming visit by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur to Moscow, scheduled for November 1-2, 1993."

"During the talks in Paris," Sidorova stated, "Russia wants to start a dialogue on ways to switch the statements of Western leaders on solidarity and support for Russia's democratic reforms to the concrete rails of practical partnership. The point is that two clear-cut tendencies are now appearing in the West. On the one hand, we hear statements expressing support for President Yeltsin's actions, while, on the other, there are fears amidst some sections of public opinion lest Russia should pursue an imperialist policy vis-a-vis the republics of the former USSR. At the same time, some sections of our public opinion believe that the West is adhering to a wait-and-see policy and refraining from real acts of assistance and partnership. We shall try to jointly rebuff the skeptics during these talks."

Talks With French Premier

LD2010202193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1830 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Andrey Krasnoshchekov, Yuriy Lopatin, Viktor Khrekov and Igor Shchegolev]

[Text] Paris, 20 Oct—"Having an ally in the center of Europe such as France is not a bad thing for Russia," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said commenting on the results of today's meeting in the Matignon Palace with French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur. The Russian minister is in the French capital on an official visit.

Replying to the ITAR-TASS correspondent's question about the subjects raised during the talks, Kozyrev said: "The French prime minister and I today discussed not only how to revive the traditions of comity between the two countries, which have their roots in the Russo-French alliance concluded 100 years ago, but also how to tackle new tasks." I would name these as the problems of developed and mature partnership between Russia and France, he stressed, noting that relations between the two countries were being built on a strong contractual basis.

The French prime minister expressed two fundamental ideas with which I cannot help agreeing with, Kozyrev continued. First, it is necessary to do everything to bring Russia into a united Europe, and France will continue to be an ally on this path. Second, the Western countries should have done and could still do more than has been done to support Russia's movement towards democracy and implementation of the economic reforms.

In connection with the coming visit of the head of the French Government to Moscow at the beginning of November, the Russian minister expressed the confidence that "it will be not just a tribute to diplomatic tradition but a very full business conversation on political and economic questions."

Discusses Elections

LD2010204593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1857 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Andrey Krasnoshchekov, Viktor Khrekov and Igor Shchegolev]

[Text] Paris October 20 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met with Valery Giscard d'Estaing, chairman of the French Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, on Wednesday to discuss democratic processes, upcoming parliamentary elections and adoption of a new constitution in Russia.

They also discussed Giscard d'Estaing's proposal to send Western observers to the Russian parliamentary elections scheduled for December 12, 1993. The Russian delegation expressed concern about possible violations of the voting procedure during the elections by hardliners who still have some influence in regions and are unwilling to give in.

The sides stressed that democratic elections and adoption of a new constitution would facilitate Russia's integration into the Council of Europe.

Signs Accord on Dismantling Nuclear Arms

LD2110075693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2153 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Andrey Krasnoshchekov, Yuriy Lopatin, Viktor Khrekov, and Igor Shchegolev]

[Text] Paris, 21 Oct—The talks between Russian and French Foreign Ministers Andrey Kozyrev and Alain Juppe ended here on Wednesday evening with the signing of Russian-French agreements on cooperation in dismantling nuclear weapons in Russia, and on cooperation to ensure the reliability and safety of the transportation of nuclear weapons in Russia. The heads of the

two countries' foreign policy departments discussed a broad range of international problems and preparations for the visit to Russia by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur at the beginning of November.

In a meeting with journalists prior to the signing ceremony, A. Kozyrev noted that the documents are a development of accords reached earlier, and provide "some financial and technical assistance for Russia in the destruction of its nuclear armaments." It is a matter in particular of the French side providing several dismantlement machine tools and of storage facilities and means to transport the relevant materials. The minister stressed that it will be a "very specific contribution toward eliminating the nuclear threat that has hung over the world for the last 50 years."

In his turn A. Juppe recalled that France has already made a decision to allocate Russia 400 million francs in the next few years to assist in the implementation of nuclear weapon dismantling programs. Under the present agreements, the French minister specified, Russia will be provided with the first part of this aid amounting to 160 million francs.

Comments on Bilateral Talks

LD2110082093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0652 GMT 21 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Andrey Krasnoshchekov, Yuriy Lopatin, Viktor Khrekov and Igor Shchegolev]

[Text] Paris October 21 TASS—Russia intends to rely on its own forces and cooperate with friendly states in developing democracy and implementing economic reforms, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said here on Wednesday, speaking to journalists after talks with his French counterpart Alain Juppe.

Democratically elected president Boris Yeltsin and Russian Government will continue to push for free elections to parliament and to follow the course of democratic reforms, Kozyrev stressed.

Commenting on the situation in Georgia at the request of journalists, the minister stressed that Russia does not plan to interfere in that republic's domestic affairs.

He noted at the same time that Russia, at the request of the three Transcaucasian republics, would participate in ensuring the non-stop operation of a railway running from the Poti port to Tbilisi and farther on to Yerevan and Baku, since it is of vital importance for the region.

In turn, Juppe reaffirmed France's support for changes in Russia, aimed at democratising and implementing economic reforms.

Describing the talks on wednesday, the French minister said that the sides pointed to "concurrence of positions on many issues" when discussing bilateral relations, international issues, including prospects for European construction.

Further on Visit

W42010180193

For French reportage on the visit to France by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, including reports on his meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand, see the France section of the 21 October and subsequent issues of the West Europe DAILY REPORT.

Kozyrev Writes on Russian-French Relations

PM2010124993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 9

[Article by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev: "Russia and France: Continuity of the Entente Cordiale"]

[Text] The 100th anniversary of the Russo-French alliance which is marked this year is a pretext not only for rereading one of the most significant chapters in our common history, but also for pondering the role of the traditional cooperation of Russia and France in the contemporary world.

The military-political alliance created in 1891-1893 tied the historical destinies of our countries closely together. Twice within this 100 years they have been not simply allies, but also comrades in arms. The phenomenon of the Russo-French "entente cordiale" survived not only its own era, but also the very alliance which gave birth to it. Decades after this alliance was annulled by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, its spirit and traditions, like the light of an extinguished star, continued to cast a reflection on the relations of the two countries. This light now scarcely flickered in periods of cold war crises, now flared up once more during the "detente" of the seventies and the "new thinking" of the eighties. Even in difficult times relations between our countries remained an important factor in European and world politics.

An exhibition dedicated to the 100 years of the Russo-French alliance which has opened in Paris testifies to the fact that it was formed not only behind the tightly closed doors of diplomatic chancelleries but also with the participation of thousands of Russians and Frenchmen, especially those who solemnly welcomed a French squadron to Kronstadt in 1891 and Russian naval seamen to Toulon in October 1893. It is these events that are the initial sources of the nationwide consensus in our countries on which the policy of Russo-French accord and cooperation was and is based.

Today these reminiscences are doubly dear to us. Russia is returning to its history. The continuity of Russia's national and spiritual traditions, broken by decades of the dominion of ideological myths, is being restored. This, naturally, applies to the best traditions of our diplomacy, including Russo-French relations. The question now is how to manage this inheritance in the interests of our countries and of Europe.

Traditionally, the basis of the Russo-French alliance was opposition to German militarism and Nazism. As a result of fundamental changes in Europe, above all historical reconciliation between France and Germany and a radical transformation in Russo-German relations, this opposition has finally become a thing of the past. Long-time opponents have become allies and partners. Are there grounds today for an alliance between Russia and France, and where does the contemporary sense of such an alliance lie?

To General de Gaulle belongs the idea that a need for such an alliance would emerge at every new juncture of history. This idea found reflection in the treaty between Russia and France signed in February 1992 by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Francois Mitterrand. While inheriting all the best that has been accumulated in the course of the last 100 years, the new relations of our countries are turned toward the future. The treaty places them at the service of the interests of building a united Europe based on law, democracy, and economic freedom. It is an alliance not "against" but "for."

Let us be realists: Considerable time and effort is still required in order to make our continent a united area. In some respects we have yet to reach the level of openness of Europe 1893, in which there existed less obstacles to the free movement of people, although of a more restricted social circle.

At the same time there has never been such a powerful unifying factor in Europe in the whole of its history as the desire of the overwhelming majority of European peoples to live in conditions of democracy and the market economy. This not only keeps at bay the threat to European peace, but also gives us an opportunity to finally break with the fallacious system of alliances pitting certain European states against others.

These evaluations are not an indication of the romanticism of newly converted democrats, but of a deliberate choice of the only correct road to a safe future for Europe. Let us recall that it was the maturity of democratic and integration processes which enabled France and Germany to bury the "hatchet." It was the democratic revolutions in Russia and East Europe which put an end to the cold war and the schism of Europe.

A guarantee of further progress along this path is the solidarity of the democratic forces of East and West. Recent events connected with the rout of the communo-fascist mutiny in Moscow once more demonstrated all the drama of this challenge.

However, the solidarity of European democracies has not yet been transformed into full-scale cooperation. The difficulties being experienced in the postcommunist area of the continent provoke in many people in West Europe the reflex of "retreating into themselves." Attempts are also being made to corroborate a new "Euro-fatalism" with references to the incompatibility of the Western and "Byzantine" branches of European culture. One after another projects emerge aimed at dividing up Europe with new barriers and "cordons sanitaires."

Solidarity and cooperation are measured not only by levels of financial and economic aid, which we value at its worth, or by useful advice, much of which we utilize. The most important thing is the elaboration of a joint strategy for resolving problems of a pan-European scale.

It is a question, first of all, of the need for mutual adaptation. We do not expect the West to attune itself to Russia, or Russia to copy the West in everything. It is a question of taking account of each other's interests in such a way as, when disagreements arise—and they are obviously inevitable—to resolve them in a spirit of cooperation.

Second, coordinated actions are needed to eliminate new conflicts in Europe. Russia has long been sounding the alarm over the threat of aggressive nationalism, which menaces not only the emergence of new bloody tragedies like Bosnia, but also a reversion by Europe to the bloc mentality, which divides states into "ours" and "theirs." Sarajevo is an ominous symbol of this threat, to which we have not yet elaborated a coordinated answer.

Russian also counts on support for its peacekeeping efforts within the former USSR, but let those who do not want to share this burden with us no longer speak to us about the threat of a new "Russian imperialism."

Third, the time has come to move away from programs of aid for the economic reforms in Russia to full-scale economic cooperation on the basis of the inclusion of our country in the world economy as a full participant. This naturally presupposes the removal of discriminatory restrictions on the development of trade and economic ties, inherited from the cold war.

Fourth, it is important to understand that pan-European challenges should be given pan-European answers. The hitherto standard reaction of our partners has been a desire to extend to the new democracies the operation of institutions which have proved their effectiveness in West Europe. But this approach by no means always responds to the character of the new problems. For example, the extension of NATO can hardly be an effective means of resolving "new generation" conflicts in Europe. In some cases this approach deprives neutral states of an active role, in others, it deprives Russia of such a role.

To artificially narrow down the European area to the framework of the "Europe of Maastricht" or of Central and East Europe means not only to present a gift to the forces of nationalism and xenophobia, but also to restrict Europe's ability to become one of the major poles of world development, alongside that of the Asiatic-Pacific and North American axes.

It is part of the traditions of Russo-French relations to think in categories of a "greater Europe" from the Atlantic to the Urals. These traditions have played a

major role in the elaboration of the principles of building the new Europe laid down in the CSCE member states' Paris Charter. The concept of a confederative structure of Europe which French President Mitterrand recently reiterated runs in the same channel.

Russia welcomes French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur's initiative aimed at strengthening European stability. It touches on the "raw nerve" of European policy—the problem of national minorities. The topicality of this problem is especially obvious in the area of the former USSR. The protection of national minorities—including, not in the last instance, the Russian-speaking population—from ethical purges and attempts to create a "monoethnic" state is developing into a serious challenge, not only of a humanitarian character, but also to international security.

We are ready to work together with France and other European partners to make this French initiative acquire a truly pan-European character. Especially since Russia and France have already put forward proposals within the framework of the CSCE aimed at strengthening stability in Europe—in particular at combattng aggressive nationalism.

Kozyrev Writes on Country's National Interests

MK2010121593 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 43, 24 Oct 93 (signed to press 19 Oct) p A15

[Article by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev: "Andrey Kozyrev: Partnership and Alliance Do Not Mean Merger"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has announced his readiness to join the pro-presidential election bloc "Russia's choice," while Vladimir Lukin, Russian ambassador to the United States, has stated his intention to run on the same ticket with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and Yuriy Boldyrev. The participation of two leading Russian diplomats in the election struggle returns society to debates about the priorities of Russia's foreign policy.

The tempestuous political fall in Moscow has already provided to analysts on both sides of the Atlantic a new impetus for the discussion on the subject of "the West—Russia." Some have fallen into a panic: There are too many problems and there is no way one can count on partnership. Others have rejoiced: At long last Russia's policy will merge with the policy of the United States and the West. And has any one ever posed this question: Partnership with whom?

Some politicians have again engaged in a search for certain "centrist leaders"—like Rutskoy and his colleagues in Civic Union, as they were seen in the past. The October drama, however, demonstrated that Russian society is dominated by two sociopolitical forces: the national-communists and the democrats. "Centrism" in between them is at best dead wood [boloto] and at worst political prostitution. It is not accidental that the "illusory center" is disappearing as the situation aggravates while its leaders find themselves either at the head of the red-browns or keep a very low profile and stay silent so as to side with the winners after a showdown. The genuine formula of centrism is a policy of radical reforms imparting stability to the rapidly changing society—like a cyclist who has dynamic stability only in movement.

At the same time it is obvious that the wide centralist democratic movement, whose symbol is Yeltsin, has not yet taken a sufficient shape. The association "Russia's Choice" was designed precisely to resolve this task. It seems that this bloc should be open for dialogue with all other movements of a democratic and market orientation. Moreover, "political fire" needs to opened on the "red-browns" and the pseudo-centrists covering them, but without any administrative bans—any closures, especially of media outlets, must be effected only through a judicial ruling. Otherwise we can see a repetition of the situation with the previous elections, whose leg[illegible]y was called into question. On the other hand, it is [illegible]tant to prevent the deputies from "changing co[illegible]ter the elections and to ensure "party oversight" over the parliamentary factions.

Western observers at elections in Russia would be fairly useful. Assistance for economic reforms in Russia oriented toward structural transformations, support for privatization and entrepreneurship is also extremely essential. A link between the entrepreneurs and the "reformers party" will consolidate the truly centrist democratic trend in Russia.

It is wrong to seek answers to everything that concerns the West on the part of Russia in the growing influence of the military establishment. A rapprochement between the CIS states has emerged—they are looking for a hand of the generals anxious to restore control in the former Union republics. They army has fulfilled its duty in suppressing the red-brown revolt in Moscow—they suspect that the Kremlin will move to an anti-Western course as payment for that support. Such an approach is akin to the position of the Russian "super-vigilantes" who still see an enemy the moment NATO is mentioned.

It is likewise incorrect to blame the military industrial complex for all problems under the sun and turn a blind eye to the difficulties and, what is the most important, to the real ways of reforming it. Russia has indeed inherited from the Soviet past a disproportionately large influence of the military factor. The task consists in, on the one hand, overcoming this imbalance, and on the other, in raising the prestige and the social protection of the army and other power structures under the supervision and in the interests of a civil society. The future democratic parliament is called upon to accelerate the solution of this problem which, in contrast to the Supreme Soviet, by virtue of its legitimacy, will not be trying to "buy the generals" over to their side. President Yeltsin's legitimacy is a legitimacy based on nationwide elections and a

referendum which constitutes his main difference from Gorbachev, who had no other power base except the power structures whose hostage he therefore became.

For democratic Russia the choice in favor of partnership and in the future in favor of a union with the West is natural. Sometimes one is amazed at how primitively the entire history has been compressed into a mere 70 years for many in this country and abroad. In fact, however, Russia has for centuries joined coalitions with those states which the ideological mythology of the second half of the 20th century has dubbed "Western." Partnership and alliance have never meant merging. Russia has and will continue to have its own interests. We intend, however, to maintain our interests not through confrontation but through interaction, as is practiced by Western allies in their interrelations.

It would be a mistake after the victory over the national-patriots to forget about the responsibility lying on Russia for protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities in the former republics of the USSR. Russia's rejection of peacekeeping activity in zones of conflict would threaten a "Yugoslav scenario" in the former USSR.

The consolidation of the centrist course toward reform—be it economic reforms, the state unity of the federation with the decentralization of the economy, or genuine peacekeeping activity in the post-Soviet space—is precisely the formula for transforming Russia. By helping its realization, the West will acquire not "the sick man of Eurasia"—what is more, with a nuclear truncheon—but a dynamic partner. Both we and "they" should not flee from cooperation because it seems insufficiently smooth to some. The responsible choice of Russia and the West is to build jointly a partnership based on realism and jointly overcome the difficulties that arise.

Grachev Visit to Finland 'Coming to a Close'

LD2010160593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1351 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] [Announcer] The visit of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is coming to a close. What issues were discussed during that trip? Our correspondent in Helsinki Dmitriy Kiselev reports.

[Kiselev] The possibility of Finland joining NATO in connection with the fact that it may become a member of the European Community was discussed during the visit. Besides that, Pavel Grachev had to answer questions here concerning the prospects of increasing conventional troops and armaments in the Leningrad Military District in northwest Russia.

While Pavel Grachev was holding talks at the president's palace, where he was received by Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho was in Brussels, and Finnish Foreign Affairs Minister Heikki Haavisto was in Washington. This means that Finland is playing a game of simultaneous chess on three boards at least. Finland has to settle all the questions, both with the United States and Europe and, last but not least, with Russia in connection with its new role on the continent.

Possibly there will be some changes, but it is already clear now that Finland will retain its role of border country between the East and West, and will remain a connecting link. This follows also from the new state strategy: Finland—gateway to the East. As before, a large part of the Russian export to Europe and import from Europe will go through Finland, so the visit of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to Helsinki will play its part here in the development of this peaceful strategy of Finland.

Holds News Conference in Helsinki

LD2010172693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1553 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Helsinki, 20 Oct—Army General Pavel Grachev, the Russian Federation defense minister, has called his official visit to Finland very successful. Both sides confirmed their intention to strengthen further their good-neighborly relations, he announced at a news conference in Helsinki today. We also acknowledged that links between us are developing well, that the Russian-Finnish border, stretching over 1,200 kilometers, is currently one of the quietest and calmest, he said.

The Russian military head gave high appraisal to the combat training of officers and soldiers in Finland's defense forces after having the chance to become acquainted with a number of its subdivisions during the course of his visit.

Commenting on the prospects of enlarging NATO, the minister underlined that the question of who joins what is the internal affair of any sovereign state, including Finland. Russia is not the Soviet Union that dictated its conditions to other states. Russia is building democracy, if with some difficulty, and in the future is not going to tell countries what to do, but at the same time, we are analyzing the situation and could have our own view about the possibility of enlarging the North Atlantic union by bringing other states into it, in particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. As long as NATO remains a military and political union, we shall have certain doubts and apprehensions about the idea behind broadening the bloc. Therefore, we are obviously not active supporters of the idea of more countries joining NATO, all the more if this involves Eastern European states.

Concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries, Pavel Grachev drew a distinction between Lithuania on the one side, and Latvia and Estonia on the other. In Lithuania, he said, all matters regarding social protection of the Russian-speaking population have, in practice, been resolved. Therefore, no problems arose in respect of the withdrawal of troops,

and by 1 September all the troops—and the most combat-capable group had been located there—had in effect left Lithuania. In Latvia and Estonia, despite lengthy negotiations, the issue of social protection of the Russian-speaking population has not yet been resolved. We consider that the Russian-speaking population remaining there is being subjected to discrimination. We advocate the same rights and obligations for both the indigenous population and those who have by the will of fate ended up permanently residing in these countries. If this issue is resolved in a positive way, we are ready to withdraw our troops immediately. Otherwise, we will stay there as long as it takes to resolve the issue.

Dwelling on the situation in Russia's northwestern region, the Army general noted that a systematic reduction of troops has been under way there since 1986. To date, their numbers have already dropped by 10,000, despite the fact that troops from Eastern Europe are being intensively brought into the region. The entire northwest, from Severomorsk to the boundary between Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts will by 1995, number just 64,000 men. Only three units with a total number of troops of no more than 3,000 men will be stationed in the immediate vicinity of the Finnish border. This group is not an offensive one and cannot pose any threat to Finland's safety.

Pavel Grachev and Finnish Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn, who took part in the news conference, spoke in favor of paying off part of Russia's debts to Finland by deliveries of armaments and military equipment.

The Russian defense Minister expressed regret that during combat operations in Abkhazia the Georgian national Armed Forces, which did not have sufficient experience and which did not display selflessness, allowed a large proportion of the armaments that had been supplied to them to be seized by the Abkhazian armed formations.

Pavel Grachev concluded by giving an assessment of the events in Moscow on 3d and 4th October. He said that the leaders of the disbanded Supreme Soviet and the former vice president had deliberately prepared for an armed coup. A large quantity of firearms, grenade launchers, and ammunition for them had been accumulated in the White House for this purpose. As a result of the mass disorders on 3 October, groups of armed militants managed to seize four armored transport vehicles that, however, were destroyed by artillery fire the next day.

At present, the minister stressed, the situation is stable. The Russian people are preparing for the parliamentary elections and for adopting the new constitution.

Today Pavel Grachev left Helsinki by air for Moscow.

Favors Part Repayment of Debt by Arms

LD2010191493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Excerpt] Pavel Grachev and Elisabeth Rehn, the defense ministers of Russia and Finland, are in favor of Russia's debt to Finland being partly repaid in the form of supplies of arms and military equipment, it was announced at a joint news conference at the end of the Russian minister's visit to Finland. [passage omitted]

Rules Out Military Intervention in Georgia

LD2010210393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by correspondent Dmitriy Kiselev; place and date not given; from the "Novosti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Kiselev] The Russian defense minister's official visit to Finland ended on Wednesday [20 October], and Pavel Grachev left Helsinki for Moscow. At a news conference before his departure, the defense minister declared that the visit had been a success, and much that had been seen in the Finnish Army will be usefully employed in the Russian Armed Forces.

In an interview for the "Novosti" program, Pavel Grachev stated that, throughout the three days of his stay in Finland, he had closely followed the development of the situation in Russia and around it. Speaking of the situation in Georgia, the Russian defense minister, specifically, made the following declaration:

[Grachev] Naturally, Russian troops will not perform any active combat operations on anyone's side regarding solving the internal question.

[Kiselev] In other words, despite Shevardnadze's dramatic and virtually direct appeal to Russia for military assistance?

[Grachev] Yes. The point is that Russia and Georgia are not at the moment, unfortunately, linked by a single international commitment. Georgia is not a member of the CIS, and, naturally, Georgia is not a party to the Collective Security Treaty. There is no Basic Treaty between Russia and Georgia. There is no military treaty, and so, in an international framework, we have no right to interfere, especially with force, in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

Paper Views Tokyo Talks, Prospects for Ties

PM2010154593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Pavel Shinkarenko article: "'We Tried To Look at One Another Impartially....' According to Boris Yeltsin, That Is Main Result of His First Official Visit to Japan"]

[Text] It has been a week since Russian President Boris Yeltsin's long-awaited and twice-postponed first official visit to Japan ended. It is time to analyze the results. What are they?

Someone said: Fast is bad. But that is hardly appropriate in this case. The Russian leader spent less than two days in Tokyo, but he set in train a process that has been unmoving for over 40 years. There were meetings with Emperor Akihito and three rounds of talks with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa; 18 joint documents were signed, including two declarations—on Russo-Japanese relations and on the prospects for trade, economic, scientific, and technical relations.

Adjustments Enabling Advances

In an interview published in ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI the day before the summit meeting Sumio Edamura, Japanese ambassador to Russia, said bluntly: "The resolution of the territorial problem is the key to establishing trust between the peoples of Japan and Russia." On this premise some people predicted that Boris Yeltsin's trip, like Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit of two years ago, might also be unsuccessful. After all, Hosokawa's coalition government, which took power in August after winning the parliamentary elections, has pledged in relations with Russia to stick to the same principle of strict linkage between politics and economics that the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party preached for over 40 years.

Fortunately, the pessimists were disgraced. "The sides largely stuck to their principled positions," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev noted during a conversation with us. "But these were not principles in the style of [hard-line communist] Nina Andreyeva. On the contrary, while sticking to their convictions, the participants in the Tokyo meeting were nonetheless able to find a formula whereby it proved possible to resolve many painful issues."

As for official Tokyo's approach to cooperation with Russia, in the minister's opinion that is a purely domestic matter for Russia's partners, a question of their political terminology. Even during the visit several options were used to describe this approach during the talks, to wit "separation of politics and economics," "balanced development of relations," "the principle of enlarged balance [rasshirennyy balans]."

"Something else is important to us," the head of Russia's Foreign Ministry stressed. "There was none of the former pressure and no linking the slogan 'Give us the islands!' with cooperation prospects in all other spheres. There was normal dialogue on the contentious problem of the islands, and at the same time 17 documents on cooperation in a whole range of specific areas were signed. But it is up to the Japanese themselves how they describe this in Japanese."

Mutual compromise enabled the leaders to outline a strategy for the development of relations between the two countries in the future and determine the sequence and areas of moves to fully normalize these relations. It was emphasized that Russia and Japan are now united by common values—freedom, democracy, and the supremacy of law and of respect for fundamental human rights. It is on this basis that it is planned to resolve the problems inherited from the past. And this will, moreover, be done on the basis of true partnership, on the basis of the principles of legality and justice.

Let us point out that this is the first time that the term "true partnership" has been used in relations between Russia and Japan.

Problem of the Islands—Again

Before flying to Tokyo Boris Yeltsin noted that he very much hoped that the Japanese side would not broach the question of the South Kurils. (We are talking about the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomai chain, occupied during the last war by Soviet troops and then incorporated in the Russian Federation. But since there is still no peace treaty between our countries, Japan disputes the former USSR's unilateral actions.)

"The most important task is that we cannot really 'develop' cooperation with Japan, particularly in the economic sphere," the Russian president said at Moscow Airport. But Tokyo did not seek his arrival merely in order to overlook the problem of the "northern territories." "During the talks the prime minister broached this problem of the ownership of the four islands, a problem inherited from the past," Boris Yeltsin said at the final news conference, and added: "The talks were very, very serious."

The sides' positions are as follows. Tokyo believes that the islands have been Japanese territory since time immemorial and the fact that they have not been returned to Japanese jurisdiction is no more than the legacy of past totalitarianism. But this visit is the starting point for resolving this problem. Moreover, when the territories are handed over, the Japanese Government will respect as far as possible the will of those citizens of Russia living on these islands. For his part, the Russian president reaffirmed his previous five-stage plan for a settlement. Some of these stages have already been covered. We have officially stated that this problem exists, he pointed out, the islands have been declared a free economic zone, a visa-free entry and exit regime has been introduced for the Kurils, and troop subunits have been cut back. This policy will continue. But final decisions will be adopted once a peace treaty is concluded.

No one seems to have expected that accord would be reached at the leaders' first meeting. The problem is so complex, so "enveloped" in the reciprocal statements of politicians and in government acts that goodwill and mutual trust are needed to achieve success together. "We have agreed to continue the talks and conclude a peace treaty after resolving this matter on the basis of the

historical and legal facts and bilateral documents, along with the principles of legality and justice," it was said at the final news conference.

Yeltsin's Japan Visit Centers Interest on Primorye Region

LD2110083393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0711 GMT 21 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Lents]

[Text] Vladivostok October 21 TASS—"The Primorye region is becoming the center of attention of Japanese entrepeneurs", announced the Japanese general consul in Vladivostok, Toshiko Inae, before returning to Japan on Thursday [21 October].

The general consul noted that the successful conclusion of President Yeltsin's recent visit to Japan has given a powerful impetus to business contacts in the Primorye region.

Toshiko Inae was the first Japanese consul to have worked in Vladivostok for more than fifty years, when Russia's major eastern port was closed not only for foreigners, but for the great majority of Soviet citizens as well.

Greenpeace Sea of Japan Radiation Level Claims Denied

LD2010151293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1356 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] The international environmental-protection organization Greenpeace has no reason to complain to Russia's Pacific Fleet for the recent dumping of liquid radioactive wastes in the Sea of Japan, Head of the Pacific Fleet's press service Viktor Ryzhkov told INTERFAX on behalf of the fleet command.

Radioactive wastes were dumped at the end of last week, 150 kilometers from the port of Nakhodka, by the Pacific Fleet's specialized ship TNT-27. As this ship transports not only liquids, but also solid radioactive wastes, and is itself a source of radiation. [sentence as received] It is not surprising, therefore, that the checks right near the ship's board produced alarming figures, stated Ryzhkov.

He admitted that the Greenpeace organization was implementing a vitally important program, but noted that sometimes its work bordered on a risky adventure. The same situation arose this time, he said. Shortly after dumping, and two hours later, Russian experts measured the radiation levels from the ship Pegas, which accompanied the TNT-27.

The gamma radiation did not exceed the admissible level. The water radiation levels were measured on the surface, around the wake and at the depth of 250 meters. The content of strontium was normal and that of caesium two times smaller than in ordinary drinking water. As for potassium-40, its content in the sea water before dumping was larger than that in the dumped liquid, Ryzhkov said.

The dumping of liquid radioactive wastes did contravene international agreements, and many countries do this work, he went on to say. The Pacific Fleet received the government's permit for one-time dumping. The previous one, also authorized by the government, was carried out in February 1992, said Viktor Ryzhkov.

More on Japanese Protest

PM2010152393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Sergey Agafonov report: "The 'Waste Epic' Continues"]

[Text] Tokyo—The noise raised in Japan over the latest dumping of Russian nuclear waste in the open sea is successfully maintained, taking on the distinct features of a major and by no means friendly campaign.

A demonstration was held outside the Russian Embassy in Tokyo; sharp statements have been delivered not only by official government spokesmen but also by some political parties, including some from the seven-party ruling coalition; the press is "milking" the inauspicious dumping topic with truly Japanese efficiency; and Russia's ambassador in Japan has already been summoned twice to appear at the Foreign Ministry and be handed stern protests.

There is, admittedly, something to write about and say here, bearing in mind not only the understandable concern of the broad masses here over pollution of the Sea of Japan. However, the interesting point is that, amid the general damning chorus, sober and increasingly loud voices can be heard urging that emotions be kept in check and that the problem be viewed pragmatically.

Pragmatism consists in the following: First, there is no point in treating Russia as the lone "bad guy" since there are many, including the Japanese themselves, who should be told off in conversations on polluting the open seas with waste products. Second, the objective reality is such that the Russian side is left with no other outlets but the seas for getting rid of toxic accumulations, as there are neither the appropriate installations nor, indeed, the funds to set these up.

The first point is prosaically simple to substantiate—Japan systematically dumped liquid waste containers with cobalt-60 into the sea in the bays of Suruga and Sagami in 1955-1969. A total of 1,661 iron drums were dumped in this period alone, each one containing 200 liters of radioactive filth. After 1969, due to protests from neighboring countries, the Japanese switched the dumping location, and no precise information about subsequent Japanese dumping operations is available, although experts assume that Japan engaged in this practice right until the lates 1970's.

The second aforementioned point is proved by the fact that both experts and government departments are increasingly eager to use the $100 million allocated by Tokyo as aid for Russian disarmament measures to construct land-based reservoirs for the burial of radioactive waste. As far as it is known, this idea will be submitted at a session of the special bilateral inter-foreign-ministry group scheduled to take place in Moscow 10 November. The sides will probably reach agreement on this point insofar as there are no other ways of freezing Russian nuclear dumping in the near future.

And finally a third point about which local analysts are writing, albeit timidly so far. When the topic of the dumping of Russian nuclear waste into the ocean surfaced in Japan for the first time (this topic, after appearing in the press last fall, reached a sort of peak in April this year), the Japanese Government Science and Technology Agency carried out a special survey in the Sea of Japan for the purpose of determining the damage to the environment caused by dumping operations. No deviations from the norm were discovered. What is more, Mamoru Nakajima, head of the agency at the time, stated in April at a press conference that there had been no radioactive anomalies recorded in the Sea of Japan since 1966, with one exception—in 1986, when the effects of Chernobyl ricocheted even as far as here. Chernobyl, of course, is also our fault, but it has little to do with the burial of the Pacific Ocean Fleet's waste.

Krishkin on Dumping

LD2010165593 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0910 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Commentary by Yevgeniy Krishkin; from the "Focus on Asia and the Pacific" program]

[Text] The dumping by a Russian ship of radioactive liquid waste in the Sea of Japan has caused disquiet in the region, leading to Japan's official protest note. Our commentator Yevgeniy Krishkin thinks that Japan's reaction may be understandable. Here is what he writes.

In our time, when the level of pollution of world oceans has reached alarming proportions, any event—be it the dumping of industrial waste, or the break up of oil tankers—raises the red flag. In this case, experts believe there is no cause for alarm. What was dumped in the Sea of Japan were 900 tonnes of low-grade radioactive liquid; it will not lead to pollution. Such low-grade liquid radioactive waste had been dumped before in the sea and did not lead to any increase in the level of pollution, nor did it affect adversely the bodies of water, the seabed or the micro- organisms in the Sea of Japan.

The recent dumping was a forced measure, for the special tankers for that purpose were overladen with the material. The dumping was strictly controlled by the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources. This was confirmed by the Deputy Minister Nikolay Rybalskiy. Therefore, there can be no question of a violation of international agreements. Existing international agreements do not forbid the dumping of low-level radioactive liquid waste in the sea, provided a notice of such intention is given two weeks in advance. Russia met this obligation on time. Other countries do exactly the same. However, dumping of toxic waste, even of low grade, cannot but be a cause for regret.

Our relationship with the environment must not be as before because the environment, including the oceans, are now very vulnerable, and Russia understands this. Russia is actively considering the building of a special storing facility, so that dumping of radioactive materials in the sea will no longer be necessary.

In this connection, Japan's readiness to assist Russia in the construction of such a storage can only be welcomed.

Dumping 'Lesser of Two Evils'

PM2010150793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 1

[Tatyana Smolyakova article under the "Furor" rubric: "But It Is Very Safe Waste"]

[Text] Once again Russia has caused a scandal in a respectable family. On 16 October Russian Navy ships dumped liquid radioactive waste into sector No. 9 of the Sea of Japan (latitude 41 degrees 40 minutes north, longitude 133 degrees 30 minutes east).

This was just the first part of a "burial" operation which resulted in the dumping of 900 cubic meters of radioactive waste with a total radioactivity level of 1.08 curies. The waste is the cooling and flushing water from nuclear submarines containing strontium, cobalt, and cesium. The mixture was dumped astern from tanks aboard the tanker TNT-27 over a distance of 2 km. Which means that the "burial" technology consisted of mixing radioactive water with clean water. The ship has now returned to its base at Bolshoy Kamen where another 800 cubic meters of radioactive waste with a radioactivity level of 1.1 curies is being pumped from tanker TNT-5 and will then be discharged into the same sector No. 9 of the Sea of Japan.

Until recently Russia has stated on numerous occasions that it is complying honestly with the decisions of the London Convention banning the burial of solid radioactive waste at sea and restricting the burial of liquid waste. And... all the while it has quietly continued its dumping operations. This time everything was done extremely honestly and openly. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Maritime Organization were notified of the planned dumping. Moreover, on 27 September Minister Danilov-Danilyan sent Minister Kozyrev a letter asking him to use diplomatic channels in order to brief our nearest neighbor—Japan—on the forthcoming operation. Admittedly, the Japanese Government claims that it never received any notification; but it is expressing considerable regret about what has happened.

This "confusion" does not look odd against the background of the Russian president's visit to the Land of the Rising Sun. Incidentally, at a briefing Japanese journalists persistently attempted to find out whether the rescheduling of the original date of the operation from 12 to 16 October was linked to B. Yeltsin's visit. Although this connection was categorically denied (it was all to do with "organizational reasons"), there is a strong feeling that the Russians are trying to put a brave face on a sorry business.

The novelty of the present situation lies in the fact that for the first time in our history a waste burial has been carried out with the knowledge, permission, and under the watchful eye of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources. This fact alone guarantees that the operation will be completely safe, so to speak.

Why then did the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, our main protector, consent to the Navy's carrying out such risky operations? Because, it appears, not to consent would have been even riskier. Both the named tankers were not only overloaded with radioactive waste, but were also extremely unseaworthy, and it was therefore decided to opt for the lesser of two evils.

Having scared journalists with the scenario of a possible disaster at the base, the participants in the briefing (representatives from the Navy, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources) immediately tried to prove that the waste in question was in fact very safe. First, it contained no alpha particles. Second, the number of beta- and gamma-emitting radionuclides in every liter of liquid was only 100 times higher than the amount permitted in drinking water. If all this is mixed thoroughly with clean water, therefore, in a few days' time levels will be back to normal.

What has always struck me personally right away is the "principled stance" and "firmness" of the Russian Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources. On this occasion too one of its representatives stated: "Our ministry's firm position is that this practice must be halted." But he later qualified this by saying: "We have been forced to continue with it in the immediate future, but in compliance with international norms and rules, of course." (?!!)

They have been forced to continue because every day Russia produces 20,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste, and all the available tanks are currently full—there is simply nowhere to put newly produced waste, but what norms and rules can they be talking about? After all, only our icebreaking fleet throws out radioactive waste in special granular form; the Navy does not possess the equipment to recycle it.

The government recently adopted a special decree on resolving the problem of recycling radioactive waste, which stipulates that the problem must be solved by 1997-1998, but since only 3-5 percent of the requirements of this work have been funded, you can calculate how much time will be needed to complete the task, and there will always be nannies to reassure us: Don't worry, they will say, it is not dangerous, just a bit unpleasant.

Inspectorate Chief Comments

PM2010144593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 pp 1,2

[Interview with Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, by Ruslan Ignatyev under the "Scandal" rubric; place and date not given: "Dumping Illegal"]

[Text] Preparations for an unsanctioned operation were concluded yesterday in the Pacific Fleet—the dumping of the latest batch of liquid radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan. The newspaper's editorial office asked Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, to comment on the Russian Navy's actions.

[Ignatyev] Yuriy Georgiyevich, as you know, radioactive waste was dumped in the waters of the Sea of Japan 16 October approximately 190 km southeast of Vladivostok. The appropriate reaction to this followed from Tokyo. Despite the Japanese side's indignation, the Navy is planning to carry out a repeat dumping of liquid radioactive waste. Who gave permission for such work?

[Vishnevskiy] Our department gave no permission for the dumping of radioactive waste. Although all operations like this are conducted in coordination with us. However, in preparing this action the Defense Ministry did not consider it necessary to even inform us of its impending work. As it turned out, there was no information given to the Japanese side beforehand either. I know that the liquid radioactive waste was dumped with the knowledge of the Russian Federation Ministry for the Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources. To my mind, it took a great responsibility on itself.

[Ignatyev] Pacific Fleet specialists are claiming that the dumping was done on a licensed basis. Is that not permission of a kind?

[Vishnevskiy] My reaction is one of doubt at the very least. The president originally instructed the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety to organize the issue of licenses. That is, an organization which intends to dump or bury radioactive waste should obtain the relevant document from us. Furthermore, the question of payment for the license was also discussed, and the funds received from this were to be channeled into measures to enhance the safety of the work being conducted. In other words, the money was to be released for the construction of special storage pits and the purchase of equipment and facilities for recycling [utilizatsiya] radioactive waste. The license question remains

open at the moment, however. Coordination work with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Economy is in progress.

[Ignatyev] Are there any legal norms for conducting work involving the dumping and burial of radioactive substances which would obviate the need to seek permission from various bodies?

[Vishnevskiy] In 1990 a draft of some documents was prepared which stipulated the conditions for dumping liquid radioactive waste in the seas surrounding Russia. This referred to the northern seas and the Pacific Ocean. However, we did not adopt this draft because our country had signed the London Convention in the first place, which bans the dumping of all radioactive substances above the 50th parallel. Russia found itself in those conditions. Although there are areas which are not subject to the convention.

[Ignatyev] What damage has been caused by the Pacific Fleet's actions in the Sea of Japan area?

[Vishnevskiy] According to reports, the initial volume of the liquid radioactive waste dumped was 900 cubic meters. In the first few hours, naturally the radiation situation will exceed all permissible norms around the tanker and in the dumping area. Damage will be done to the environment all the same. Moreover there are plans for more dumping. All this is gradually accumulating, and in the end it will boomerang onto people themselves.

[Ignatyev] Is there a solution?

[Vishnevskiy] Yes, there is. I understand that the Defense Ministry is at the moment not in a position to settle the problem of burying liquid radioactive waste in a flash, but in time it could be possible to obtain installations for turning the contaminated waters into a hard state in order to be able to bury them all. We need powerful purification structures. Once it has passed through filters, the radioactive water will become harmless.

[Ignatyev] Do you consider the dumping of liquid radioactive waste currently being conducted by the Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan to be legal and in line with all international norms?

[Vishnevskiy] No.

Difficulties in Burying Radioactive Waste

LD2010175293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1622 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—The second portion of liquid radioactive waste from Russia's nuclear power installations will probably not be dumped from naval tankers in the Sea of Japan, but the final decision has yet to be made by the Russian Government, according to Yuriy Kazakov, an official of the Russian Environmental Ministry's Department for International Relations.

As is known on October 16, a TNT-27 tanker dumped 900 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste in Area 9 (some 100 kilometers south of the port city of Nakhodka in the Russian Far East) of the Sea of Japan. The tanker was then scheduled to approach another tanker, TNT-5, for pumping another 800 tons of waste to be dumped in the same area. The Federal Environmental Ministry had issued permission to proceed and duly notified international organisations about the plan.

Both tankers were brimful of radioactive waste and verging on accident, which would have been imminent if the waste had spilled and polluted the coast. This was why Russia found it possible to resort to dumping the waste in the sea, a method which is generally regarded as traditional. According to Yuriy Kazakov, the first portion of waste dissolved in the ocean water almost instantaneously and no trace of pollution was discovered by special measurements.

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy said the second dumping would cause no pollution either. Radioactive waste is being dumped in the sea not only by Russia, but also by other nuclear powers, including Japan which dumps its radioactive waste in the same Sea of Japan.

Nonetheless, the sharply negative reaction of the U.S. and Japanese Governments to Russia's actions in this field makes it necessary to discuss the problem once again. ITAR-TASS learned that the Minister of the Environment Victor Danilov-Danyliyn is expected to meet President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on Wednesday or Thursday to discuss the situation.

If the second dumping is prohibited, the waste can remain in the holds of the TNT-27 for some time, according to Yuriy Kazakov. But the question is bound to arise again. Russia does not have a technology for solidifying liquid radioactive waste for underground burial, which is believed to be safer for the environment.

Government To Cancel Next Dumping

OW2110040893 Tokyo KYODO in English 0325 GMT 21 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 20 KYODO—Russia will not carry out its planned second dumping in a week of nuclear waste into the ocean north of Japan, a Russian Foreign Ministry official said Wednesday [20 October].

Nikolay Solovyev, head of the Foreign Ministry's Asia-Pacific Affairs Bureau, informed Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Sumio Edamura of the decision, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said in Tokyo on Thursday.

Moscow will soon formally announce the suspension of the nuclear dumping, Russian government officials said.

In the meeting with Edamura, Solovyev said Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev had instructed him to convey the Russian Government's decision.

Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata phoned Kozyrev on Tuesday to protest Russia's reported dumping of 900 tons of liquid nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan on Sunday and asking him to call off the Russian Navy's plans to dump another 800 tons there sometime this week.

On Sunday, the Russian Navy tanker TNT 27 dumped radioactive waste into the sea some 550 kilometers west of Japan's northernmost main island of Hokkaido, just a few days after President Boris Yeltsin's Tokyo visit from October 11 to 13.

In talks with Yeltsin during the visit, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa urged Russia to stop dumping nuclear waste into the ocean.

On Tuesday, Valery Damilyan, head of the Chemical Service of the Russian Pacific Fleet, said Russia was preparing to dump another 700 to 800 tons of low-level radioactive liquid waste in the Sea of Japan on Wednesday at the earliest.

He said there was no alternative to dumping the nuclear waste in the sea because land-based storage and disposal facilities will not be completed until 1995 or later.

Japan strongly protested the action and warned that if Russia continued to dump nuclear waste in the sea it would greatly damage relations between the two countries.

South Korea also protested the dumping and President Kim Yong-sam on Wednesday proposed that South Korea, Japan and the United States join hands to get Russia to halt the dumping.

In the meeting with Japan's ambassador, Solovyev proposed that experts of the two countries meet in Moscow on October 27 and 28 to hold a joint investigation into the dumping and that the experts visit the Russian Far East port city of Vladivostok on October 29 to continue their inquiries for two more days, the officials said.

The Russian Pacific Fleet has its headquarters in Vladivostok.

Solovyev also suggested convening a second round on November 10 and 11 of experts' talks that began in May on Russian nuclear dumping in the sea, which Moscow acknowledged in March had continued from 1959 to 1992.

Japan is ready to consider using part of the 100 million dollars it has offered to help Russia dismantle nuclear arms for preventing the ocean dumping of nuclear waste, Japanese Government sources said.

Protests Said 'Politically Motivated'

LD2110081393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0305 GMT 21 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Grachev]

[Text] Vladivostok, 21 October—The Pacific Fleet is planning to complete the operation to bury the remains of radioactive fluids in the Sea of Japan this week. Captain First Rank Valeriy Damilyan, head of the chemical service of the Pacific Fleet, reported to the ITAR-TASS correspondent. He thereby noted that the "fuss created in connection with this action is obviously politically motivated."

At the fleet's chemical service, said Damilyan, they were surprised at the reaction to this incident on the part of the "Greenpeace" international organization. According to assurances from him, its heads were informed in advance about the measure being prepared and did not display any concern at the time, but when the fleet's tanker with the waste on board appeared in the specified area of sea where the radioactive cargo was to be dumped, experts armed with television and radio equipment and radiation monitors on board the "Greenpeace" vessel were already waiting for the sailors.

In order to ascertain the ecological safety of the operation being conducted, a special Pacific Fleet vessel, the Pegas, has constantly taken measurements in the water, which confirm that the level of radiation does not exceed the permissible norms. Nevertheless, the world public is being misled by the "Greenpeace" account and our activities are being presented in a negative light, the captain stated. As a result the Japanese side is alarmed, but we feel sure that our neighbors will approach the assessment of the events that have occurred in a balanced manner and will not make an unnecessary controversy of it, the fleet's representive said.

Official Admits Rules Were Broken

LD2010195293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of the Russian State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety [Atomnadzor], confirmed in an interview to "Vesti" today that Russia's international obligations have been violated in two ways. Because, under the London Convention on the burial of waste, and in accordance with precise International Atomic Energy Agency recommendations, only solid radioactive waste can be dumped in the sea and only in the region between 50 degrees north and 50 degrees south.

[Peslyak] Vishnevskiy said Russia has the technology to render liquid radioactive waste harmless but the Defense Ministry has been economising on safety for 30 years and is trying to represent its inactivity as necessity. Is it really difficult to build four metallic tanks, 25 meters by 9 meters every year? Therefore, it is shameful to present foreign aid as our salvation. If we cannot cope by ourselves, the head of Atomnadzor noted, then we must halt the whole nuclear submarine fleet.

[Begin Vishnevskiy recording] We must not foul our whole planet just because we are incapable of resolving some task. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Protest in Seoul Against Dumping of Nuclear Waste

LD2010211793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1830 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] A protest meeting in connection with Russia dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan has taken place in front of the Russian Embassy in Seoul. Taking part in the action, which had been organized on the initiative of the Korean Federation of Action in Defense of the Environment, were several dozens of people representing seven public organizations of the Republic of Korea.

For some two hours the demonstrators chanted slogans demanding that Russia stop such actions and apologize to the Korean people.

Shevardnadze's Appeal Treated With 'Prudence'

PM2010145993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 1

[Aleksandr Shinkin report: "Dark Clouds Over Georgia"]

[Text] At the end of August Valerian Advadze, Georgia's ambassador to Russia, said sadly when describing the situation in his republic that the military have lost their fear of the law. Georgia's trouble is that there are forces there which would like to legitimize these people.

Today these "military" people seem to have brought Georgia to civil war. After the war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgians "split" into supporters of Shevardnadze and Gamsakhurdia and are using force to find out which of them is right.

Having occupied the port of Poti, the city of Samtredia, and important strategic junctions, troops loyal to the former Georgian president have effectively taken control of all western Georgia.

The threat posed by Gamsakhurdia was evidently one of the reasons that made Shevardnadze say that Georgia will join the CIS. Speaking at a public meeting in Tbilisi on this matter, Shevardnadze said: "The path to the CIS is the path to Russia. The two neighboring states can fully implement their mutual interests within the framework of this Commonwealth."

He also remarked that he had come to the decision to join the CIS after long and hard reflection and is satisfied that most of the people approve his action. Primarily representatives of the working people, weary of political upheaval, who have found themselves ruined and impoverished as a result of pseudopatriotic insinuations.

Eduard Shevardnadze is absolutely right on this point. The country is not only living in poverty, but also in fear. Eyewitness testimony indicates that even Tbilisi, the republic's capital, has effectively become a ghost town run by the "military."

However, Shevardnadze is not only concerned by the situation in the country. According to Gamsakhurdia, his forces' offensive will not stop until he has recovered his post as head of state, a position he was ousted from by Shevardnadze's supporters.

Shevardnadze himself acknowledges that it is hard to resist these forces. The government army is close to collapse. And naturally in addition to economic aid it also expects effective military aid from Russia. The mass media have already carried Georgia's proposal that Russian subunits take over the job of guarding transport routes. However he may have spoken about Russia and its army, Shevardnadze is nevertheless once again trying to take refuge under the protection of friendly Russian bayonets.

However, the Russian authorities seem to have displayed prudence. While voicing the willingness to offer Georgia any aid, they have ruled out military intervention. It is not only foolish but dangerous to separate fighting brothers because the person who does the separating always ends up as the guilty party. Especially since, judging by reports from Tbilisi, people there are still counting on the "military," and they do not intend resolving matters at the negotiating table but on the battlefield.

Defense Ministry Denies Troop Redeployment to Georgia

LD2010161693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Sergey Shatunov] As we have just learnt from the Russian Defense Ministry's Directorate for Information and the Press, there has been no unscheduled redeployment of Russian troops in Georgia so far. The troops stationed in the Transcaucasus are engaged in scheduled military training and protection of vital Russian military installations.

Troops To Help in Delivering Essentials to Georgia

LD2010174593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1643 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow October 20 ITAR-TASS—The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia will respond to Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze for help in ensuring the non-stop operation of the Poti-Kutaisi-Tbilisi-Yerevan-Baku railway by detailing troops and means for use in this peace-keeping mission.

The railway in question links Georgia's Black Sea port of Poti, the main gateway to three Caucasian republics of the former Soviet Union, with the capitals of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Russia's troops will act in conjunction with Georgian, Armenian and Azeri units.

Russian troops will act exclusively to ensure the unobstructed passage of important cargo to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. These joint actions undertaken at request from the Georgian legitimate government cannot be regarded as intervention in the internal affairs of another independent state, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement today.

Shevardnadze Held 'Secret Talks' With Russian General

LD2010185393 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Excerpt] Troops loyal to Zviad Gamsakhurdia launched an offensive on Kutaisi this morning. Artillery has been used and there are dead and wounded on both sides.

In the meantime, according to eyewitness reports, the Russian troops deployed in Kutaisi are being redeployed. The purpose of this operation remains unknown.

The Georgian agency IPRINDA, citing Russian officers in Tbilisi, reports that Eduard Shevardnadze held secret talks yesterday with General Fedor Reut, commander of the Russian troops in the Transcaucasian region. [passage omitted]

Georgian Intelligence Agents Released From Custody

LD2010215793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1942 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Zhilyakov]

[Text] Krasnodar October 20 TASS—Informed sources told ITAR-TASS that the Russian Security Ministry's department for the Krasnodar territory released from custody and passed on to Georgian authorities four residents [as received] of Georgia's intelligence service who had been spying on Russian territory.

The extradition of the special service agents became possible on the initiative of the Georgian Foreign Ministry with consent from Russia's procurator general.

Nonetheless, the investigation of the activity of the spy net continues. Abkhazian authorities had sentenced the intelligence agents to death in absentia.

Joint Forces May Use Force Against Georgia's Gamsakhurdia

LD2010124993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1356 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] A joint contingent of Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian forces will accompany freight from Poti and Batumi to eastern Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Chairman of Georgia's Committee for Ethnic Relations Aleksandr Kavsadze told a press conference in Moscow. But prior to this, he said, the transportation routes must be unblocked.

Asked if this implied the involvement of Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in combat operations against the Zviadists, Kavsadze told INTERFAX that supporters of Gamsakhurdia had been asked to voluntarily unblock the motorways and the railway in the region of Samtredia. If this request if not fulfilled, "force will have to be used," he said.

Speaking about the role of Azerbaijani and Armenian units in safeguarding the communication systems, Kavsadze told INTERFAX that "perhaps, this will help soften relations between these states".

Kavsadze believes that no talks are possible between the Georgian authorities and the ex-president because "in principle, it is impossible to come to terms with Gamsakhurdia on anything."

Chernomyrdin, Tajikistan's Abdullodzhanov Hold Moscow Talks

LD2010213593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1821 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] The Russian and Tajik government negotiations, led by Prime Ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov, took place in Moscow Wednesday.

The deputy Russian Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin, who took part in the talks, has told reporters that the two sides have discussed the problem associated with the unification of the two countries' monetary systems. The Russian side has said that the exchange of the 1961-1991 rubles, currently in circulation in Tajikistan, for new Russian rubles will be held when the Tajik side is ready for that. Shokhin has said that in order to carry this out it is necessary to bring the legislations of both countries into sync and unify key principles and parameters of the social and economic development.

Shokhin said that during the meeting in private the two prime ministers discussed military-political cooperation.

Sources in the Russian Government have told Interfax that the Tajik side asked to urgently increase energy supplies to the republic because the shortage of fuel threatens to halt the cotton- harvesting campaign. Tajikistan offers its cotton in

exchange for Russia fuel. The negotiators also discussed Russia's participation in finishing the construction of the Rogun hydro-power station.

Chernomyrdin, Moldovan Delegation Agree on USSR Assets

LD1910190293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1720 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] A statement to solve issues of legal succession with respect to the former USSR foreign debt and assets was signed as a result of negotiations between Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin and a Moldovan state delegation headed by President Mircea Snegur and Premier Andrey Sangeli on Tuesday in Moscow. According to this document, Russia assumes all of Moldova's obligations to service the former USSR's foreign debt and Chisinau, for its part, gives up the former USSR assets in favor of Moscow.

According to Chernomyrdin's estimate, the negotiations have removed "obstacles to the development of economic relations and both parties have neared relations needed between member-states of the Economic Union. The Russian premier reported that the parties had reached an agreement to remove tariffs from products delivered to Russia from Moldova and to construct 12 wine producing factories on the Russian territory which will use raw materials supplied by Moldova.

Snegur expressed the conviction that the results of the negotiations would help existing ties to be preserved and extended.

Regarding Commander of the 14th Russian Army General Aleksandr Lebed giving up all his deputy's authorities in the Transdniestrian parliament, Snegur declared that "in this case General Lebed acted correctly according to his conscience." In Snegur's words, "the whole world knows that Transdniestrian fighters participated in the defense of the White House and there is much evidence of this." Snegur asserts that Lebed's electors supported the general's action.

Chernomyrdin underlined that all fighters who had participated in the recent revolt in Russia would be punished according to the law.

Official Comments on Latvia Troop Withdrawal Talks

LD2010155293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1424 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—A Russian high-ranking official has praised the results of the three-day Russian-Latvian talks that have ended in Moscow.

Sergey Zotov, head of the Russian delegation to the talks, said the talks centered on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia, a legal basis for the pull-out and its terms.

The sides also discussed social welfare guarantees for the servicemen and their families and the retired military who decide to stay in Latvia.

"The discussion aimed at finding mutually acceptable compromises" and was held in a "constructive atmosphere," Zotov said. He added that the meeting created conditions for further progress at the future talks.

Commenting on U.S. President Bill Clinton's statement outlining his concern about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia and Estonia, Zotov noted that the United States could play a positive role in creating favourable conditions for solving some financial aspects of these problems. If the U.S. side keeps its promises to help build housing for the returning troops, "we could quickly settle all remaining disagreements," Zotov said.

Interior Minister Returns to Moscow From India

LD2010220493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1830 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Excerpt] The official visit to India by Russia's Internal Affairs Minister Viktor Yerin is over. He returned to Moscow from Bombay on a scheduled Aeroflot flight.

The main feature of the visit was the signing of an agreement on cooperation between the Indian and Russian internal affairs ministries which provides for interaction between law enforcemenet agencies of the two countries in fighting organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and other dangerous crimes. The agreements make it possible to coordinate the actions of the internal affairs bodies of the two countries, to exchange operational information, to examine and tackle plans for joint measures, including of an operational and CID nature.

Viktor Yerin believes that a very important and necessary agreement was signed in Delhi. It will make it possible to take concerted actions with India's law enforcement bodies aimed at preventing criminal actions, above all those most dangerous and harmful for both countries. This agreement was in preparation for a long time by specialists of the interior ministries. It presupposes meetings between professional experts of both countries and joint work. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Approves Naval Exercise With Kuwait

LD2010221293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2036 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] President Yeltsin ordered to accept the Defense Ministry's proposal, supported by the Foreign Ministry, that a joint Russo-Kuwaiti naval exercise be held in the Persian Gulf next November and December.

The order states that this was needed to consolidate the Russo- Kuwaiti military cooperation.

The Defense Ministry was ordered to negotiate with Kuwait's authorities on the organization and payment of the Russian expenses in the exercise.

Kolosovskiy Transferred From Washington to Geneva

LD2010161093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1327 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] President Yeltsin is reported to have signed a decree appointing Andrey Kolosovskiy Russia's representative in the Geneva-based UN and other international bodies.

By yet another decree, the president released Yevgeniy Makeyev from his ambassadorial duties "because of his retirement."

Kolosovskiy's transference from Washington to Geneva is apparently an early sign of a reshuffle drive expected at Russia's foreign department.

As a senior Russian diplomat has told Interfax, Kolosovskiy's new appointment has most likely been prompted by Russia's new Ambassador to the U.S. Yuliy Vorontsov. A deputy foreign minister even in Soviet times, Kolosovskiy went to Washington "at a time when the new Russian state was in the making."

Vorontsov took over this post from Vladimir Lukin, to whom Kolosovskiy had been an assistant.

For more details see today's Diplomatic Panorama.

Prospects for Bosnia 'Remain Vague'

LD2010193493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1635 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By Diplomatic Correspondents Dmitriy Vosbolnikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] The prospects for resolving the conflict in Bosnia "still remain vague," a highly placed Russian diplomat told INTERFAX.

According to him, "such a situation is quite natural, since, now that the peace process is stalemated, the warring sides have to collect their thoughts."

INTERFAX's interviewee also pointed to other difficulties which hinder the process of settlement. "This involves above all the differences in the camp of Bosnian Muslims who no longer pose a monolithic force."

With reference to the role played by Russia in resolving the Bosnian crisis, the diplomat said that its peacemaking activity in the region has already "scored many points" in terms of heightening Moscow's international prestige. "It's already clear to everyone that without Russia's participation progress in the efforts to resolve the conflict is virtually impossible," he said.

According to the diplomat, Moscow hasn't said "its last word" in the Bosnian settlement yet. However he declined to state when and what exactly Moscow intends to say.

Potapov on Possible Extension of NATO, Russia's Position

LD1910174393 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 18 Oct 93

[Commentary by Anatoliy Potapov]

[Text] Next, commentator Anatoliy Potapov shares his views on a possible NATO extension by affiliating East European countries. He writes: My attention has been drawn by a new idea advanced by NATO's Secretary General Manfred Woerner. He intends to use the January meeting of the leaders of the member countries to push through his concept of associated membership of NATO which does not exist at the moment. If such a decision is taken, he would offer such a membership to the countries of Eastern Europe. What is the point?

I believe that Mr. Woerner has been convinced by now that those countries cannot be admitted as equal members of the military bloc. This is being opposed by most NATO countries, including the United States. All this took place after Russia had expressed big doubts about such an approach to consolidate European security by extending NATO, which is far from a concept of a collective security if it is to be truly European.

What is then associated membership? It does not place any responsibility for protecting the borders of such states on NATO. Associated membership implies military cooperation, developing joint plans for possible crises and operations to maintain peace. However, here I have a question—isn't it all envisaged in the activity of the North Atlantic Council, which acts under the auspices of NATO and embraces the states of the bloc as well as the Warsaw Treaty countries, including Russia?

So one would expect that the task now would be to invigorate the effort by the North Atlantic Council. Otherwise, plans for expansion of the NATO eastward would look very much like isolating Russia and a new split of Europe. This, however, contradicts what many Western politicians and military commanders would want to see. Here is, for example, an opinion by the German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe. Russia is a very important factor for a strong stability in Europe. We can achieve stability only acting jointly with Russia and not against it, the minister pointed out.

Let me remind you of Moscow's position, which is as follows. Membership or nonmembership of NATO is naturally every state's choice. Russia is prepared to cooperate with this alliance and does not rule out it's joining NATO in the future. As for the present time,

Moscow is for interaction with the member states of the North Atlantic Council, with a view to removing any possible challenges to the continent's security, and it really seems very doubtful that NATO's extension eastward, with Russia left out, would result in stronger European stability.

Kozyrev on Russia's Attitude Toward NATO

LD2010211693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Evening Herald" program]

[Text] NATO defense ministers are holding a meeting in the German town of Travemuende. They intend to pay considerable attention to strategic relations with Russia in order to work out security structures in Europe. It is not a question, however, of automatically expanding the Alliance to the east, but that of opening a renewed North Atlantic alliance for new members. Russia's stand on this problem was worded in President Boris Yeltsin's recent statement. Andrey Kozyrev, head of the Russian foreign political department, made the following comment on the subject.

[Begin Kozyrev recording] We do not regard NATO as an enemy bloc, and we do not rule out joining the organization ourselves in the future. We are not sticking to any Brezhnev doctrine, therefore, it was natural for President Yeltsin to say while in Poland: It is your sovereign affair to take a decision. If you want to join NATO, please apply, but we cannot all rush there just because the door is open. This is what we are telling our partners. Let us think carefully whether we should enter this door. If, as a result, NATO expands without Russia, will it be a positive fact for European stability? I am far from convinced of that.

What are the real threats in Europe today? They include the Yugoslav conflict or, say, the Dniester conflict, or Abkhazian conflict. It is not quite clear to me in what way, say, Poland's joining NATO will help us to settle these conflicts. That is why I am saying: Let us think how we could really use NATO's potential and infrastructure while not neglecting or forgetting, in the process, European neutral states which have colossal experience of participating in different peace-making operations. How, instead of enlarging NATO by simple additions, can all this be put together, pooled together, so that we could respond all together in a more resolute and vigorous way to real challenges to our security? Aggressive nationalism and local conflicts are a real challenge. Let us not rush things, let us solve concrete, important common tasks and let us think how to do this better. [end recording]

Commentary Views West's Responsibility After Coup

PM1910140393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 93 First Edition p 4

[Commentary by Stanislav Kondrashov: "The West's New Responsibility After the Events of October in Moscow"]

[Text] Russia now no longer has, and will not have until at least mid-December, a parliament or a Constitutional Court, and therefore the main elements in the short-lived system of checks and balances to the structures of executive power, from the president down to rank-and-file OMON [special purposes militia detachment] officers, no longer exist. Who then will restrain the "victors" from excessive euphoria when that euphoria passes into tyranny? Who will remind them of the need to recognize the human rights "even" of former deputies, savagely beaten by militiamen flying into a passion of unchecked permissiveness? Who is to remind them and call persuasively for the observance of rights without which democrats cannot be called democrats?

Recent days are posing many such questions, from private questions to the most general, cardinal, and historical question of all: In Russia, after all, with its age-old traditions of autocracy and its tradition of more than half a century of CPSU dominion, it is easy to plunge into authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and dictatorship, especially in view of that other long tradition—of official hypocrisy and demagoguery concerning "true democracy." Who will restrain the one, and now the only, branch of power until 12 December, and after that, seeing that the inertia of the road we have taken is powerful and now, once entrenched, it could produce a tame or puppet-like, complacence parliament?

We are obliged to create the badly needed system of checks and balances from mechanisms not built directly into the state machine but capable of exerting influence on it—namely, the mass media. This is also the opinion of the West, of stable democratic states; it is their timely appraisal, both official and public, of the stormy new phase of development of the processes in this giant country that is tossing between the extremes of anarchy and dictatorship in a spasmodic search for the balanced, golden mean of democracy.

It is logical to pin some hopes on the "fourth estate," although I doubt whether it will be able to justify them sufficiently. First, our mass media, especially the electronic media, for the most part only service the executive, and already for that reason are unsuitable for the role of impartial critics of that executive. Second, they are trying to "gag" this mouthpiece by the use of censorship restrictions. Third, regarding outright, "intransigent" opposition publications, the resolute measure of a wholesale ban has already been implemented. As a result newspapers with an aggregate circulation of, perhaps, not less than 2 million have not been published since 5 October, and their subscribers have in effect had their rights infringed and are suffering moral and material losses; and the new press minister, Mr. Shumeyko—hitherto, I believe, a scrupulous reader of PRAVDA—the other day had the audacity to declare that from now on and forever more PRAVDA shall never more appear, even though that newspaper, unless and until it dies a natural death, is as impossible to remove from the newspaper kiosks as from our own—including Mr. Shumeyko's—common memory and history.

Russia's "fourth estate," in the absence of the first and the third, is extremely important. But, afflicted as we are with all the ills of a divided society, we will hardly be able to keep the executive in democratic check if it takes the bit between its teeth.

We are obliged once again to appeal to foreign countries. No, not for 100-percent guarantees, which are not to be found even there, but for a kind of humanitarian aid. The disappearance of the internal system of checks and balances in Russia increases the significance of the international system of checks—the opinions of the West, which for Russia's current leaders have paramount authority. Indeed, Western human rights campaigners are more experienced, more consistent, and more impartial in their mission than ours, not dividing the victims of oppression into "ours" and "theirs." The same goes, alas, for the foreign press. We first heard about the savage beatings of deputies in Moscow militia departments on Radio Liberty. And the victims sent their first account to the Western press, to London's THE GUARDIAN, assuming that it would be published there; and they were not mistaken.

Incidentally, Western aid began instantly—in the form of live transmissions by the U.S. CNN television company on the tragic events in Moscow 3-4 October. This was "the real McCoy"—raw, gory material. The world was shocked and drew conclusions. Various conclusions, various formulations.

In order to convey the essence of the West's perception of what happened, together with its typical reservations, we can avail ourselves of the words of THE NEW YORK TIMES' former correspondent in Moscow, David Remnick, a man very familiar with Russian realities: "Until the emergence of a new generation of political figures Yeltsin deserves general support—and a critical eye. If he remains true to his word, holding free elections and quickly restoring civil freedoms and repealing censorship, he will retain the chance to prevent his tragic victory from turning into a Pyrrhic one."

Similar desiderata expressed from public platforms have reached Moscow from Western capitals via the diplomatic post, as have wholly transparent warnings concerning the undesirability of further bloodshed and the desirability of—moreover, the need for—free elections.

There are reports that the edict on the introduction of censorship was being prepared and discussed, though it had not been issued, even before the events of October. There are also reports that after the events Yeltsin repealed or softened the censorship following American explanations that its introduction could not be explained within the framework of democracy. First, knowing that freedom of the press implies press pluralism; and second, even considerations of political expediency require that information should not be made a forbidden fruit—sweet since the times of Adam and Eve.

President Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo was anticipated by reports from official Japanese sources that a "tough line" awaited him from Premier Hosokawa—"against the introduction of press censorship and the restriction of freedom of speech." The Japanese were shocked by the spectacle of Russian tanks firing on the Russian parliament, and this could not but be reflected in the preparation of the visit. The Liberal Democratic Party—until recently the ruling party—sharply criticized the government for receiving such a guest hot on the heels of such events.

However, IZVESTIYA's Tokyo correspondent Sergey Agafonov, who reported on these facts and feelings, received a kind of unprecedented reprimand from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a person... out of touch with Japanese and Russian life. According to the traditional understanding of Russian functionaries, losing touch with life begins from failure to understand that the boss must be protected from unflattering truth.

Meanwhile in Tokyo the Russian president still had to explain that the decision to use force was necessitated, that it was painful, but unavoidable...

In addition, Moscow passed on and Tokyo accepted an official invitation to send Japanese observers to the 12 December elections.

The West—which politically speaking includes the Far East—the West from Washington to Tokyo does not wish to, and cannot, assume the stance of a bystander and observer. It has its own gigantic stake on Russia's "taxiing" toward stability through democracy rather than dictatorship. But it is not only a matter of this interest. Mature democratic states carry their share of responsibility for the events of 3-4 October in Moscow. By unequivocally supporting Yeltsin in the increasingly bitter confrontation with the Supreme Soviet, President Clinton and the other leaders furthered the polarization in Russian society, and thereby the recent bloody denouement. It would be no bad thing if, apart from anything else, the motive of redeeming guilt were present in their current actions.

What I have called an international system of checks does not mean, of course, interference in Russia's internal affairs. That would be counterproductive. However, delicate advice, at the same time not devoid of firmness, and warnings about the snares of authoritarianism emanating from the West are extremely necessary in the movement toward a rational democracy in Russia.

Political Issues

Impending 'Reorganization' of Government Viewed

MK2010125993 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 43, 24 Oct 93 (signed to press 19 Oct) p 18

[Vladimir Orlov report under the "Government" rubric: "Perestroyka According to Chernomyrdin?"]

[Text] Viktor Chernomyrdin intends to reorganize the government. Recommendations to this effect have already been sent to several "academic" institutes. Simultaneously, analysts at Staraya Ploshchad itself have gone to work.

The Russian Government remains today the only federal structure that has survived and even grown stronger after 21 September. More than that, the government is being conceived in the coming two to three years as a very strong and influential organ. At least this conclusion suggests itself after all sorts of projects on "power organs for the transition period" have been considered. Should the Security Council eventually be scrapped (this option is being considered), its functions would pass on to the government, or rather, to the "inner cabinet."

The prime minister's role during the 3-4 October events suggests the idea of a considerable strengthening of his positions. Chernomyrdin proved to be a much shrewder politician than even his closest associates had suspected. He managed to derive from the October disturbances the maximum—the official status of a second in command of the state. At the same time, the strengthening of Chernomyrdin's [illegible]d should not be overestimated: It could be a temporary factor. The premier still remains not too near the president's "earshot" although a rare day passes without face-to-face contacts between the two.

A change in the government structure is due and overdue. Some time in the past, Shumeyko undertook to "reorganize" and "trim" it. Today's result? There are nine "supervisors" in the persons of the vice premiers per thirty ministries and state committees. Three of them are first vice premiers. It is not quite clear who supervises what. The division of the spheres of influence appears to be less than conventional.

This "ladder" was created with an eye to specific persons. Each new person invited to sit in the government would not agree by then to join the government as a "plain minister." A vice premier not only sports a position that rings beautifully, but also a secretariat of five to eight persons and membership in the government collegium.

We have come to learn that the proposed reorganization is expected to lend the government's top echelon at least a civilized appearance: one premier, one first vice premier, three "plain" vice premiers....

One government source indicates that one should expect "with a great degree of probability" the resignation of Aleksandr Shokhin soon. The next probable move is that Boris Fedorov (a vice premier and the finance minister) takes over the Central Bank chairman's seat, while Yegor Gaydar combines the position of first vice premier with that of finance (or the economy and finance) minister.

Yuriy Yarov's prospects are unclear. Aleksandr Zaveryukha may continue as plain agriculture minister. Sergey Shakhray will leave to do party and parliamentary work, apparently, in the Federation Council. The future of Vladimir Shumeyko will most probably be linked with the new State Duma for which he is running on the Russia's Choice ticket. As the State Duma goes to work, he may lay claim to the chairman's (speaker's) seat of this chamber, although he now denies this. The "power" and political agencies (Defense, Security, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Justice Ministries, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Committee for State Reserves) will be supervised jointly by Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin.

Thus the extremely crowded situation at the government's top echelon will resolve itself. The question though is: when? Before 12 December is unlikely. The government will remain the most secure "cover" for top officials of the Yeltsin team until the election results become known. However, after 12 December, there will surely emerge a so far inadvertent tendency: a growing struggle for the premier's seat. Chernomyrdin got this seat, some radicals from Yeltsin's entourage think, only through blind chance and through the now disbanded Congress.

Rumors of Security Services' Shakeup 'Well Founded'

PM2110094793 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 (signed to press 19 Oct 93) p 1

["Sixth Floor" News Agency report: "New Boss in Store for Eavesdropping Specialists"]

[Text] According to information from confidential sources, the recent increasing rumors of reform in the Russian special services, primarily the Security Ministry, are well founded.

According to the sources' information, the president's entourage is supposedly considering a plan to put telephone tapping subunits within the Security Ministry structure under the jurisdiction of the Main Administration for the President's Protection.

Experts think that a gradual process of transferring major organizational structures within the former KGB to different jurisdiction is thus taking place without obvious reform of Security Ministry structures so as to concentrate control of security in the president's hands. Thus, after the putsch in August 1991, the former Eighth Main Directorate of the KGB (special communications)

was turned into the Federal Agency of Government Communications, supervision of whose activity was placed in the hands of the head of the president's administration. In August 1993, after Barannikov's dismissal, the Special Training Center and the Alpha group were removed from the Security Ministry structure and placed under the jurisdiction of the Main Administration for the President's Protection.

Sources have learned that Security Minister Nikolay Golushko opposed the transfer of the telephone tapping subunit to the jurisdiction of the Main Administration for the President's Protection. He tried to get a personal meeting with Yeltsin, but failed and only spoke to Filatov, head of the president's administration, who refrained from promising to organize a meeting and, in the sources' opinion, demonstrated that the "matter had already been decided."

Government Leaders' 19 Oct Activities Reported

PM2010162193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 1

[Unattributed feature: "Executive Branch Monitoring"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko has participated in the first sitting of the public chamber of the Constitutional Conference, chaired by Anatoliy Sobchak.

First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets chaired a sitting of the Commission for Urgent Questions, where questions such as the organization of work to implement agreements on industrial ties with the CIS states, the raw materials base of the oil and gas industry, and measures for its development were on the agenda, as well as questions which are to be reviewed at the commission's sittings in the fourth quarter of 1993. Then Oleg Soskovets took part in the "World Experience and Russia's Economy" international forum in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. After that he held consultations on industrial policy. In the afternoon, Oleg Soskovets took part in the work of the Commission for Urgent Questions.

Vice Premier Boris Fedorov was involved in settling current issues, and he held a number of working meetings. [passage omitted]

Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray held a commission sitting where the subject of discussion was the draft edicts of the Russian Federation President on local government organs and the basic provisions on holding elections to these organs. In addition, questions of the reform of representative power and local government organs were also examined at the sitting.

Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha held a sitting where questions of the harvest and the financial state of organizations in the agro-industrial complex were examined.

Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays gave an interview to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and the Mayak radio station. Then the vice premier received British ambassador to Russia Brian Fall. In the afternoon, Anatoliy Chubays met with St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak. [passage omitted]

White House Trial Attorneys Will Be 'Familiar Faces'

PM2010112793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[Journalist Dmitriy Varnavin report: "Attorneys Have Entered the Case of the October Revolt: All Familiar Faces..."]

[Text] As is known, charges have been laid against those assumed to be to blame for the bloodshed in Moscow. As yet the Prosecutor's Office is not trying to lend a political hue to this case, as happened in the case of the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency]—which caused that trial to be brought to a standstill. General Prosecutor Aleksey Kazannik has demonstrated his potential for countering those who, to judge from previous reports citing some "internal sources in the General Prosecutor's Office," have tried to draw him into political games.

To all appearances, the October rebels will be defended, with a few exceptions, by the same attorneys as those defending the accused in the SCSE case: Yuriy Ivanov, Kryuchkov's defense attorney, will defend Rutskoy, while Dmitriy Shteynberg, Varennikov's attorney, will defend Barannikov. Aleksandr Kligman, Tizyakov's defense attorney, and attorneys Dmitriy Fomichev (he will defend Khasbulatov) and Yuriy Borovkov will participate in the new trial.

Some attorneys do not consider it possible to work on two trials at once. "Khasbulatov and Rutskoy are witnesses and active participants in the SCSE trial," Genrikh Padva told our correspondent. "They have given very serious testimonies. I, for example, disagree with some of Khasbulatov's testimony, which I do not believe tallies with reality. How am I going to defend Khasbulatov in one trial, if in another I will be accusing him of untruthful testimony?" At the same time Dmitriy Shteynberg hopes to combine work in the two trials: A second attorney will help him to defend Barannikov.

All the attorneys, however, are unanimous in the opinion that their own political views must be of interest to no one.

'White House Snipers' Said Security Ministry Staffers

PM2010153593 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 (signed to press 19 Oct) p 1

["Own Information" report under the "From Unofficial Sources" rubric: "White House Snipers Had the Identity Cards of Russian Security Ministry Staffers"]

[Text] As NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA has learned from reliable sources, the operation to eliminate snipers positioned on the roofs of buildings in the area of the White House and the Arbat during the events of 3-4 October was carried out by a Moscow Internal Affairs Main Administration special militia detachment.

According to a member of that detachment who took a direct part in the operation, some of the snipers detained were not White House gunmen but were representatives of the Russian Security Ministry.

Their firing positions were located in the tall building which houses the Arbat restaurant and in the Ukraina Hotel. Firing was carried out from ordinary looking premises adapted by the Russian Security Ministry for so-called technical purposes. The snipers attributed their actions to fulfilment of a special mission. However, from specialists' standpoint, the sniper position above the Arbat restaurant was completely unsuitable for firing on the White House.

Official Comments on Investigation of Recent Events

PM2010163593 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Oct 93 p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Frolov, section chief of the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry Main Administration for Organized Crime, by Svetlana Orlyuk; place and date not given: "Russia Again in State of Emergency"—final three paragraphs are "own information" report]

[Text] Few people remember that the side that suffered—representatives of the three boys who died in August 1991—is also taking part in the hearings on the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. The "representatives of the interests" of those who died in October 1993 would, I fear, occupy the entire Russian Supreme Court building. Are we allowed to learn this time who is guilty and of what?

I personally find little inspiration in the fact that the investigation which has begun has been sanctified by a special edict by the president himself. He has determined the "briefest possible deadlines" to consider the tragedy involving thousands of protagonists. A just demand, there is no denying, but what could follow it in a month, three months, or a year?

I put that question to Aleksandr Frolov, now section chief of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Administration for Organized Crime. It was him I turned to, respecting the secrecy of the investigation—Frolov is not taking part in the case. His experience of work in Armenia, Fergana, and Osh and his leadership of a team in the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in our view enable him to discuss problems connected with the October events as a professional.

[Orlyuk] I fear that after the arrest of the "occupants" of the White House they will start to be accused of plots and treason and that the investigation will disappear into politics before it has scarcely begun...

[Frolov] In my view the question of description in connection with the October events is more or less clear—it is a case of mass disorders, of a crime stipulated by article 79 of the Russian Federation criminal code: "The organization of mass disorders accompanied by pogroms, destruction, arson, and other such actions and also the direct perpetration of the above crimes by their participants or their offering of armed resistance to the authorities..." In the actions of the organizers and direct participants there are signs of the elements of crime and on the basis of the results of the investigation they should in my view appear before the court. There is no politics here.

[Orlyuk] How do you imagine the "briefest possible deadlines" assigned to the investigators?

[Frolov] I think that if the investigation is not completed by the end of the year it loses any point since this will be followed by the lengthy familiarization of the accused with the materials of the case, the authorization of their pleas, and the preparation of formal charges.

[Orlyuk] Recalling the Moscow events of the recent past—at Ostankino in 1992 and on 1 May this year—when the start of the investigation was not announced so loudly, one does not have any great faith that this October case will be brought to a conclusion still less sent to court.

[Frolov] God grant I am wrong but my forecast on this score is highly skeptical. We have again found ourselves unprepared for an investigation of crimes of this kind.

First, work is now being done by separate teams—studying the incidents at Ostankino, the city hall, the White House, and so forth. If a single investigation group is being formed—that process has only begun. At least several weeks will be needed to set it up. Meanwhile time is already ticking by. Each day counts in such cases. In addition, no state of emergency relieves the investigators of the obligation to observe all procedural norms and guarantees, for which time is required. Furthermore, attorneys are engaged in other trials, which does not accelerate work on the matter.

[Orlyuk] As far as I understand it, the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency required no less promptness?

[Frolov] It was indeed unprecedented. We were helped by the fact that a group that had already been formed undertook the work. The team's backbone had experience in large-scale investigations. We had a good base, computers, programmers, and transport.

This problem did not arise today—large-scale conflicts have been shaking the country for at least five years. I am sure that a permanently operating group of investigators should exist with their own equipment and headquarters, ready at any moment to set to work in extraordinary

circumstances. I am speaking of a rapid deployment group which we have nonetheless managed to retain in truncated form after the elimination of the USSR Prosecutor's Office. At the time I heard that there were not and would not be any mass disorders in Russia, and that there was no need for such a group. Soon the Caucasus started to rumble. Can you name even one trial on the results of the investigation of these or other similar events of our recent history, including Moscow? Yet the October events are part of the same chain as the other events, which have so far had no legal assessment.

And now too they are not ready, they are beginning from nothing. I repeat: Time is already ticking away and there are only days left.

[Orlyuk] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, you speak of a single team that has worked well together while several criminal cases have been instituted in connection with the 3-4 October events...

[Frolov] I believe this to be a fundamental error—one cannot institute criminal proceedings on each case individually. There is a methodology of research into cases of mass disorders approved in many regions: Work must be done within the framework of one single criminal case since the events in Moscow in particular were encompassed by the same criminal design on the part of their organizers. The overall logic of the development of events is also traced—following a rising curve.

Yes, within the investigation group there can be some distribution of roles and specific incidents can be allocated. But initially it is essential to pass through the investigation team all information about the people who have come within their purview: Those who have been apprehended and arrested and removed from the White House... Only then is it possible to determine the role of the organizers and direct executors and bring full charges against them.

The threat that the case will be as voluminous as a rayon library can also be eliminated. At a certain stage of the investigation, materials on specific individual incidents—I have in mind pogroms, arson, deliberate killings in Moscow—should be allocated to independent proceedings. Not a single superfluous piece of paper should be left in the main case—the charges against the organizers.

I say this mindful of the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency—although the investigation took just five and one half months, a monster of 150 volumes was created whose study took far longer than the investigation. And this when a further 300 volumes had been allocated to separate proceedings.

[Orlyuk] In my view there is a danger that the fate of a delayed construction site has been prepared for the case of the October tragedy. In the confrontation that has taken shape, if everything had turned out differently other forces would have gotten the upper hand and the president would be in Lefortovo. The "October case" will turn out the same way events develop in the country in the future...

[Frolov] I know one thing for sure: Unless the forces of the investigation team are concentrated immediately no adequate potential will be created, it will get caught in organizational and procedural fetters and red tape. And the words "wait for a reply" will be heard for many years, as has been the case in the past...

But we have agreed not to talk about politics.

While material was being prepared for the press it became known that:

On the night of Friday to Saturday Ilya Konstantinov, leader of the banned National Salvation Front, was arrested. The warrant for his arrest was signed earlier and a little over a week ago a contract was concluded with lawyer V. Belyayev, who agreed to defend I. Konstantinov. The arrested man was without his usual beard, without weapons, offered no resistance, and is now in a Security Ministry remand cell in Lefortovo.

Following A. Makashov charges under article 79 of the criminal code, "mass disorders," were brought against A. Rutskoy, R. Khasbulatov, V. Achalov, V. Barannikov, and A. Dunayev. The article provides for imprisonment for two to 15 years.

Meanwhile A. Rutskoy has won a suit in Moscow's Sverdlovskiy Rayon court which had examined his suit against A. Karaulov, who back in August had "discredited the honor and dignity" of the vice president. The course decreed that 1 million rubles be confiscated from Karaulaov for Rutskoy. As we know, Rutskoy still faces a civil suit with IZVESTIYA.

A special group of investigators has left Moscow for Tiraspol to check information on the participation of military from the Dniester region in the Moscow events.

Presidential Defense Adviser Views Oct Events

LD2110090893 St. Petersburg Fifth Channel Television in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Oct 93

[Interview with Colonel General Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, presidential defense adviser, by Yevgeniy Kiselev; place and date not given; from the "Itogi" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Kiselev] Dmitriy Antonovich, what actually happened in Moscow on 3 and 4 October? What was that? A spontaneous demonstration by opponents of the president and supporters of Khasbulatov and Rutskoy, as some people think, or a previously prepared and planned action, as others think? Of course, the investigations will probably uncover the truth, or try to, but all the same, you, as a military man, as a participant in the events, as a presidential defense adviser, how do you yourself assess it?

[Volkogonov] A month ago a very highly placed person came to me in this very office and gave me extremely confidential material originating from the warlords of the White House, as I would put it. Essentially the information showed that at the very end of September or beginning of October an armed attempt at seizing power in the capital would be undertaken.

[Kiselev] So there were even signals of this kind arriving about the plots in preparation?

[Volkogonov] Yes. What is more, with specific dates they matched up absolutely. You know, I will tell you right away that I did not believe it. Well, it was very difficult to believe. It seemed improbable, seizing power in the capital by force of arms, but I nonetheless informed all the higher echelons [vse ochen vysokie instantsii] about it. There as well they listened but did not really believe it. I would even say that they more or less accepted it for information only.

There was no great spontaneous eruption; it was all planned. It all comes down to the fact that the warlords of the White House, as I call them, were betting on the army being either neutral or at best supporting the mutineers. Without the army joining in, they thought the domino effect could work. First you seize Ostankino, then the mayoralty, then a few ministries, then the Security Ministry, and if no decisive measures were taken the majority of state structures could simply have fallen into their hands within 24 hours, and a real large-scale civil war would already have begun.

[Kiselev] At that time, on Sunday, 3 October, when did they actually begin to realize what was really happening in Moscow here on Staraya Ploshchad and in the Kremlin?

[Volkogonov] You know, I had just left hospital. I had an urgent phone call on Sunday and left immediately for the Kremlin, and I will say this straight out: I found many people in the corridors with very little idea of what they should be doing; that is, a sort of fundamental panic, because it was a little shocking and unusual, a real storming of Ostankino and the mayoralty, and combatants [boyeviki] ready to go further. At the same time we were putting out these slogans everywhere. The Security Ministry was saying: We are not carrying out political investigations. True. No need to carry out political investigations, but that doesn't mean that the main function of the Security Ministry, state security, should be put on the back burner. When the question of whether the state is to exist or not arises, when a change of system is possible, it is simply impossible to say that the army is outside politics. To the very last moment, literally, on Sunday night this slogan was being proclaimed everywhere, that the army is outside politics.

[Kiselev] You mean to say that when we were hearing from Russian television's second channel, the only channel working, that Moscow was under the command of military units, the decision to storm the White House had still not been made?

[Volkogonov] The decision was made on Sunday night. I know that this decision was made by three people—the president, the prime minister, and the defense minister.

[Kiselev] Is it true that the president himself went [words indistinct]?

[Volkogonov] Absolutely true.

[Kiselev] At night, and held long negotiations there?

[Volkogonov] [Words indistinct] Chernomyrdin and there, as it were, there was a conversation, a fairly pointed one, and the decision was made. As it happened, subsequent military events were led by the defense minister himself, and led very professionally.

[Kiselev] What was it in the end that provoked the military on the night of 3-4 October to go through with it and take the most decisive action?

[Volkogonov] An order from the supreme commander in chief, given in the presence of the prime minister; they both went to the minister and there the decision was made. Alfa was brought into action.

[Kiselev] Incidentally, Dmitriy Antonovich, what forces specifically were activated to storm the White House?

[Volkogonov] On the whole it was possible to suppress the situation with a small quantity of forces. A decisive role was played by those 10 tanks which fired seven or eight shots; they completely paralyzed the will of the defenders and made them all run off to the cellars, and it was effectively only a matter of time. I have to say that at that time the White House was putting out a large number of rumors about such-and-such a division arriving on the mutineers' side, this regiment of that division had arrived and so on.

[Kiselev] But that was at the very beginning of the crisis.

[Volkogonov] The very beginning of the crisis. It was on Sunday night in particular as well. In this case we went over to 41 Leningradskiy Prospekt, the command post, the real control point where you can contact any unit. [Word indistinct] with Polyakov, the commander of the Kantemirov division, and spoke to others several times, and became convinced that the majority, the overwhelming majority of these instances were bluffs by the White House. But it was an extremely serious danger. If the mutineers had not stopped and had begun pogroms, seizures, and so on, it is difficult to say how some other state structures might have behaved, but Yeltsin was acting on the basis of the most important thing. He was acting on the basis not that it was simply a question of suppressing a mutiny, but a civil war in embryo.

[Kiselev] Were you in contact with the warlords of the White House?

[Volkogonov] We didn't—they called us themselves, before the line was cut. I didn't call anyone, they phoned. Voronin, Sokolov, and Sevastyanov called me, and they

all said more or less the same thing: Dmitriy Antonovich, use your influence to halt the firing, we are prepared to continue negotiations. Without taking any advice, I said only one thing: No negotiations. You have one chance: Come out of the third or 20th exit with a white flag and your hands up. We guarantee everyone's safety, but there can be no more negotiations. You have broken up these negotiations and broken agreements so many times that there cannot be any negotiations any more.

[Kiselev] Rutskoy and Khasbulatov did not phone?

[Volkogonov] No, they did not phone, but as I understood it, these people were of course calling with Rutskoy and Khasbulatov's knowledge, because they themselves would hardly have demanded...

[Kiselev, interrupting] Who, in your opinion, was in control of the situation [words indistinct]?

[Volkogonov] I think of course Rutskoy was in control of the situation.

[Kiselev] Tell me, Dmitriy Antonovich: Do you believe that the embryo of civil war is dead?

[Volkogonov] Yes, I think that the embryo of civil war, of the second civil war of this century, is dead. The danger was very great. It could have been the worst civil war in human history because it would have been in a nuclear country. So I think a very important step was taken on 4 October, but at the same time, I would not like this to give the president's side the possibility to crack down further and further now. Some people are pushing for that. Yes, I think criminal elements, fascists, and so on, should be purged; it's a serious job. On the whole, the rubicon of infringing on human rights and democratic freedoms and much else, questions of glasnost and so on, should not be crossed. I think great sensitivity should be shown by the president, the authorities, and the government, because it could lead to a very strong wave of reaction which would worsen the situation.

Soldiers Missing in 3-4 Oct Events Found

LD2110093093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0826 GMT 21 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow October 21 TASS—A dozen of soldiers of the Dzherzhinskiy interior troops division who were considered missing in the October 3-4 armed rebellion in Moscow are safe and sound, TASS learned from the interior force on Thursday.

The 18-19-year old soldiers fled the battle scene in Moscow and hid themselves at home. The fate of one soldier remains unknown, but the command of the division believes he is hiding at home too. It added that parents of some of the soldiers do not allow their sons back to the service.

The command said it had searched all the city morgues and hospitals for its servicemen, but finally discovered them at home.

Former Deputies Stand Firm in Fight for Housing

LD2010163393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1608 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—More than 20 deputies of the former Russian parliament have said they would fight to the end for the right to stay in the Moscow apartments which they have been ordered to vacate within three days.

Twenty four deputies who refused to leave the Russian parliament building and stayed there until the end of the siege said they can be evicted from their apartments only by court, but not by the president or the city administration.

They intend to file an appeal against the local authorities's illegal attempts to throw them out of their apartments. They also accused Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov of signing an illegal order to move out of the apartments which were provided to them for the duration of their deputy terms.

Filatov on Government Members Holding Deputies Posts

LD2010223893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2036 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] The date of presidential elections, scheduled for next summer, is a political compromise the president made under pressure from the opposition, said Chief of the Presidential Staff Sergey Filatov at a news conference on Wednesday. He confirmed that the dates for parliamentary and presidential elections remained unchanged, December 12 and June 12.

Sergey Filatov described as emotional the criticism representatives of a number of political parties voiced at the session of the Public Chamber of the Constitutional Conference against the idea of permitting government officials to be elected to parliament. He said he hoped that a new Constitution would allow that possibility. Sergey Filatov added that that rule would not apply to members of the presidential staff, who would have to pledge to quit their jobs in the case that they are elected to parliament.

Sergey Filatov said that currently there were 17 parties, associations and blocks planning to join the election process.

'Final Text' of Constitution To Be Ready Early Nov

LD2010174993 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1300 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] The final text of Russia's new draft constitution will be ready around 3-4 November. This has been disclosed by First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko. Prior to this, the public and state chambers of the Constitutional Conference, which are at work in Moscow, will make amendments to the final draft of the country's basic law. The Constitution will be deemed to have been adopted if over half the electors who turn out vote for it. It will then come into force immediately.

Report on Latest Developments in 1991 Coup Plotters Trial

LD2010173593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By correspondents A. Pishchayev and S. Gusev; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The hearing of the Statement of Indictment prepared by the Procuracy in the State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE] trial was continued today. The witnesses' testimony and the chronicle of events centered round two of the accused today—Kryuchkov and Yazov.

The plotters—this term is borrowed from the Statement of Indictment—attempts on 18 August to get in touch with the heads of union republics, with the intention of winning them over to their side, were described.

The case devotes a great deal of space to the conferences in the KGB and the USSR Defense Ministry on the eve of the putsch. The KGB worked out and implemented a plan for transferring more than 300 armed servicemen to the Baltic countries to maintain the state of emergency regulations. However, they were not brought into play.

The Defense Ministry, for its part, worked out in detail a plan to redeploy airborne assault troops to Moscow to protect the most important facilities.

The accused testified that there existed no plans to have Yeltsin arrested, but Gdlyan, Afanasyev, and other rabble-rousers were on a list of persons to be detained later on.

Facts concerning the visit those concerned with the SCSE paid to Gorbachev in Foros, and the details of Gorbachev's isolation from the outside world, were also publicly aired today.

It was emphasized that all in all, the plot had been planned and prepared beforehand. The Procuracy's view is that Kryuchkov's and Yazov's guilt is obvious. Incidentally, nor did the accused themselves deny their guilt, as their testimonies showed. The hearings in the case are continuing.

First Part of Indictment Announced

LD2010183493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1541 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—The first part of the indictment against former Soviet top officials was read out in Moscow on Wednesday in a two-year long show-trial launched after the August 1991 failed coup.

The document said that the coup leaders had held a secret meeting on August 17, four days before the putsch in Moscow, to discuss their roles and decide who would inform the leaders of other Soviet republics.

On August 19, 1991 Vladimir Kryuchkov, who headed the KGB at the time, phoned Kyrgyz leader Askar Akayev to tell him that a state of emergency had been imposed in the country. He then called Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk, but failed to reach him. Meanwhile, former Soviet prime minister Valentin Pavlov tried to get in touch with the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov.

The indictment also revealed that on the eve of the coup the KGB senior officials and the Soviet army top officers had also held secret meetings at which the then defence minister Dmitriy Yazov was told to be ready for bringing in troops to the city.

Other documents which were made public today told about coup leaders' moves to isolate former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev in his resort house in Foros, the Crimea, including cutting off all communications and increasing the number of loyal guards at Gorbachev's dacha.

Shakhray's PRUC Party Offers To Support Chernomyrdin

LD2010213193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1821 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray, leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Concord (PRUC), said he had had "a detailed conversation" with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin "about the aims, tasks, program principles and tactics of the new party."

In the course of the conversation, which took place prior to the party's founding congress in Novgorod, "we reached mutual understanding on the main points," Shakhray told Interfax in an exclusive interview on Wednesday.

Following the Novgorod congress, the party's senior body, the federal council, nominated Chernomyrdin a candidate to the State Duma, one of the chambers of the future parliament, for one of the constituencies (225 members of the State Duma are to be elected on party lists, the other 225 on a constituency basis).

"We hope we will have the consent of the prime minister and will be one of the organizations supporting his candidacy," he said.

PRUC takes the view that, though the premier, just as the president, "can, of course, be at the head of one of the blocs or party lists, this is hardly a good idea," Shakhray said, adding that Chernomyrdin agreed with this too.

Shakhray said PRUC had offered its support to the prime minister, but it was up to him whether to accept it or not. "In any case, we cannot see any serious reasons why PRUC should receive a refusal," he said. "We know that Viktor Chernomyrdin will be nominated in Orenburg Region, though we don't know whether he has consented to this," he said.

Shakhray is sure that membership of different government ministers in different electoral organizations, Russia's Choice and PRUC, will not cause a split in the government. When an election to the State Duma was announced, every member of government realized that the government was only temporary, he said. The new parliament and the president would form a new government, he said.

Nor could there any splits because neither the president nor the prime minister had joined any of the parties or blocs, Shakhray said.

He said PRUC was not prepared to join any large electoral blocs, for blocs tended to split or disintegrate, and some of their candidates, when elected to parliament, might take "unpredictable steps," while PRUC would like to be represented by people obeying to party discipline and keeping their commitments to their party and electors, Shakhray said.

Election Issues

Yeltsin Not To Postpone Parliamentary Elections

LD2010142593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1346 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina: "Yeltsin Will Not Postpone Elections - Aide"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin will not agree to move up parliamentary elections scheduled for December 12, according to Head of the Presidential Administration Sergey Filatov who added that early presidential elections should not be held in 1994 at all.

The president "does not accept the possibility of moving up elections to the Federal Assembly", Filatov told reporters on Wednesday adding, however, that election campaign is going on slower than necessary.

None of the election blocs has submitted the lists of the candidates to the Central Election Commission and, naturally, did not collect the necessary 100,000 signatures of voters, he stressed.

However, the Election Commission said two parties got their lists of candidates approved Wednesday and may begin collecting signatures.

Filatov said a presidential decree had been drafted to provide equal grounds for all parties running for parliament.

Dwelling on the early presidential elections scheduled for June 12, 1994, Filatov expressed the opinion of the presidential entourage that it is not "necessary to hold elections of the president every year." Yeltsin was elected in 1991 and enjoyed a confidence vote at the April 1993 referendum.

Filatov stressed that the decision to announce early presidential elections was a "compromise to which Yeltsin ceded under the pressure of soviets".

Filatov, however, supported the presidential decision to allow government ministers run for parliament without resigning and said this provision should be included into the draft constitution.

The decision to allow government members combine parliament seats with top executive jobs was opposed by the public chamber of the Constitutional Commission on Tuesday. However, Filatov said that the principle of the division of authorities "was made absurd" in russia and resulted in open hostilities between authorities which was demonstrated during the armed rebellion in Moscow.

He added that it is necessary to treat the decision of the president "from the position of the state interests".

Members of the presidential staff will also run for parliament, however, they are committed to resign from their posts if elected, according to Filatov.

Filatov on Preparations for Federal Assembly Elections

LD2010221393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Report on interview with Sergey Filatov, head of the Russian president's administration, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer Igor Vykhukholev] Sergey Filatov, the head of administration of the Russian Federation president, held a news conference today. It focused on the preparations for the elections to the Federal Assembly.

[Correspondent I. Minayev] A mere thought that the election campaign could begin and end smoothly would

be strange—the shortage of time is making itself felt. According to Sergey Filatov, the drawing up of normative documents and the formation of election blocs is taking longer than expected. However, the date for the elections to the Federal Assembly remains the same—the president's stance on this is adamant. [passage omitted]

Boris Yeltsin has also instructed that members of the government should not be forbidden to be elected parliamentary deputies.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified Correspondent] But does not the president's decision permitting members of the government to work in the [State] Duma violate the principle of division of powers?

[Filatov] The principle of division of powers consists in dividing their responsibilities—this is the most important thing. Could we implement the principle of division of powers when both branches of power performed the function of control, or of setting regulations? Once you have determined the responsibilities of each of the powers, the division of powers will be there.

[Correspondent] Is there no danger that the Russian citizens will not turn out at the elections because they have become too indifferent?

[Filatov] No, there is no such danger. I have received some information form Murmansk Oblast today, where at the best of times, when the president was being elected, the turnout at the polling stations was 80 percent. Now, according to forecasts, this figure will be 73 percent.

[Correspondent] Do you think this is a general trend?

[Filatov] Yes, I think so. [end recording]

Chubays, Yavlinsky Explain Position of Election Blocs

LD2110082193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1937 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow, 20 October—Anatoliy Chubays and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, the leaders of the two pre-election blocs "Russia's Choice" and "Republic" (provisional title), held a meeting today with the electors' club of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The aim of the meeting was to acquaint scientists with the program of the blocs, which in the future might ensure the support of the academic circles of either faction.

Although both "Russia's Choice" and "Republic" favor a new state with a market economy, they see different ways of achieving this objective. As Anatoliy Chubays stressed, the creation of the bloc he represents is the result of two years of work by the Russian Government in the move toward a market economy, although the most difficult stage of this path, he said, had already been passed.

Further moves in this direction and ongoing steps already taken by the government provide for a transition from the present unstable market relations toward economic growth. To achieve this, in the opinion of the head of the State Property Committee, we must "curb the increase in prices" and in the next couple of years complete the process of privatization based on principles already adopted and being utilized and introduce private ownership of land. If these main tasks are fulfilled, Anatoliy Chubays calculates, 1994 can become the year of stabilization when the slump in production will be halted and economic growth can begin in 1995.

Grigor Yavlinskiy, the "Republic" leader, described his bloc as "an independent democratic constructive opposition." On this occasion the author of the "500 Days" program gave no timetable for the implementation of his pre-election program. He believes that first much needs to be prepared in order to solve the basic economic question of ownership. In his view, "small privatization" amounts to private competitions and auctions for the populations of individual regions, whereas large-scale privatization means attracting funds for industry, which, in his opinion, is not being done at present.

Broadly speaking, "Republic's" work, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy assured, will be conducted within the framework of the new constitution (the bloc also favors its adoption). The main theses of its pre-election program are the protection of citizens' interests and freedoms, private ownership, an effective economy, and a worthy place in the world.

Ryabov Interviewed on Election Preparations

PM2010134193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 Oct 93 pp 1-2

[Interview with Nikolay Ryabov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, by Vladislav Krukovskiy in Moscow; date not given: "Russia Chooses Its Destiny"]

[Text] This tall building on the New Arbat is a focus for communications from all corners of Russia. Information is pouring in on the progress of preparations for the Federal Assembly elections. On the day we spoke with Nikolay Timofeyevich Ryabov, a number of documents had just landed on his desk. These were the Statute on the Election of Federation Council Deputies and submissions regarding the ratification of district electoral commission chairmen. The chairman's time is scheduled down to the last minute, and he found it hard to find a window for our conversation.

[Krukovskiy] Nikolay Timofeyevich, how do you assess the current state of preparations for the Federal Assembly elections? Do you get the feeling that things are being rushed?

[Ryabov] I have already said repeatedly that the timetable for the Federal Assembly elections is too tight. And there is the nationwide vote on the new Russian Constitution to contend with into the bargain. But we can fit into this schedule provided that we organize things well and everyone involved with the election process works well. And provided that we plan our preparations for the election, which is what we are currently doing. So, naturally, I do not feel that preparations are being rushed.

[Krukovskiy] Right, but the "ground rules" for the election mean that everything has to be done on schedule, there can be no making up for lost time afterward...

[Ryabov] We at the Central Electoral Commission are making every effort to ensure that the timetable for the preparations is unconditionally fulfilled in line with the Statute on Elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council. Work is currently under way at the local level to set up district electoral commissions, and we are embarking on the ratification of their chairmen in the republics and autonomous formations 19 October. Following this, the leaders of district commissions in krays, oblasts, and cities of federal status will be examined and ratified. In short, the statute stipulates that electoral commissions be set up by 23 October. So this will be done, their composition will be published in the Federation component press. The preparation of all election documents—ballot papers, electoral rolls, and so forth—is now virtually complete. In short, we have a clear concept of the state of play.

[Krukovskiy] To what extent will the president's decision to alter the procedure for forming the Federation Council and to organize elections to it complicate preparations for the election? Literally the other day an edict appeared on the holding of a referendum on the new constitution at the same time...

[Ryabov] Of course, the president's decision on the Federation Council elections complicates our work to a certain extent. But, in my view, it is entirely justified and natural. Russia needs to elect not just some chamber, but a parliament for a new democratic country as a whole. The Federation Council statute has been ratified and will be published in the next few days. It contains one new date, but it too is realistic for us. The other dates coincide with what has been envisaged for the preparation of the State Duma elections. So in practice the two timetables for the preparations completely overlap. The formation of two-seat electoral districts in Federation components is no problem either. The plan has already been prepared and published.

[Krukovskiy] Please explain Article 5 of the Statute on Elections to the State Duma. This relates to the right of groups of voters to nominate candidates in single-seat districts. Readers are asking how many voters such groups need and how they are set up.

[Ryabov] The statute covers the nomination of candidates by a group of voters. Such a group should contain at least 1 percent of the district's total number of registered voters. Therefore, a citizen wishing to be nominated, or an action group of individuals—irrespective of how many of them there are—will collect lists of signatures (the format has been published) and conduct a signature campaign in their electoral district. Having collected signatures from at least 1 percent of voters in the district, they will thereby have exercised their right to form a group of voters.

In the past we did this through so-called labor collectives, and now we are doing the same thing but by collecting signatures. Signatures can be collected at one or several large collectives. It is not recommended that signature campaigns be conducted at law enforcement organs or state institutions, and caution should be exercised in hospitals. It would be undesirable to conduct the campaigns during work time. The list of people wishing to nominate their candidate will constitute the group of working people referred to in the statute.

[Krukovskiy] How will the final results of the State Duma elections in the federal [obshchefederalnyy] electoral district be calculated? After all, it will require a considerable amount of mathematical calculation. On what technical basis will this be done, and who will be responsible for ensuring that the calculations are correct and impartial?

[Ryabov] The Central Electoral Commission will sum up these results. We are in charge of all district commissions and play this role ourselves in respect of the federal electoral district. Having obtained voting returns from electoral districts in the federal district, we will calculate the final results. We are now completing the computerization required and are developing a special program. The EC has offered technical assistance. We applied to them for computers and means of communication.

When it comes to elections in the federal district the Central Commission will also be responsible for seeing that the calculations are correct and impartial. Moreover, the statute stipulates that commissions of representatives of electoral associations, public observers, and even—for the first time—international observers will take part in the work.

[Krukovskiy] Incidentally, the decision to allow in foreign observers has already been made. How will it operate in practice?

[Ryabov] International observers from the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the G-7, the European Parliament, and a number of other international organizations will be taking part in the Russian elections for the first time. A special presidential edict on this will be issued in the very near future, and a statute on foreign observers is also in the pipeline. We already have a draft of it.

We have already met with representatives of a number of international organizations—specifically, envoys from

the G-7. In order to streamline this participation their activity will be coordinated. For our part, the Foreign Ministry has set up a special department for this work.

[Krukovskiy] Nikolay Timofeyevich, you have been an active participant in the Constitutional Conference and have fully experienced the drama of confrontation between the branches of power. What guarantees does society have that there will be no repetition of this nightmare after the formation of the new parliament?

[Ryabov] Maybe there are no absolute guarantees. It is very important that Russian people adopt a new constitution, because leaving the new parliament to "contend" with the old constitution would mean preserving all the old problems and contradictions. That is why the referendum on the new constitution is being held concurrently with the Federal Assembly elections.

The new constitution lays down a new relationship both in parliament itself (between the chambers) and between parliament, the president, and the government. There will be a new relationship between federal organs and Federation components. The new constitution also lays down legal guarantees to ensure that the tragedy of dyarchy is never repeated. Of course, the main guarantee of stability in society is its actual political standards. Unfortunately, life shows that our society has been found wanting in this area. So even the approval of the new constitution cannot be an absolute guarantee against any possible clashes between the branches of power. It will clearly take us many years to achieve political maturity.

[Krukovskiy] At a time when the corps of deputies is being formed rapidly it cannot be ruled out that by no means the worthiest people will be included in it. What do you think about the mechanism for recalling those who fail to justify the voters' hopes?

[Ryabov] From my standpoint, the recalling of deputies is a rudiment of our old politics. Yes, there used to be all kinds of instructions for deputies and demands that they work for their district... But we are electing the Federal Assembly to resolve statewide matters domestically and abroad. All those old instructions were just a way that was dreamed up to create a semblance of communications between the deputy and his voters.

It was a case of "if you've built us a hospital or a road, you're a good deputy. And if people in parliament are ruining the country and plunging it into civil war—that does not concern us!" We are only just getting over this kind of attitude.

Some of our ultraradicals, having nominated deputies under party lists, are prepared to demand that they implement their party's policy in parliament and carry out its will and instructions there. And if the deputies fail to do so, they will be replaced. No, this idea of recalling deputies is completely absurd—it will never happen. After all, it would mean that a deputy's mandate would be provided by some party or bloc rather than by the people. But this is not the case. The people decide who will be a deputy. So, from my standpoint, for all its apparent democracy, recalling deputies is by no means democratic in actual fact.

Gaydar, Kostikov on Election, Political Blocs

MK2010114993 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 4

[Interviews with First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar and Presidential Press Secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov by Konstantin Katanyan under the "Only for KURANTY" rubric: "President's Future Will Be Decided by New Parliament"]

[Text] The constituent congress of the "Russia's Choice" bloc nominated candidates to the State Duma. They are in for a tense election campaign. What will be its outcome? This question is answered by participants in the congress.

Russian Federation First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar

[Katanyan] You count on winning the elections. How many seats do you think your bloc, "Russia's Choice," may win?

[Gaydar] It is hard to say. Let us see how the election campaign unfolds. And, generally speaking, the role of a soothsayer does not suit me.

[Katanyan] Does the work of ministers in the parliament violate the principle of the separation of powers?

[Gaydar] The wonderful principle of the separation of powers should not be carried to absurdity. Banning government members from participating in parliamentary work serves only to heighten tensions between the branches of power. Such bans exist only in a limited number of countries. If we proceed from the experience of the government's work, not from pure theory, an unequivocal conclusion can be drawn that the separation of ministers from deputies provokes a conflict between them.

Vyacheslav Kostikov, press secretary of the Russian Federation president

[Katanyan] Democratic Russia argues against holding one-round elections in one-mandate districts. Do you think the president may review the regulation on elections?

[Kostikov] I would not like to go into details. The current situation is so changeable that we may well expect changes to this system as well. Russia is changing right before our eyes.

[Katanyan] Is the president really considering whether it is necessary to call presidential elections in June 1994?

[Kostikov] The president has said clearly that he is ready for presidential elections in June 1994. As for my opinion, I think that the president could stay on till the end of his constitutional tenure, that is, till 1996. I am

ready to give reasons for this conviction. For all the diversity of political leaders and political blocs, presently Russia does not have a leader who would combine the qualities of being simultaneously a politician, a statesman, a strategist, and a man who has vast government experience.

One of the president's objectives is to help bring up new political leaders. He understands that, as any other person, he is not immortal and that sooner or later new leaders will come to replace him. If the new Federal Assembly decides that the president has reached the end of his tenure, I do not rule out that Yeltsin may well review his decision.

[Katanyan] That is to say, the president's fate must be decided upon by the new parliament?

[Kostikov] Yes, a lot will depend on it, but we should not forget about the voice of Russia itself, about the evolution of the political situation, which is changing rapidly after the well-known political earthquake.

Commission Receives Parties' Candidate Lists

LD2010181993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1327 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] On Wednesday, the Central Electoral Commission received lists of candidates from the National-Republican Party (leader Sergey Rybnikov), the election association "August" which includes the Economic Freedom Party (Konstantin Borovoy) and the Constitutional Democrats' Party (Zolotaryov), and the Democratic Party of Russia (Nikolay Travkin), commission member Anastasia Tur told Interfax. She also said that she had no right to announce the number or names of the candidates figuring in the lists. To quote Tur, only parties and election alliances can do so.

One leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, Vyacheslav Smirnov, told Interfax that his party's list had 192 candidates, topped by the party leader Nikolay Travkin. Next come film-director Stanislav Govorukhin, Director of the Institute of World Economy, Academician Oleg Bogomolov, ex-Minister of Justice Nikolay Fedorov and ex- Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Sergey Glazyev.

Smirnov denied rumors about his party's plans to form an alliance with other parties and blocs.

Anastasia Tur also said that lists of candidates were expected to arrive soon from the Agrarian Party, the political movement Women of Russia, the Socialist Workers' Party (Roy Medvedyev), the Conservative Party (Lev Ubozhko) and the Russian Christian- Democratic Party.

She noted that the moment the parties and blocs received copies of their lists, they had the right to begin collecting voters' signatures (100,000 will suffice). The deadline for submitting the signatures is November 7.

Large bloc such as Russia's Choice and the Russian Party of Unity and Accord have not yet presented their lists, said Anastasia Tur.

Sobchak Says Election Rules Being Amended Out of Necessity

MK2010113593 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 1

[Konstantin Katanyan report: "We Are Doing It Much Too Fast"]

[Text] The work of the Public Chamber of the Constitutional Assembly resumed in the Kremlin yesterday.

St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, coordinator of the Chamber, told KURANTY about the first day of this forum's proceedings.

[Sobchak] The discussion, I think, is proceeding fruitfully. There were many proposals on ensuring the most democratic procedure for the elections.

[Katanyan] Does not it worry you that the rules of the game are changing while it is in progress, as they say?

[Sobchak] Indeed, on the one hand, all sorts of additions and amendments while the election campaign is already in progress are undesirable.

On the other hand, since the terms of holding the campaign have been formulated by presidential edict and the corresponding rules have not been used in practice (as it was in the past when provisions of laws were supplemented by instructions of the Central Electoral Commission) many questions that were lost sight of surface instantly. One is thus obliged to violate the principle that the rules of the game should remain unchanged.

There is also a radical proposal—to postpone the elections, say, until next spring, and to hold the referendum on a new constitution in the meantime.

[Katanyan] Do you personally go along with the idea?

[Sobchak] I would describe the proposal as attractive. But once the election campaign lets go full blast, when dozens of political parties and blocs have entered the race, it would be too tricky to stop this campaign, which would be in full swing.

Chernomyrdin Not To Head Shakhray's Unity Party

LD2010130093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0816 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—"Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has no intentions to head the party of Russian Unity and Accord," Valentin

Sergeyev, spokesman of the premier, told TASS on Wednesday denying corresponding mass media reports.

"Rumours on this account are completely groundless", he added.

The party was founded by Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray to represent regional interests.

Six Parties To Remain Barred From Elections

LD2010161793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1327 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] All parties suspended by the presidential decree "On the state of emergency in Moscow" can resume their activity after the expiry of the state of emergency on October 18.

A Justice Ministry executive has remarked in an interview with Interfax that his department "sees no reason to refuse registration in the Federal Assembly election campaign to those 10 banned parties which do not figure in the decree issued by the president on October 19. According to that decree ("On some measures to maintain national security during the 1993 election campaign"), only 6 organizations are barred from registration for elections on December 12—the National Salvation Front (led by Ilya Konstantinov and Albert Makashov), the Russian Communist Workers Party (Viktor Anpilov), the Officers Union (Stanislav Terekhov), Shield Union, a social security fund for servicemen (leader Vitaliy Urazhtsev), the Russian Communist Youth League (Igor Malyarov), and the Russian National Unity (Aleksandr Barkashov).

Thus, the Labor Russia Movement (whose rules have not been registered by the Justice Department), the People's Party of Free Russia (led by Grigoriy Vodolazov), and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Gennadiy Zyuganov) have the right to draw up documents necessary for the election campaign and nominate their candidates.

Suspended Parties' Approach to Elections Viewed

PM2110102193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 1

[Georgiy Marinin article: "Lonely Opposition Provided With Seats in Duma"]

[Text] The opposition's call for a concerted boycott of the December elections was most likely made very much in the heat of the moment: The majority of opposition members quite quickly grasped the fact that they did not like at all the idea of banging their head against the locked doors of Russian politics for several years. But the adoption of the decree on participation in the elections does not make things much clearer: After October's attempted coup the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice banned the activities of all more or less well-known parties and movements. So what, after all, do they intend to do?

"All the blocs to which the Russian Communist Youth League [RCYL] belonged have been banned along with it," Dmitriy Churakov, secretary of the RCYL Central Committee, sighed, "and so the RCYL will probably endeavor to 'insert' its own candidates into organizations whose election program includes points on social protection for young people. It could very well be that preference will be given to the Socialist Party of Working People, 'Working Russia' and the Russian Communist Workers Party, which are in a state of shock following the arrest of their leader Viktor Anpilov, have not yet chosen a new leader and are not giving any thought to other elections—they are more concerned about the possible removal of Ilich's mummy from the Mausoleum. There are also hopes that 'in a month or two' Yeltsin will be swept aside by a popular uprising, and then all difficulties will disappear of their own accord."

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] has lodged a protest with the Ministry of Justice and is torn at present by an internal struggle: Are the communists still to participate in the elections or not? Supporters of the elections predominate, but this is not what counts: Therefore the possibility of nominating the party's leaders (including its leader Gennadiy Zyuganov) as independent candidates is being considered. The CPRF will agree to this only as a last resort, since it is perfectly well aware that in this way it could lose up to half of the votes due to it.

The NSF [National Salvation Front] is no longer a united front. Already flimsy, with the ban it collapsed once and for all. Waving goodbye to the sinking ship of the NSF, its numerous members have decided to act "everyone for himself." There is no information yet as to which way out the "brothers in arms" have found (conferences continue incessantly).

Having assessed the existing situation in an instant but missed the chance to get away from the storming of parliament, Sergey Baburin has gone away to his electoral district with a view to possible meetings with potential voters.

"The 'Russian National Union' [RNU], in which Baburin is chairman and I am a member of the board, is a legal movement," Nikolay Pavlov, former member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, commented, "and therefore it can nominate both of us both independently and as candidates from the party. It is likely that both things could happen."

[Marinin] But do you not admit that tomorrow, let us say, the RNU will join the list of banned parties?

[Pavlov] Of course. The authorities can do what they like now.

[Marinin] What is your prognosis regarding the results of the elections to the State Duma?

[Pavlov] The opposition will secure a significant minority. Limited success is possible for Gaydar's "Russia's Choice" bloc. Money will come into the struggle for votes in single-seat districts.... [Pavlov ends]

As for such a musical-comedy opposition grouping as the "Permanently Functioning Presidium of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies" (which also belonged to the aforementioned deceased NSF), naturally its representatives will not run for deputy, since Sazhi Umalatova and Viktor Alksnis consider their office "the only legitimate organ of power on the entire territory of the Soviet Union."

Several other "suspended" parties plan initially to bide their time and hope that "things will be sorted out" (these include the Free Russia People's Party). It is obvious that in this way the opposition, which takes a partly temporizing stand and has not yet decided whether or not it should, nonetheless, participate in "illegitimate" elections, is totally incapable of knocking together a strong election bloc during the remaining two months and, on top of everything else, is in a state of unprecedented fragmentation. But if the tactic of "independent candidates" is adopted, there is a chance of uniting the opposition members who get into the Duma into a new antipresidential strike force, albeit not as strong as before. It is not a stupid plan: If the new parliament again contrives to be a thorn in Yeltsin's flesh, it will be awkward to break it up in less than three years' time. But three years is quite a long time....

Communist Party Participates in Pre-Election Campaign

LD2010144693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1056 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party Gennadiy Zyuganov told Interfax on Wednesday that, after the lifting of the state of emergency in Moscow, all restrictions on the activity of the Russian Communist Party had been removed.

In his words, on Tuesday and Wednesday morning the party's leadership had consultations with Russia's Justice Minster Yuriy Kalmykov and Chairman of the Central Election Commission Nikolay Ryabov concerning possibilities to resume the party's political activity and its participation in the pre-election campaign.

Zyuganov explained that in the course of the consultations he had received explanations that, due to removal of the state of emergency, all restrictions imposed on the political activity of those organizations which are not mentioned in the presidential decree "On Measures to Ensure State and Public Security during Election Campaign in 1993" issued after the lifting of the state of emergency had been removed.

The presidential decree rules out participation of such organizations as the National Salvation Front (leaders Ilya Konstantinov and Albert Makashov), Russian Communist Labor Party (Viktor Anpilov), public club Union of Officers (Stanislav Terekhov), Union Shield (Vitaliy Urazhtsev), Russian Communist Youth Union (Igor Malyarov), and Russian National Unity (Aleksandr Barkashov) in the upcoming elections.

Zyuganov reiterated that the party opposed "political extremism" and viewed "early elections as a peaceful way out of the crisis situation in the country."

He said that the presidium of the Central Executive Committee would hold its session on Thursday [21 October] to discuss the tactics and strategy of the party's participation in the country's political life and, primarily, in elections to the Federal Assembly. At the same time Zyuganov indicated that tactics of participation can be quite different, namely formation of a separate election list, nomination of candidacies on territorial districts, and support of other left-wing blocs and movements.

Communists Call For Boycott of Elections

LD2010191893 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Union of USSR Communist Parties calls on communists to use the tactic of vigorous boycott with regard to the upcoming elections to the Federal Assembly and voting on the Constitution and to refrain from nominating candidates to both chambers of the Federal Assembly or at least to vote against all the candidates on the ballot papers.

Revised Statute on Elections Criticized

PM2010141193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Oct 93 First Edition p 4

[Report by Irina Demchenko: "Parliament Cannot Be at a Higher Level than Society"]

[Text] Vladimir Tumanov, a well-known legal expert and a specialist in the field of constitutional law, is not optimistic when assessing the quality of the future Russian parliament, the Federal Assembly. In his opinion, parliament's political and legal sophistication cannot be higher than that of society as a whole. Or, to be more precise, only a little higher, Tumanov said.

Vladimir Tumanov believes that the new, revised Statute on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma gives diminutive parties excessive and unjustifiably large advantages, making them privileged participants in the election process. The leaders of some of these parties are not even ashamed to say that the electoral law will personally guarantee them a seat in parliament.

Elections based on party lists would be a good idea, the legal expert believes, if only as an experiment, provided our country had an established and stable party system with strong traditions, deep roots in the regions, active

members, and different programs. But there is no such thing in Russia: Our amorphous, largely elite parties have no broad base or political line. The members of all the political parties taken together account for no more than 1 percent of the country's population. The authors of the Statute on Elections believe that, by reserving one-half of the seats in the State Duma for parties, they will contribute to refining the party system in our country. However, Tumanov pointed out, the purpose of holding elections is to form an efficient parliament and not to improve the party system.

Of all the unjustified party privileges, Tumanov drew particular attention to the inequality experienced by independent candidates in comparison to "party" candidates during nomination. Under the new version of the Statute, parties are required to collect 100,000 voters' signatures in support of their list—not in any particular electoral district, but across the country. A party with 2,000-3,000 members can simply go around friends and relatives. Having registered this federal list, the party—and this is very important—automatically receives the right to nominate its candidate in each single-seat electoral district. In other words, a party can nominate 450 candidates—one-half for the federal district and one-half for single-seat electoral districts—thereby contesting every parliamentary seat at once.

The independent contender, on the other hand, must first collect the signatures of 1 percent of his district's voters (approximately 5,000-6,000 signatures in a single region) in order to register his candidacy. Let us compare: 100,000 signatures across the country to register 450 candidates (that is, 222 signatures each) and 5,000-6,000 signatures in a single district to register one candidate. No developed democratic country has such a heavy qualification limiting the nomination of candidates (depending on the country, a maximum of 200 signatures and an average of 10-20 signatures are required to nominate a candidate from an electoral district). Moreover, Tumanov pointed out that, apart from Russia, there are only three states in the world which act as a single electoral district during elections: Israel, the Netherlands, and Lithuania. None of them can compare with the Russian Federation in size or in the nature of their national state structure. In all other democratic states, elections based on party lists are held in individual electoral districts.

Tumanov believes that parties which only exist in their leaders' imagination and on the Justice Ministry's registration list could win enough votes during voting on the federal list to gain two or three seats in parliament. To increase their chances, he assumes they could use the well-known method of including popular public figures, politicians, statesmen, singers, sportsmen, and so forth in their electoral list.

In Vladimir Tumanov's opinion, the outcome of voting based on the mixed system proposed by the current Statute on Elections will primarily be decided by small Russian towns and villages, whose population is often more conservative in its beliefs than the population of large and medium worker cities. "The more deputies that are elected on the basis of federal lists, the greater will be the danger of a concentration of conservative forces in the future parliament," he said, "as populist slogans and appeals are still very popular in society."

Moreover, Tumanov claims that deputies elected from party lists to the State Duma cannot be recalled: It is not possible to determine who voted for them across the country. At the same time, in his opinion, voters should no longer have the right to recall a deputy "inherited from 'socialist democracy.'" Tumanov believes that deputies in the State Duma must be regarded as, and feel themselves to be, representatives of the entire nation—regardless of the kind of list from which they are elected. Deputies must be personally independent. In this sense, he categorically disagrees with the proposal now under discussion: Namely, to give parties the right to recall "their" deputy who has not lived up to the party's trust and replace him with the next person on the party list.

Vladimir Tumanov is convinced that the political situation in the country, the level of legal awareness, the economic situation, and the moral and psychological climate in society determine the quality of parliament and the conduct of its members. Taking all these factors together, he believes we should not expect much from the future Federal Assembly. We will probably elect a parliament that is not too intelligent, not very intellectual, and not entirely professional.

However, Tumanov added, even with a parliament of inferior quality, there is a means of organizing and formalizing its activity in such a way as to avoid a repetition of past mistakes. In this regard, he believes, the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation prepared by the Constitutional Conference lays reasonable foundations. According to this draft, the two chambers work separately, have different powers, and are relatively independent of one another. This will prevent parliament from becoming an amorphous "herd" led by one shepherd. Moreover, the draft Constitution does not give deputies the right to adopt populist draft laws which wreck the state budget.

However, this is not enough, the legal expert said. We must clearly establish, for example, that parliament does not have the right to act as owner and distributor of property funds, engage in self-financing, or turn its monitoring function into direct interference in the administrative process. Parliament must not have the right to set up organs like the Supreme Soviet Presidium, own dachas and subsidiary plots, found press organs, and so forth. There must be measures to monitor deputies' income (termed "financial transparency" in the West). The responsibility for tackling such issues must not be given to parliament itself. This "corridor" must be specified in advance, before the elections, as deputies must not have the right or the opportunity to alter its boundaries. Otherwise, we will again hear sessions of the country's supreme representative organ discussing the

question of deputies buying cars or privatizing office premises in the capital. It would be right to lay down all the legal restrictions needed to ensure that the new parliament functions in a civilized manner either in constitutional regulations or in a special act.

Democratic Russia's Members Unhappy With Party Chiefs

MK2010142993 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 2

[Aleksandr Mitrofanov report: "'DemRussia' Promises To Punish Its Leaders"]

[Text] Whereas "DemRussia" leaders describe the results of the founding congress of the Russia's Choice bloc as "our joint victory," "DemRussia" activists believe that their movement has already lost the parliamentary elections and that it is their leaders who are to blame for the defeat.

The "Russian democrats" are sure that the bloc's distinguished founders, suspecting "DemRussia"—which they see as inclined to hysterical populist activity [isterichnaya mitingovost]—of "an infantile understanding of democracy," have done everything to make their positions within Russia's Choice as modest as possible so as not to frighten away law-abiding voters.

Ponomarev, on the contrary, maintains that it was precisely "DemRussia" which, by using its popularity among the marginal democrats, would bring more votes to the election coalition. By attracting the marginal strata of the population to its rallies, "DemRussia," as Ponomarev explained to journalists, thus prevents them from gravitating toward the communists, who will surely direct the lumpenized elements toward "militia chains."

Lev Ponomarev condemned the traitors from "DemRussia" who have switched over to another side—toward new, more generous masters and who "demonstratively" voted against Yakunin and Ponomarev's being included in the election slate. Adding insult to injury, "DemRussia" regional overseers have fled, taking with them, among other things, lists with the addresses of provincial organizations.

Nonetheless, "DemRussia's" rank and file are primarily dissatisfied with their own bosses who have failed the ensure the movement's success at the Congress. They decided to hold a "DemRussia" plenum in December where they will stage a showdown with their leaders.

Socialist Workers Party Sets Up Opposition Bloc

MK2010151993 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 2

[Indira Dunayeva, Yevgeniy Krasnikov report under the "Elections" rubric: "First Opposition Bloc Formed"]

[Text] The Socialist Workers Party [SWP] held its congress yesterday. "We are going to take part in elections in the conditions of a dictatorship," was how SWP Chairman Lyudmila Vartazarova described the current political situation. One of the key issues discussed at the congress was forming an electoral bloc. According to Vartazarova, presently it is more important to take into account tactical similarities of various opposition organizations, not general strategy matters. For instance, according to a view generally held by the congress delegates, such similarities include the attitude to the October coup d'etat, the shelling of the White House, the elimination of the representative authorities and the system of democratic freedoms in Russia. The delegates also adopted by a majority vote (only one delegate voted against) a decision to set up a new electoral bloc, which, apart from the SWP, will include the Union of Russia's Revival under Dmitriy Rogozin, the Russian Union of Workers' Collectives, and a number of sectoral trade unions from the construction and timber industries.

The SWP's federal list included around 70 candidates (in addition to SWP members, it comprises representatives of the Labor Party, the Congress of the Left-Wing Democratic Forces, and the "New Left" association). The congress also approved the SWP's election motto: "Social justice, democracy, freedom."

Republican Party Discusses Joining Election Bloc

PM2110083793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[Andrey Zhukov report: "With Whom Will Republicans Side?"]

[Text] The Republican Party of Russia [RPR] Congress has been held in Moscow. We would remind you that the Republicans are not very numerous—around just 5,000 people. But the RPR contains many leaders of local administrations and this transforms the party into a substantial political force.

The main topic at the congress was the question of the RPR's joining a particular election bloc since the Republicans autonomously are simply unable to collect the 100,000 signatures needed to register their own federal list.

Many of the RPR's local organizations have already joined the "Russia's Choice" democratic bloc. But party leaders Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy and Igor Yakovenko believe that disagreement with the current version of reforms—in which there are plenty of negative aspects—is coming to a head in Russia. Thus, the bureaucracy has increased many times over. Numerically it is already larger than the entire former party-state apparatus. Moreover there is a real threat of an authoritarian regime, there are already signs of it: Opposition newspapers have been closed down and political parties banned.

The Republicans also took a disparate view of the events of October in Moscow. Some speakers believe that a crushing blow could have been dealt to mafia cells as a

result of the state of emergency in the capital, but instead small fry are being evicted or altogether innocent people are suffering.

Yegor Gaydar, Konstantin Zatulin, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy addressed the RPR Congress as guests. Gaydar described the prospects for the country's development and urged the Republicans to join the "Russia's Choice" election bloc. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy expressed total support for the strong-arm suppression of the revolt in Moscow and said that he and Lukin, Russia's former ambassador to the United States, are currently engaged in creating their own election bloc, which admittedly does not have a name yet. Konstantin Zatulin said in his speech that both sides—the White House leadership and the president's side—bear responsibility for the events of October.

So, with whom will the Republicans ally to go to the polls?

Media Issues

Press Secretary Promoted to Ministerial Rank

LD2010215393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Russian Government has adopted a resolution appointing Valentin Sergeyev, head of the press service of the Council of Ministers, a plenipotentiary of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, with the rank of Russian Federation minister. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the chairman of the government, signed this resolution today. Valentin Sergeyev is an experienced journalist who has been in the profession for many years and we are pleased to know that a colleague of ours will hold this important post.

Moscow To Look Into Media's Role in 3-4 Oct Events

LD2010203893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1920 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow October 20 ITAR-TASS—"Now that some time has elapsed since the tragic events of October 3-4, 1993, it is possible to take a more balanced look at the part played by the mass media outlets whose activity has since been suspended or terminated completely," the Russian Press and Information Ministry said in statement circulated on Wednesday.

"It is no secret to anyone that such publications as the newspaper DEN (DAY), NARODNAYA PRAVDA (POPULAR TRUTH) and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (SOVIET RUSSIA), which persistently promoted a hostile attitude toward the current economic and political reforms in our society, the president and the government, acted as virtual ideological headquarters in preparing the uprising.

The leaders of these newspapers, including the sacked editors-in- chief of PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, should and could have foreseen where one or another publication might push the readers. They did foresee this, moreover they made their own contribution—denounced by the god and the people—to the preparation for violence, blood was spilled, tens of human lives were sacrificed—that was the price the people had to pay for unrestrained political ambitions of the eternal "have-beens" who rallied with ultra-right wing nationalists, fascists and the like.

"In the entire civilized world, the opposition media suggest to society one or another way out of the crisis instead of instigating senseless bloodshed which can do little but outlaw the instigators.

"As concerns such publications as "RUSSKIY PORIYADOK" (RUSSIAN ORDER), "K TOPORU!" (TAKE UP THE AXE) and the like, which openly propagated the misanthropic Fascist ideology, the ministry deserves a rebuke for suppressing their activity only after the bloodbath.

"It would seem that no normal individual would doubt the legality of this step on the part of the ministry.

"However some domestic and foreign civil and political rights activists have called, in defiance of the common sense, for a "civilized handling of the matter", as if forgetful of the truth that where fascism begins, civilization ends. Calling on us to follow international law, advocates of Nazism and Fascism deliberately overlook the fact that the ministry acted in strict accordance with the international convention of civil and political rights adopted on December 19, 1966, which said in particular that any utterance in favour of national, racial or religious hatred which instigates discrimination, enmity or violence must be prohibited by law". (Art. 20, Para 2).

"This is why we say with full responsibility, unafraid of invented and essentially speculative accusations of dictatorship, that the Fascist press will always be outlawed, no matter what disguise it would don.

"The responsibility for the bloodshed must be taken by the leaders, instigators and participants in the armed uprising, and they will be made responsible.

"As concerns PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, their activity has not been banned but only suspended and will resume after they fulfil the requirements of legislation.

"The editors of the newspaper GLASNOST, "the organ of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," are to blame for the suspension of the publication—they have failed to comply with law and find a real founder instead of the non-existent central committee.

"As concerns the newspaper "YESHCHO" (MORE), which was in no way involved in the violence in early October, it was openly seeking to deprive its readers of

any moral footing. Activity of this kind and calls for the destruction of any morals and morality are deemed to be no less dangerous for society than the calls for restoring the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"Aggressive amorality with its degrading influence is a no lesser danger to society than Fascism, and we intend to carry on a consistent and tough struggle against it."

Government Says Papers 'Suspended,' Not Banned

LD2110095593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 21 Oct 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Russia's Ministry of Press and Information has issued a clarification about the ban imposed on a number of newspapers. The statement stresses that fascist papers will always be outlawed in Russia, no matter what form they take. The activities of PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA have been suspended rather than banned, however. After they have complied with the requirements of legislation, these papers will be allowed to resume their activities.

PRAVDA To Be Known as PUT PRAVDY Under New Editor

PM2110102393 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 6

[NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA Political Department report: "PRAVDA Dealt With With Party-Minded Severity"]

[Text] First Deputy Information Minister David Tsabriya, implementing the Russian Federation president's Edicts Nos. 1400 and 1578, ORDERED (!) that Gennadiy Nikolayevich Seleznev be relieved of his post as PRAVDA chief editor as of 13 October 1993 and that Aleksandr Alekseyevich Ilin be appointed acting chief editor.

There are doubts as to whether a deputy information minister, even if he is a first deputy, has the authority to fire and appoint newspapers' chief editors. He could also, implementing the esteemed person's edict, just as successfully deprive Sazha Umalatova of her mother's rights—can you really entrust the raising of children to a person with those kind of views?

But if Citizen Tsabriya does not fully grasp the subtleties of jurisprudence, Russia's new general prosecutor should certainly have paid attention to this clear breach of the law.

Incidentally, the Ministry of Information has asked the editorial office to change the name and thrust of its publication. In simpler terms, the newspaper has been banned by the ministry although, as you know, bans are solely the prerogative of the court.

But Citizen Tsabriya's activity in the field of cadre selection and placement elicits particular attention. The specially created commission could hardly, after long, protracted work, have found a more—as we are now accustomed to say—"pro-communist" person among PRAVDA's personnel.

He may of course change PRAVDA's course, but not in the way society expects.

According to the PRAVDA editorial office, the appointed acting chief editor has gotten straight down to business. He has devised a new name—PUT PRAVDY—and begun signing up volunteers. All manner of support from the "high-ups" indicates that there should be no doubts as to his being victorious. Expect to see PUT PRAVDY (founded by A. Ilin in October 1993) on the newsstands.

And PRAVDA personnel have learned another lesson: The main thing is not your convictions, but your willingness to serve. You can even have a Communist eating out of your hand.

Viktor Loshak To Head MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI

MK2010124093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 43, 24 Oct 93 (signed to press 19 Oct) p 12

[Unattributed report under the "MN" rubric]

[Text] Our newspaper has a new editor-in-chief. Viktor Loshak was unanimously elected to this post by the newspaper's general meeting.

He is 41 years old. Seven years ago he started out at MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI as a reporter, and since then he has not missed a single rung on the editorial board's ladder. The new editor-in- chief is married and has a daughter.

Len Karpinskiy, who asked the collective that he be relieved of the post of editor-in-chief for health reasons, will stay at the newspaper. A well-known columnist and philosopher, he will head the editorial council—the conference of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI authors—and will continue to work as a political observer.

SOVETSKIY PATRIOT To Sue Censors

PM2010160193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 2

["Own information" report: "Censorship Will Not Get By"]

[Text] It is easier to impose censorship than to abolish it. The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editorial Office has the issue of the newspaper PATRIOT signed to press 14 October (eight days after censorship was lifted!), which has a gaping blank space on page 2.

In reply to our question M. Zemskov, chief editor of the weekly (the former DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance To the USSR Army, Air Force, and Navy] publication SOVETSKIY PATRIOT),

explained that this was a doubly absurd thing, since the material had been removed from the issue by censors at the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Publishing House (the newspaper is printed on the basis of a contract with the printing house and has nothing to do with the publishing house).

The editorial board was forced to give in to blackmail (either you take out the material, or the issue does not appear) in the name of its subscribers.

But Chief Editor Zemskov, rightly believing that an article of the Criminal Code ("preventing the legitimate activity of journalists") has been violated, intends to apply to the Russian Federation General Prosecutor's Office, to institute criminal proceedings against the censors, and to demand compensation for the moral and material harm.

Particularly as the newspaper's attorney has averred that he cannot lose the case—the larger the sum that the PATRIOT Editorial Office requests, the greater his personal fee will be.

Economic Issues

Fedorov Discusses Financial Stabilization

PM2010130793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 Oct 93 p i

[Article by Boris Fedorov, deputy prime minister and finance minister; from the "Delo" supplement: "Russia's Finances Can Be Put Right. Unpleasant Stabilization Medicine Already Working"]

[Text] I consider the continuation of the policy aimed at achieving financial stabilization in the country to be one of the most important tasks facing the Russian Government. This is a multifaceted policy and, of course, we are by no means achieving noticeable progress everywhere. However, there are some things that allow us to say that the government's efforts of late are beginning to bear fruit.

Budget Being Patched Up, but Not Cracking Up Any More

Through incredible effort we intend to hold the federal budget deficit in the fourth quarter to 4.6 trillion rubles [R]. I would recall that, under the plans approved by parliament, it was permitted to reach no less than R20 trillion. Thus, Central Bank lending in the third quarter—despite a number of unfavorable factors relating to monetary reform and the raising of energy prices—has grown by less than 50 percent, even though certain experts had predicted at least 80-90-percent growth. For comparison purposes, Central Bank lending grew by 185 percent in the third quarter of 1992. As we can see, this is a substantial difference. And, despite the political upheavals, the ruble-dollar rate has been virtually stable for the past four months.

I think that a budget deficit of R4.6 trillion in the fourth quarter—or around R13 trillion for the year (10 percent of GDP)—is far better than our old indicators of 5-6 percent of GDP, which failed to take into account lots of other spending which did not pass through the budget.

At the same time, I must note that even the R4.6 trillion budget deficit in the fourth quarter is a very tough figure and requires a very tough policy from the government.

Landmarks on the Road to Stabilization

I could note a number of government decisions of late that have directly promoted financial stabilization in the country. These are, as it were, landmarks which not only help us to get an overall impression of the Council of Ministers' activities in the financial sphere, but confirm that the government has been quite consistent in its actions.

First and foremost I would like to note the fact that, as a matter of principle, we have not allowed enterprises to **mutually offset their nonpayments** as the former Supreme Soviet and sector lobbyists had unambiguously been insisting.

Moreover, the president has on his desk an edict on the compulsory conversion of plants' and factories' deferred debts to each other into short-term commercial paper redeemable in three to six months' time, after which bankruptcy proceedings will be instituted against defaulting enterprises. I am confident that when the prospect of bankruptcy becomes a reality, most enterprises will find a way of quickly redeeming their paper.

The second principled decision is that we would refrain from **indexing the circulating capital** of enterprises by printing more money. I am sure that it will take no more than six months for directors to forget this demand and start working under the new conditions. This will be one of the main achievements of reform.

I consider the **raising of the Central Bank interest rate** from 80 to 210 percent to have been a significant step on the road to financial stabilization. You will agree that this is a weighty indicator, given that rates had remained unchanged from May of last year through this March.

I would call the Russian Government's decision to abolish **preferential credits** as of 1 October a literally epoch-making event as regards continuing the reforms.

This means that neither agriculture nor shipments to the North will receive loans at less than 210 percent. I would like to note that we have long since stopped issuing soft loans to anyone—with the exception of agriculture and enterprises carrying out targeted federal programs. At the government Credit Commission we examine dozens of the thousands of applications from these economic units and always look at the prospects for the specific projects proposed by them that claim federal program

status. These prospects relate to the possibility of producing new output capable of having a large economic impact and of supplementing state coffers.

One other very important step taken by the Russian Government is, I think, the complete **liberalization of bread and grain prices.** Grain prices were formally liberalized last year, but to all intents and purposes there were mandatory recommended prices, which meant that in a number of cases they easily exceeded the market rate. We are now moving toward targeted support for those who really need help, and I daresay this will be far cheaper than subsidizing the entire Russian population regardless of need and covering agricultural leaders' inability to organize production properly.

The situation in the financial sphere will undoubtedly be improved by the decision recently adopted by the Central Bank to **ban cash transactions in foreign currency.** I do not know why, but people have long wanted to turn a blind eye to the problem of the "dollar economy" in our country. Yet this in itself is a major inflationary factor. If there is around $16 billion officially in circulation in Russia today, and another $5 billion unofficially, then that is equivalent to more than R23 trillion. And this represents a substantial percentage of the entire cash money supply in the country. If we reach a situation where foreign currency constitutes 80 percent of the actual money supply, then the ruble will simply become surplus to requirements and can be abandoned with ease. This is why I am committed to fighting the "dollar economy"—even with administrative methods.

Is It Worth Rushing Into the "Zone"?

In talking about the success and relative consistency shown by the Russian Government in terms of financial stabilization and curbing inflation, as finance minister I nonetheless cannot fail to voice what is, in my view, a very major fear. I refer to the attempts to expedite the creation of a so-called ruble zone.

Rushing to merge the monetary systems of countries that may be close to us but are already essentially different countries with different principles underlying the functioning of their economies is a very dangerous undertaking that could do a great deal of damage to Russia's interests. I fear that for the sake of purely political slogans about integration and closer partnership we will enter into a monetary union without having elaborated in detail the mechanisms for protecting our own economy and coordinating key aspects of overall credit, monetary, and budgetary policy. In this event we could find ourselves "importing" inflation into the country and being faced with an abrupt devaluation of the Russian ruble for reasons not of our making and a weakening of the control and influence wielded by Central Bank of Russia institutions within the ruble zone.

I am fundamentally in favor of economic integration and convergence in the financial sphere, but this cannot be achieved in a couple of weeks. We need to calculate all the consequences beforehand. At any rate, the history of the creation of the European Common Market is a more than object lesson.

I very much hope that the impending elections will not make government members court popularity, try to please everyone, or promise manna from heaven. Our experience of life tells us that a severe illness can only be cured with unpleasant medicine, not by developing an addiction to useless drugs.

Leaked Draft Edict Sparks Protests in Insurance Industry

PM2110094593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[Article by Tatyana Khudyakova: "Appearance of Draft Presidential Edict on Measures To Mess Up Insurance Business in Russia"]

[Text] One learned purely by accident of the appearance in the president's apparatus of a draft edict "On Measures To Develop Insurance in the Russian Federation." The document has not been through the usual, proper channels—evaluation in the Legal Administration and Economic Council and discussion with interested sides. The intention is obvious—amid the turmoil of the October events the requisite document will slip quietly beneath the presidential pen and, when signed, will acquire the mighty force of law.

Indeed, who would have dreamed of doubting the document's importance, since it is accompanied by a letter from Finance Minister Boris Fedorov. It quite rightly says: "...it is advisable to resolve a number of problems connected with assisting the development of insurance."

But the solutions proposed in the draft edict are such that following the leak of the document everyone involved in insurance attempted to deny authorship. But we now know that too. The accompanying note from the president's State-Legal Administration, signed by R. Orekhov, says: "...prepared by the Finance Ministry in conjunction with the Russian Federal Service To Oversee Insurance Activity."

Let us run through the points. All insurance organizations, irrespective of the form of ownership, must have licenses to operate. A reasonable requirement, but it does not provide the real picture. So far 1,700 companies have received authorization, and another 800 are waiting in line. Those waiting in line could write an epic about the way the Russian insurance oversight service fails to meet the required deadlines, constantly rejects documents due to quibbles over formalities, and the demands vary from company to company.

Furthermore, the draft envisages a sharp increase in the paid-up incorporation capital from 2 to 200 million rubles [R] before January 1995.

"The consequences of this 'protection' are already easy to calculate," Vladimir Podkaminer, general director of the Russian Insurers' Union [RIU], said. "The small insurance companies (and they are in the majority at the moment) will die immediately. The medium-size ones will go somewhat later. Getting together R200 million is no easy matter. Then again, the amount of incorporation capital does not directly affect a company's stability. There are reserve funds for this purpose, provided for by the law and therefore obligatory, as well as a system of reinsurance."

The authors of the draft, pretending that they do not know these elementary truths, raise the stakes even more, forcing each company to contribute 10 percent of payments for voluntary types of personal and property insurance for citizens into a "fund to guarantee that commitments are met." The fund is to be managed by the Russian insurance oversight service.

According to preliminary assessments, the fund could accumulate as much as R60 billion next year. To protect citizens' interests, of course. Except the citizens have no idea that the intention is to protect them at their expense! The only way to get this kind of money together is to increase insurance rates. So this formula very cleverly conceals yet another indirect tax.

But it is point number three that produces the "knockout punch." All foreign insurance companies are allowed to set up on Russian territory insurance organizations with 100 percent foreign capital. The minimum incorporation capital is set at $500,000. This means that our vast and cheap market will be swallowed up immediately.

One can see why all the Russian insurers took fright and got together, instantly forgetting about their petty squabbles and feuds. Telephones are constantly ringing in the RIU and there are floods of requests for an immediate appeal to the president not to sign the draft edict.

Official Relates Privatization Figures

LD2010180893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1456 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Ivantsov]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—Vice-chairman of the Russian State Property Committee Aleksandr Ivanenko told the international "Privatisation in Russia" congress, now under way here, that privatisation was proceeding at a fast pace in the country.

"Today," he stated, "the process of denationalisation has become irreversible in Russia. This is borne out by statistics. As many as 81,000 Russian enterprises had been privatised by the beginning of October, accounting for approximately one-third of all the existing Russian enterprises. Privatised enterprises now account for 43 per cent of the property based on Russian territory."

"The privatisation process is proceeding at the fastest pace in the Volga-Vyatka area, where it has reached about 60 per cent. The central black earth, northwestern, and north Caucasian areas have privatised 50 per cent of their enterprises. The share of privatised enterprises has reached about 30 per cent in the west Siberian, central, Volga, and east Siberian regions. These figures are slightly smaller in the far eastern, northern and Urals areas, where they fluctuate from 20 to 27 per cent.

The lowest pace of privatisation was recorded in Kaliningrad and Baltic region, where it accounts for 16 per cent.

"The adduced statistics," according to Ivanenko, "do not reflect fully, however, the number of enterprises covered by the privatisation process. Judging by the submitted applications for privatisation, 55 per cent of all the Russian enterprises have completed or are about to complete their privatisation formalities.

The privatisation process is proceeding at a sufficiently high pace in agriculture. Twenty-four thousand out of the existing 31,000 or slightly more enterprises have already been reregistered. More than 12,000 joint-stock enterprises have been set up, along with more than 1,000 farmers associations and 2,000 farm cooperatives.

Privatisation is all but completed in such economic areas as commerce, public utilities, and public catering. More than 63 per cent of all the commercial enterprises, more than 64 per cent of all the public utilities, and 58 per cent of all the public catering establishments had been privatised by the beginning of October. Sixty-three per cent of all the existing enterprises have become private property in the sphere of "minor privatisation".

Noting the key importance of the privatisation of large-scale industrial enterprises, Ivanenko said that almost 14,000 such plants and factories had been reformed into 8.2 thousand joint-stock societies, accounting for 59 per cent of the initial total. 2,200 out of the five thousand largest enterprises that are to be turned into joint-stock societies have already completed their privatisation formalities.

The highest pace of privatisation was recorded in the light and food industries, and in the production of building materials. Privatisation figures there have reached 57, 56 and 57 per cent respectively. Sixty-seven per cent of all the motor transport services have already been privatised.

Sales of Antonov Heavy Transport Planes Defended

PM2010104193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 16 Oct 93

[By V. Prunov and V. Myznikov from Ulyanovsk; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Prunov over video of presentation ceremony, Aviastar production facilities] The Aviastar Joint-Stock

Company is the first company in Russia to have obtained a production approval certificate for the heavy transport An-124/100 aircraft. This will make it possible finally to conquer the world aircraft market. The 50 or so Ruslans sold for hard currency will enable the industrial giant to pay off its debts and cope without budget subsidies. However, some ranking officials believe that the Ruslan is our national pride and should not be placed in the hands of people known to be our competitors.

[V. Mikhaylov, general director of Aviastar] I do not believe that Russia stands to lose from allowing a few dozen of our aircraft to appear on the world market. On the contrary, it will improve its image.

Regional Affairs

Yeltsin's Edict on Regional Governments Previewed

MK1910112993 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 67, 19 Oct 93 (signed to press 18 Oct) p 2

[Dmitriy Kuznets report under the "Territories" rubric: "Triumphal March of Anti-Soviet Power. Governors Will Be Able To Run for Federation Council"]

[Text] An edict defining the form and powers of the new regional organizations of representative authority will soon be signed by Boris Yeltsin. This has been stated by commission member Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the presidential staff's administration for work with the regions.

The edict provides for compact bicameral parliaments (not more than 50 deputies working on a professional basis) whose powers will be considerably limited in comparison with the powers of the dying- off soviets. The edict is only to set the limits (the details are to be devised by the regions) but the general tendency toward the lawmakers to be subordinated to the governors is to remain.

Subordination of the representative branch to the executive branch is quite justified, Medvedev thinks. "The premise about an absolute separation of powers has not justified itself," he stated. "Two vertically arranged systems of power were created that were fighting against each other, which is inadmissible." True, this fighting died down at the components of the Federation authorities' level, and the heads of administrations often calmly worked together, joining the soviets in blackmailing the center and extorting all sorts of perks from it. The reason for blackmailing disappeared after the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet was disbanded and the regional elites were plunged into a state of shock by the president's rude interference in their province. The new presidential edict violates the Federation Treaty, that "holy scripture" of every oblast, kray, etc., boss. According to Mr. Medvedev's protestation, the Federation Treaty was violated by soviets themselves when they refused to recognize the validity of the president's Edict No. 1400 on the territories of their domains.

The edict, Medvedev thinks, is supposed to prevent the transfer of the system of soviets into new parliaments, while for the time being the process of "reforming the representative organs" is in the stage of liquidation of soviets themselves.

To date, 15 oblast soviet and one republican soviet, as well as three soviets of autonomous okrugs have stopped their work. Most of them were dissolved by decrees of the heads of administration on the strength of point 5 of the president's 9 October edict for lack of quorum (as few as four soviets made decisions to dissolve themselves). Administration heads of Murmansk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts even overdid it by dissolving their soviets where a quorum of deputies was present. The latter were suggested that they appeal in court against their overzealous governors.

The rest of the soviets are either trying to preserve their powers until after their reelection, or keep postponing indefinitely the holding of the sessions to discuss the president's edict of 9 October. The "sabotage" tactics have been adopted by nearly all the soviets in the Chernozem zone and the Volga area. The administrations of these regions have been directed "to insist on the holding of the sessions before 20 October."

Soviets will die while the regional elites with separatist inclinations will remain. One should expect them to surface again after the elections "not later than the first quarter of 1994" in all sorts of kurultays [assemblies] and oblast parliaments. As for governors, one would be able to meet them even in the Federal Assembly, for whose upper chamber—the Federation Council—they have been permitted, "by way of exception" to run on a nonprofessional basis. This means that they would be able to get back their senatorial togas that were all but taken away from them, while remaining princelings in their own patrimonies.

Discussions of Dissolving Local Soviets Continue

Chukotka Local Soviets Dissolved

PM2010113793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 93 First Edition p 1

[Own Information report from the "From Our correspondents and News Agencies" roundup: "...Chukotka Okrug Soviet Requested To Dissolve Itself"]

[Text] By means of his own decree Chukotka Autonomous Okrug Administration Head Aleksandr Nazarov has terminated the activity of village, settlement, and rayon soviets of people's deputies as well as the Bilibino, Pevek, and Anadyr City Soviets.

At the same time, as the administration head's press secretary announced, under the same decree the

Chukotka Okrug Soviet of People's Deputies is requested to examine the question of its own dissolution by 25 October.

Kabardino-Balkarian Discusses Reform

MK2010160993 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Igor Terekhov report under the "Kabardino-Balkaria" rubric: "Parliament To Be Reformed, Probably, by Kabardino-Balkarian President"]

[Text] After two days of discussions, as a result of which the electronic vote counting system broke and the parliamentarians split into presidential supporters and those of the speaker, the Kabardino-Balkarian Supreme Soviet managed to adopt a decree on reforming local representative authorities. Earlier, the city council of the republic's capital—Nalchik—announced its self-dissolution. City deputies adopted an appeal to the Kabardino- Balkarian Supreme Soviet suggesting that it make a decision on holding early elections and create a legislative framework for the elections to the new parliament. Meanwhile, the Congress of the Kabardin People [CKP) stood up against dissolving the soviets and called for holding elections for the new parliament and the Kabardino-Balkarian presidency on 12 June. The CKP also called on the Kabardin people and the Kabardino-Balkarian Supreme Soviet not to take part in the elections to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly "until a law on elections to the Federal Assembly is adopted by the country's legitimate legislative body." Undoubtedly, these statements contributed to the polarization of Supreme Soviet deputies' opinions.

The Supreme Soviet session decided to hold early elections to the Kabardino-Balkarian parliament simultaneously with elections to the Russian Federal Assembly. A working group of 16 people was set up on a parity basis by the executive and legislative authorities to draw up regulations on the new Kabardino-Balkarian parliament and elections to it. The Kabardino-Balkarian Supreme Soviet was tasked with considering and adopting by 25 October legislation on elections to the new parliament, which will be drafted by the working group. If the Supreme Soviet is unable to cope with this task, its powers will be transferred to the Kabardino-Balkarian president. The proposal on halting the activity of the soviets at all levels and handing their powers to the chiefs of administration did not win the requisite number of votes. At the same time, the session rescinded its earlier decree declaring presidential edict No. 1400 invalid on the republic's territory.

Thus, the process of dismantling soviet power encountered a snag in Kabardino-Balkaria. As early as within the next few days, however, the situation may change. The matters regarding parliamentary reform in the republic have been under discussion for over a year, but local distinctions relating above all to the republic's dual nature (the Kabardin Balkar Republic's two components are the Kabardin and Balkar people, the former outnumbering the latter by five to one) has so far prevented it from working out a model for the future parliament that would be in any way acceptable to all. This is why most observers are not certain that the decision will be reached by 25 October. Then the Kabardino-Balkarian president will have no other option but to take over all power during the transition period.

Amur Oblast Soviet Suspended

LD2010131693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Vladimir Polivanov, the acting administration head of Amur Oblast, has suspended today the oblast soviet of people's deputies. Our correspondent reports that this was caused by the deputies'active noncompliance with the presidential decree on stage-by-stage constitutional reform and other breaches of law by the oblast soviet.

Samara Regional Soviet Dissolved

LD2010182493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1327 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Head of Samara Regional Administration Konstantin Titov on Wednesday signed a resolution to terminate the powers of the Samara Regional Soviet (Council).

The address to the inhabitants of the region in the Volga area says that after October 22 the emergency session of the regional council not only denounced President Yeltsin's Decree No. 1400, but rejected the president's attempt to resolve the political crisis in Russia peacefully, through stage-by-stage early elections of all power branches.

The Samara Regional Soviet also refused to comply with the decisions by the federal authorities and illegally endowed the region with the rights of a republic.

The prosecutor and the head of the administration protested against the illegal decisions. These, however, have not been considered and the Soviet session scheduled for October 20 was postponed indefinitely.

The address says that some deputies gave up their powers, the Soviet had no quorum and, according to the current laws, appeared unable to take any decisions.

Muscovites Polled on Economic Situation

MK2010120793 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Oleg Savelyev report under the "Social Barometer" column: "Muscovites Are Optimists"]

[Text] The Moscow branch of the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion conducted over the last weekend a snap poll of some 2,300 residents of the

capital according to a program designed for simultaneous surveys in Russia's major cities by the Center for the Study and Forecasting of Social Processes based in St. Petersburg (L. Keselman, director).

Answers to some of the questions in this survey together with the answers obtained in similar polls earlier are in percentages.

Do you think your material position has improved as compared with the end of 1991 or does it remain approximately the same?

	Oct '92	Oct '93
Worsened	64	60
Improved	24	18
Remains the same, hard to say	12	22

Do you think your material position will improve, worsen, or will remain approximately the same as today in the near future?

	Jan '92	Oct '92	Oct '93
Will worsen	62	43	39
Will improve	11	21	19
Will not change, hard to say	27	36	42

What about the economic situation in the country?

	Jan '92	Oct '92	Oct '93
Will worsen	61	50	41
Will improve	15	18	21
Will not change, hard to say	24	32	38

Do you think reforms started by the Gaydar government should be continued?

	Apr '92	Jan '93	Oct '93
Yes	59	45	46
No	23	31	29
Hard to say, do not know	18	24	25

Majority of Muscovites in Poll Support Army's Actions

PM2010143193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 1

[Untitled reprint of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT poll based on Moscow Institute of Comparative Social Research figures]

[Text] An October poll of 560 Muscovites showed that 62 percent of them think the use of the Army to storm the parliament building justified; one in two pin the blame for the bloodshed on opposition leaders, 35 percent blame Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, and Yeltsin all together for this, and 90 percent of respondents approved the introduction of the state of emergency in Moscow, while 52 percent approved the decision to ban opposition political parties and shut down their newspapers. However 64 percent do not rule out the possibility of renewed conflicts and confrontation arising in the capital and certain regions of Russia.

Reshuffle in St Petersburg City Government Reported

MK2010131993 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 Oct p 3

[Sergey Slyusarenko report: "Reshuffle in St. Petersburg Town Hall. Anatoliy Sobchak Prepares To Give Up Mayoralty"]

[Text] A reshuffle began in the city's executive branch structures after St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak agreed to run for the State Duma on the Movement for Democratic Reforms ticket, and became coordinator of the Public Chamber of the Constitutional Conference. It became known yesterday that "with a view to further streamline the city management structures" the mayor abolished the position of Committee for Culture and Tourism chairman held by Yelena Drapeko.

The mayor's directive also abolishes the position of deputy mayor for culture, science, and higher education. Concurrently, Vladimir Yakovlev has been appointed first deputy mayor for culture, science, and higher education—chairman of the Committee for Culture and Tourism.

Also, Vitaliy Mutko, deputy mayor for social questions, tendered his resignation yesterday. According to unofficial information, Vitaliy Mutko had been offered to fill the position of head of the administration of the Peterburg seaport. According to other equally unofficial information, Vitaliy Mutko had to resign after it came to the mayor's notice that Mutko, appointed Sobchak's deputy less than a year ago, had supplied the "600 Seconds" TV program with confidential information on the mayor's work.

It has also become known that Sergey Belyayev, Sobchak's deputy for property matters, has received an offer from the government to head the Federal Administration for Insolvency (bankruptcy) under the State Committee for the Management of State Property of Russia. Yesterday, Sergey Belyayev left for Moscow for talks with Viktor Chernomyrdin and Yegor Gaydar. The signing by Chernomyrdin of a directive appointing Sergey Belyayev chairman of the Federal Administration is expected in the coming days.

Quite possibly, the vigorous reshuffle in the Town Hall of Petersburg are attributed to the fact that Mr. Sobchak

is planning to be not only a State Duma deputy, but also to go and work for the president's administration, leaving the position of mayor. Considering Sobchak's ideological differences with Vice Mayor Vyacheslav Shcherbakov, who will automatically fill the mayor's position once Sobchak leaves, the latter's desire to put pro- president men in key positions in the city administration is understandable.

Ryabov Urges Regions To Postpone Local Elections

LD2010130793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1008 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—Head of the Russian Election Commission Nikolay Ryabov called on those regions which decided to combine local and federal parliamentary elections in December to postpone local polls.

He said on Wednesday that the decision to combine local elections with the parliamentary ones and the referendum on the constitution was a "reckless step" and that the election commission would hardly manage the enormous bulk of work.

"The profanation of elections to legislative bodies of power is inadmissible", Ryabov said, adding that such a "haste makes it hard to create representative bodies of power in republics, territories and regions" and would undoubtedly tell on the quality of local elections.

He stated that his commission is not going to bar local elections in any way, but said that it "reserves the right to explain their untimeliness".

Political Situation in Dagestan Reviewed

MK2010151193 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Eduard Urazayev report under the "Dagestan" rubric: "Whom Will Dagestani Voters Support? Republic Braces Itself for Elections"]

[Text] Political signals coming from Moscow to Dagestan have elicited a reaction and follow-up actions that could well have been expected. After the 3-4 October events, the Dagestani Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers paused until 12 October, when a joint meeting of the republic's Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers was held. Without going back to the 30 September decree of the Republic of Dagestan Supreme Soviet, which pointed to the inadmissibility of violating the Russian Federation Constitution and the need for simultaneous early elections for both the presidency and the parliament, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers heard a report by Akhmedov, Supreme Soviet first chairman, and resolved that: "1. In order to coordinate efforts... a group of officials responsible for the organization and conduct of early elections to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly shall be formed... 3. Proposals for reforming the representative and local self-government authorities in the republic shall be considered by a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Dagestan." According to unofficial reports, the session is expected to be convened in late October.

Meanwhile, the local ruling "party of the soviets," lacking a "head," is scrambling to find a political niche. Without waiting for the reaction from local "top leaders," local democratic and national-democratic associations held a conference and decided to join the "Russia's Choice" bloc.

The currently ruling party nomenklatura has for the most part kept a low profile or resolutely opposed Boris Yeltsin until the recent events, so they will find it fairly hard to switch to a new course. The smaller part of bureaucrats who secretly supported the Russian Federation president have to pay heed to their seniors and public opinion all the same. Meanwhile, public opinion in the republic is slowly changing: If 86 percent of the voters at the 25 April referendum voted against the president, on 23 September there were 74 percent of those who did not support the president's actions, and on 7-8 October their number dropped to 63 percent.

The growing number of people loyal to the Russian Federation president does not, however, mean that these people are going to vote for "Russia's Choice." Ramazan Abdulatipov, former chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Chamber of the Nationalities and currently first deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Affairs of the Federation and Nationalities, held a press conference at Makhachkala and granted an interview for local television. He announced that he was ready to run for the new Russian parliament and explained that he "has never been the president's supporter. But one should show respect for the head of state." A conference to set up a branch of "Shakhray's party" (PRES) was also held in Makhachkala. On 16-17 October, the congress of the PRES electoral association was attended by a delegation from Dagestan, and Ramazan Abdulatipov was nominated among the first candidates topping the electoral list. According to unofficial reports, representatives from Dagestan also attended the congress of the Agrarian Association, which is headed by Vasiliy Starodubtsev.

It has transpired from unofficial sources that the republic's authorities have requested that three electoral districts be set up in Dagestan, but the center refused to do so. The average standard of around 500,000 voters per one district was observed in Dagestan. None of the districts has an absolute dominance of any single nationality among the voters.

Buryatia Prepares for Elections, Referendum

LD2010164093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1041 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Trofimov]

[Text] Ulan-Ude October 20 TASS—The ruling group of the parliament of the Buryat Republic in eastern Siberia met today to discuss a set of problems relating to the implementation of the presidential decree concerning reform of local bodies of representative power in the Russian Federation.

The group, called the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was renewed recently. Its agenda today included the approval of the composition of the republic's electoral commission, as proposed by the government of the former autonomy, which will supervise the elections to the Russian Federal Assembly from this constituency.

Along with preparations for the general elections, the group also discussed measures to prepare the holding of a republic-wide referendum on the introduction of presidency in this republic. The plebescite is scheduled for December 12. The Presidium set up a commission to run the poll.

Yeltsin Appoints Komornik Representative in Sakhalin

OW2110085893 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 18 Oct 93

[From the "As of This Hour" newscast]

[Text] The president of the Russian Federation signed an edict on 15 October, appointing Viktor Komornik to the post of presidential representative in Sakhalin Oblast.

Sakhalin Administration Takes Over Executive Functions

OW2110103393 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 12 Oct 93

[From the "As of This Hour" newscast]

[Text] Yevgeniy Krasnoyarov, head of the Sakhalin Oblast Administration, signed a decree today on implementing the edict of the Russian Federation president on reforming representative organs of power and organs of local self-administration in the Russian Federation. The full text will be published in the local press.

In accordance with the decree, the administration head proposed the Oblast Soviet of people's deputies convene an extraordinary session within three days in order to determine the deputies' position in relation to the Russian president's edict.

A second decree of the administration head says that in accordance with the Russian president's edict the Oblast Administration is undertaking executive and administrative functions.

Sakhalin Soviet Session Postponed for Lack of Quorum

OW2110063093 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 15 Oct 93

[From the "As of This Hour" newscast]

[Text] Unfortunately as there were more guests than deputies, the extraordinary session of the Sakhalin Oblast Soviet could not be held today for lack of a quorum. The session has been postponed until tomorrow, 16 October.

Sakhalin Military Holds Exercise for Oblast Leaders

OW2010145093 Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian 1415 GMT 6 Oct 93

[A. Agriyev video report, from the "Dalniy Vostok" program]

[Text] There are Sakhalin Oblast deputies, chiefs of oblast departments, and even vice governors here at this firing range. It is understandable that in today's context of political events such a picture is very reminiscent of black humor, however, a fact is a fact—a military demonstration was organized for the Sakhalin Oblast leaders. [video shows a 3su 2s6m (3cu 2c6m) Tunguska mobile antiaircraft defense vehicle demonstrating its target location capabilities, a firing range, RPG and machinegun firing, then cuts to show a lecture in progress and Agriyev interviewing A.S. Shipko, deputy commander of the Army]

[Begin Shipko recording] I think that these exercises have an important aim, that is, to introduce the officials to the conditions at the garrison, the weapons, and other problems already mentioned by the commander. What disturbs us today is, first, the manpower shortage, and in concluding his lecture he is appealing to the oblast leadership present for assistance in resolving this problem. [end recording] [video shows soldiers showing equipment to a group of civilians, BMP-2 vehicles, small arms range activities]

[Agriyev] The main thing is that these are planned exercises, and it is not the first time that they are being held. Here we have the representatives of the oblast administration and the small soviet side by side and on equal terms. They have demonstrated enviable self-control, professionalism, and the feeling of camaraderie. The general opinion is that similar meetings in the future will be systematic.

Deputy Prime Minister Yarov Visits Northern Fleet Base

PM2010150193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 1

[Vladimir Gundarov report from the "From Our Information Bureau" roundup: "Yuriy Yarov on a Visit to the Northern Fleet"]

[Text] While in Murmansk Oblast, Yuriy Yarov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers, visited the city of Severomorsk, the main base of the Northern Fleet, 19 October.

A conference was held at the fleet headquarters involving Vice Admiral Innokentiy Naletov, acting commander of the Northern Fleet, Yevgeniy Komarov, head of Murmansk Oblast Administration, and Ivan Menshikov, the Russian president's representative in Murmansk Oblast. Yuriy Yarov inspected the nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Ushakov.

Government Delegation Visits Northern Region

PM2010154993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2100 GMT 19 Oct 93

[By Valeriy Anuchin and Oleg Kul from Murmansk; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Anuchin over video of conference] Problems pertaining to living conditions in the Far North, food deliveries to the region, and the survival of local enterprises in the prevailing complex economic conditions were at the focus of an itinerant conference headed by Russian Federation Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov during his visit to Murmansk.

Catches of fish and production of fish products have sharply declined, fishing fleets are forced to sell part of their output abroad to be able to make ends meet somehow, to be able to purchase fuel and carry out repairs on transport and fishing vessels. The maintenance of nuclear icebreakers, without which operations in the Arctic are essentially impossible, is costing the Murmansk Maritime Shipping Line hundreds of millions of rubles. Yet the state which owns the fleet has allocated practically no funds for this. Construction of housing in the Far East has declined sharply, and the solution of social issues is proceeding slowly. As a result, the Kola Peninsula's population has begun to decline. People are leaving. The number of jobs is decreasing every day. The "Apatit" Association, the "Severonikel" combine, and other industrial enterprises are in a very difficult position. Economic ties have been disrupted. Government delegations like this one have visited the Kola Peninsula many times before. But as yet there are no tangible changes. Time will tell whether the present government delegation can resolve these issues. [video shows meeting, port scenes, sweeping views of Murmansk bay, street scenes, apartment blocks, large-scale industrial plant, Yarov aboard a ship]

International Affairs

Kiev Protests Detention of Vessels on Danube by Serbs

AU2010123693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 19 Oct 93 p 5

[Text] As reported by the information administration of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our state's ambassador in the Russian Federation, V. Kryzhanivskyy delivered a note of protest on behalf of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Russia. The note states that the illegal actions by the Serbian public organizations "White Rose" and "New Byzantium," which, with the help of floating devices, blocked navigation along the Danube in the area of the 1173th kilometer, have caused material losses worth more than $1 million to the Ukrainian Danube Steamship Company [UDP].

The convoy of vessels with export cargos for Austria and Hungary and cargo being shipped, via the Danube, to countries of Near and Middle East and Southeastern Asia, cannot reach the ports of destination. On board the Ukrainian vessels held up as a result of actions by the "White Rose" and "New Byzantine" organizations, reads the note, the reserves of food and drinking water have run out. Representatives of the aforementioned organizations are threatening the crews with physical reprisals. Repeated appeals by the Ukrainian Danube Steamship Company to Serbian official organs, including through UDP representatives in Belgrade, have produced no results. This situation places the UDP on the verge of actually curtailing its main activity and of serious financial consequences.

In this connection, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses a protest and states that the Ukrainian side regards such actions as a blatant violation of the FRY's obligations in accordance with the Belgrade convention of 1948, in particular, with regard to ensuring the freedom of navigation along the Danube, reads the note. If these illegal actions continue, Ukraine will have to raise this question before the UN Security Council.

Concurrently, Ukraine's Consul General in Belgrade, V. Prymachenko, called on the minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and handed him the Ukrainian government's official protest regarding the aforementioned actions on the part of the Yugoslav side.

Kravchuk, Clinton May Meet Before Year's End

LD2010173293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1635 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Vosboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] A meeting between U.S. President Bill Clinton and his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kravchuk, might take place even before the year ends, Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk told INTERFAX on Wednesday.

He made it clear that a meeting between Kravchuk and Clinton will take place before the Russian-American summit tentatively planned for early January.

Earlier it was believed that President Clinton's trip to Russia and possibly other former Soviet republics would be timed with the NATO summit to be held in January in Brussels.

Tarasyuk evaded answering a question as to when and where the envisaged Ukrainian-American summit will take place. According to him, this issue will be discussed during U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit to Kiev on Sunday and Monday.

The Ukrainian leadership, Tarasyuk said, intends to discuss with the American Secretary of State "the issue of economic and political cooperation, including "nuclear problems." "Agreements on some of these issues may be reflected in documents," Tarasyuk said.

Government, UN Officials Discuss Rapid Deployment Force

LD2010170793 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0928 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Excerpts] Kiev [no dateline as received]—Between 17-20 October, a special UN group led by Colonel Herard Gambiez [name as received], head of a group on the creation of a UN rapid reaction force, is working in Ukraine in agreement with the republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. It should prepare proposals regarding a rapid deployment force and determine Ukraine's likely contribution to the manning of these forces. [passage omitted]

During the meeting at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, assurances were given on the Ukrainian side that following a detailed consideration of the given issue, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will send appropriate proposals through the Ukrainian Government on the creation of the UN rapid deployment force. No documents were signed.

Experts Sign Intentions Protocol on Nuclear Arms

AU2010162893 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 19 Oct 93 p 3

[Report by the Defense Ministry's Press Service and UKRINFORM]]

[Text] The scheduled meeting in Kiev between experts of Ukraine and the Russian Federation has ended in signing a protocol on intentions regarding guaranteeing safe exploitation and storage of nuclear weapons. A possibility of rendering technical assistance to the Russian side in servicing its missile complexes was analyzed

and the question of further work on guaranteed supervision and technical maintenance of strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine was discussed.

The sides exchanged opinions on the safe removal from combat duty of Ukrainian and Russian missile complexes, provision of corresponding mutual assistance, and exchange of existing methods for guaranteeing nuclear and ecological safety. The experts also discussed a number of other problems that present interest to both states.

The participants in the meeting expressed their satisfaction with the fulfilled work, because, this time, the positions of the groups of experts were balanced and were based upon mutual understanding and joint approach to resolving problems.

Parliamentarian on Pressure To Sign Nuclear Treaty

LD2010192093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Report by Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Supreme Council Foreign Affairs Commission, to the Supreme Council evening session on 20 October—recorded]

[Text] National security has many supports. But its main foundation is its own armed force, capable of checking an aggressor.

Excluding from the arsenal of its foreign policy the threat of (?using) nuclear weapons, I quote (?our) document, Ukraine as an owner of these weapons should deal with them wisely. We should ratify START I, but at the same time it is not necessary or even harmful to extend the framework of this treaty. Talk may be about destroying (?30) percent of nuclear weapons located in Ukraine, and not more.

The accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] is possible only after, first, the world community reinterprets this document, which is discriminatory regarding our state, in 1995, and second, an agreement is signed between Ukraine and nuclear states, a legally binding act that nuclear states will not allow a change to the current Ukrainian borders. We are going toward non-nuclear status, but no one, apart from us, can decide how long this road will be. We are owners of weapons today, and we should not give in to any pressure directed at disarming us as soon as possible and against our own interests.

Sevastopol Coastal Defense Chief on Division's Status

WS2010153993 Kiev KIEVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 3

[Interview with Colonel V. Karpov, commander of the 126th coastal defense division deployed in Sevastopol, subordinated to the Russian Defense Ministry, by Georgiy Chernomorskiy; place and date not given]

[Text] [Chernomorskiy] I have known you for a long time. How come the division commander is still a colonel?

[Karpov] You must have seen St. Andrew's flag over the building. It has exacerbated Russian-Ukrainian relations somehow, and this is why I have not been promoted. However, I still cannot understand why some people want to build up tension. Ukraine, too, honors St. Andrew—Ukrainian nobleman Ivan Mazepa was one of the first people awarded the St. Andrew Order.

[Chernomorskiy] So much for a warm-up. For most civilians the term "coastal defense division" sounds exotic. What kind of a division is this? What are its functions and strengths?

[Karpov] In terms of strength, our division is identical to a Ukrainian Army prereform motorized rifle division. We are better armed, though, and our weapons are more up-to-date. Speaking of our functions, we are a major component of the coastal infrastructure. Ships cannot be in the open sea all the time. They also have to return to base; and this base should have reliable protection.

[Chernomorskiy] However, this base is on the territory of another state.

[Karpov] I see your point. Believe me, I am not very happy with the division stationing here. This situation developed historically. Saying that the Black Sea Fleet cannot function without Sevastopol is not an exaggeration. It is natural, though, that our stationing in the Crimea should be regulated by appropriate political agreements precluding any misinterpretations. As we know, such a document is currently being drafted. However, let us be frank, the sides will have to overcome many difficulties before an agreement is signed.

[Chernomorskiy] So far, you have to serve two Gods.

[Karpov] Nothing of the kind. The division is entirely supplied by Russia and I am subordinated solely to the Russian Defense Ministry. However, this does not hinder our good relations with local authorities. We also have perfect relations with local residents who understand that Russian soldiers will never shoot at Ukrainians.

[Chernomorskiy] What are the wages paid to officers, ensigns, sergeants and sailors in your division?

[Karpov] We receive half of what our colleagues serving in other regions of Russia are paid. Nominally, our wages are the same, but our rubles [R] are converted into karbovanetses [K] according to the exchange rate fixed by the Ukrainian and Russian National Banks. We receive K3200 for every R1000, which is one third of the real rate. We do not care who expropriates the difference. Ukraine cannot afford to pay its servicemen wages comparable to those paid by the Russian Armed Forces. This is why our wages were reduced, too. Let us hope that

Ukraine will soon improve its economic situation and this will improve our situation as well. Money is not the main thing in life. We are here to serve the Motherland.

Black Sea Fleet Officer Refutes Dissolution Report

LD2010202893 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] A UNIAN correspondent has learned that the Coordination Council of the Black Sea Fleet officers' assemblies has officially not made a single statement regarding self-dissolution, as "Ostankino" reported in the last few days. "I do not understand," said Captain First Rank Valeriy Volodin, chairman of the Coordination Council, "who needed to spread this information and why. It is not ruled out that we might well dissolve ourselves in the future, but we will do it when there are favorable conditions for it."

Valeriy Volodin did not specify just what conditions, but there was no hint in his words of the dissolution of "nationalist Ukrainian organizations", which the "Ostankino" report was about.

Official on Gas, Oil Supplies From Russia, Debt

WS2010135193 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Report by Vadym Frunze: "Oil and Gas in Ukraine May Disappear"]

[Text] According to Tadey Mykhalevych, dispatcher service manager at the Ukrhazprom concern, the Russian AT Gazprom sent a cable to Kiev on 5 October, notifying that beginning 10 October daily natural gas shipments to Ukraine will be reduced by 50 million cubic meters [CM]. (Also prior to this, Ukraine daily received 25 million CM less than envisioned by Ukrainian-Russian agreements.) Thus, the figures agreed upon earlier, will be reduced almost twice—Russia once promised to ship to Ukraine 9,200 million CM of gas in the fourth quarter of 1993, that is 100 million CM daily.

Tadey Mykhalevych says that Ukraine's gas problems and the recent cable have been prompted by the fact that the Republic has not been paying for the Russian gas for a long time now and most likely is not going to pay soon. As of 4 October, Ukraine owed Russia 580 billion rubles [R]. Ukraine cannot afford to repay the debt. According to Mykhalevych, Ukrainian consumers are paying the Ukrhazprom in karbovanetses (which is quite natural) and very irregularly (which is quite unnatural for a normal economy—only local consumers owe the company 53 billion karbovanetses).

The Ukrhazprom dispatcher service manager also says that Ukraine has started using its strategic gas deposits, meant for use in emergencies, primarily during a war. Tadey Mykhalevych is afraid to give an outlook for the future. He knows the size of strategic deposits, however he names no figures, saying that they are classified. He also knows that without establishing normal financial relations with Russia, Ukraine may soon be left without gas.

The situation with oil is similar. According to Valeriy Nykytenko, chief of the Fuel and Power Economy Department at the Ministry of Economy, as of 4 October, Ukraine owed Russia R220 billion for gas and R700 billion for oil (Nykytenko's figures are different from Mykhalevych's). Russia has reduced daily oil shipments to 26,000 tonnes, while in Soviet times the Republic used to receive 52 million tonnes annually, that is about 145,000 tonnes daily. Nykytenko points out that Russia has lately been hinting that power resources transactions can only be based on advance payments. Russia has allocated 7 million tonnes to Ukraine, but demands advance payments. In Nykytenko's opinion, Ukraine's claims toward Russia are groundless and the government, the legislature, and the president are fully responsible for the current state of affairs.

Further development of the situation is bound to involve considerable price increases for both individual consumers and organizations. Prices for electric appliances will also dramatically increase, because people will rush to buy these appliances hoping that the appliances will protect them against gas shortages. However, who can guarantee today that electric power supplies will not be cut tomorrow?

Trade, Economic Links Discussed With Uzbekistan

LD2010181593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1511 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Olga Tanasiychuk for TASS]

[Text] Kiev October 20 TASS—Trade and economic cooperation in 1994, mutual supplies and payments between Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan were discussed at a meeting between two government delegations here today.

It was noted that contacts between Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan are developing actively, especially in the setting up of joint ventures and banking operations.

The Uzbek delegation is expected to sign an inter-bank agreement and some other documents.

The Ukrainian delegation is led by Vice Premier Valentin Landik, the delegation from Uzbekistan is headed by Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Voznenko.

Interior Ministry Signs Agreement With Turkey

LD2110092493 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2020 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev—On 20 October negotiations were held at Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs and an agreement

was signed on cooperation between the Ministries of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and Turkey. Internal Service Lieutenant General Venyamyn Bartashevych, Ukraine's deputy minister of internal affairs [name and title as received], and Balkan Kizigeli, deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate of Turkey, the heads of the delegations, stressed that the basic areas of joint activity of both ministries would be the fight against the drugs trade, terrorism, and organized crime.

Members of the Turkish delegation noted that this is the first step in deepening mutual relations. The next stage will be the signing on an interstate level of documents on the mutual extradition of offenders. Turkey became the 29th country with which Ukraine has signed an agreement on interaction.

National Affairs

Supreme Council Continues Plenary Session

National Bank Head Addresses Council

LD2010180993 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Speech by National Bank Chairman Viktor Yushchenko at the Supreme Council session on 20 October—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed audience! Allow me to dedicate the first part of my speech to the characteristics of the monetary and inflationary state of the country. In the first nine months of this year the growth in retail prices was 1,605 percent which is equal to approximately a monthly average of 36 percent. This means, firstly, that the average monthly rates of increase in prices in 1993 was seven percent more than last year. Secondly, by the beginning of the year, the absolutely general rise in prices already exceeded last year's level by approximately 1.3 times. In addition, the duration between the peaks of increased prices is becoming shorter in the cycle of galloping inflation. The first inflationary peak occurred in January and was 179 percent, the second after six months in June was 149 percent, and the third [occurred] only three months later in September, and was approximately 150 percent. [passage omitted]

At the beginning of the year the money mass increased 13 times and last year, if you remember, [it rose] only 10.8 times. What are the results? Increases in prices in the third quarter reached 325 percent which is a monthly average of 50 percent. At such a level, one must expect average monthly increases in retail prices in the fourth quarter compared to 34 percent per month between January -August 1993. I would like to stress that a particular influence on the inflationary processes is caused by state credits and credits that are granted for the government's operational expenses. As of 15 October, in accordance with a presidential decree, and resolutions by the Supreme Council and the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Bank gave a credit to the Ministry of Finances of 9.5 trillion karbovantsi, which is 50 percent of the total sum released into circulation by the National Bank. Of the general sum of emission credit received by Ukraine's Ministry of Finances, 6.4 or 67 percent was granted for financial support to agriculture. [passage omitted]

Economy Minister Addresses Council

LD2010185193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Speech by Economy Minister Roman Shpek at the Supreme Council session on 20 October—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed president, esteemed chairman, and esteemed people's deputies! The economy is the most (?sensitive) sphere in terms of the national security of Ukraine. The national income of Ukraine fell by 12 percent in the nine months of 1993, compared with the same period of last year. The volume of industrial production decreased by 7.8 percent and that of consumer goods production by 19.5 percent, including foodstuffs by 18.6 percent. The situation with industrial production especially worsened in the third quarter of the year. The financial situation at enterprises is deteriorating and inflation deepening. The analysis of the state of the economy shows that the cause of the crisis in it is, first of all, its low efficiency, high energy resources consumption, and the fact that its structure lacks rationalism. The crisis also has to do with the financial and banking sphere. The financial and credit system functioning as it is at present represents a serious threat to national security. The economy cannot endure the paralysis of the monetary system for too long a time. The Ukrainian karbovanets has exhausted itself as monetary unit. [passage omitted]

The following are structural changes needed to be made as a matter of priority in the very near future, that is at the end of 1993 and in 1994: Saving of energy; increasing the production of energy of our own; engaging and using secondary energy resources; developing nuclear power-engineering; increasing the depth of oil refining; increasing the scale of geological work on prospecting mineral resources in short supply; developing agricultural produce industries within the agro-industrial complex; modernizing and technologically re-equipping processing and procurement enterprises; developing rural areas in social terms; increasing the manufacturing of export goods and widening the spectrum of goods produced for our own consumption to replace imports. [passage omitted]

To step up privatization, the formation of corporations [korporatyzatsiya] from enterprises has begun. A total of around 4,000 enterprises are to undergo transformation to corporations in the course of 1993-94, with 800 as early as this year. To step up privatization, the following measures have to be taken: Privatization targets be

introduced, regardless of the type of state property—be it property in state or communal ownership—with obligatory fulfillment by state privatization bodies; revenues from the implementation of privatization in accordance with these targets be determined in appropriate budgets for 1994; a single system of state privatization bodies be formed, with their vertical [structures] clearly defined; a mechanism be set up to privatize the facilities and land together; privatization of incomplete construction facilities be carried out. [passage omitted]

The critical situation that has come about in ensuring the economy's vital needs, requires preservation and restoration of integrational ties, that were disrupted, and economic cooperation with CIS partners. To lessen the effect of the imbalance and discrepancies in the provision of resources, it is very important that the spontaneous disruption of relations with our former partners, (?established) many years ago, should be prevented, since at present there are not any other equivalent factors of stabilization of the economic situation. At the same time, a consistent policy of reducing our dependence on our neighbors should be pursued. [passage omitted]

Apart from tough measures to intensify the saving of energy, another possibility is now being considered to reduce the trade balance deficit, which is the decentralized import of oil and other fuel and energy resources with the large-scale engagement of entrepreneurial structures, abolition of any concessions in import operations, cancellation of restrictions and additional stimulation of export operations, and other possibilities.

Under the conditions that have formed, intensifying the state regulation of market-oriented economic changes is needed by way of creating a vertical [structure] of executive power, with the managerial functions of central and regional state bodies harmoniously united in it, and the plenary powers and functions of the Cabinet of Ministers and the regional bodies defined. Decisions, esteemed colleagues, must be carried out, and there must be feedback and a chance to make corrections. [passage omitted]

A policy of considerably reducing the state's outgoings, including those to maintain the Army, in our opinion, is possibly one of the major levers in putting the actions proposed in practice. This will enable us to engage part of the funds released in conducting conversion, which will help reduce social tension in society. [passage omitted]

Landyk, Onopenko Address Council

LD2010142193 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1205 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev, 20 Oct—The plenary sitting of the Supreme Council is continuing discussion of Ukraine's national security. The deputies first heard a block of reports on economic security and social stability before a short break. Valentyn Landyk, deputy prime minister for issues of external economic activity and investments, delivered a report on the situation and measures regarding substantially improving external economic activity. Mr. Landyk was in favor of stimulating exports and rendering state and foreign financial assistance only to priority industries of the national economy. He was also in favor of a balance in relations with states of the former USSR, and reported that money from foreign investments is being utilized in particular on extracting oil in Akhtyrskiy rayon of Sumy Oblast and in the Black Sea shelf, and on a gas purifying plant in the village of Andreyevka in Kharkov Oblast.

The deputies also heard reports by the minister of economy, the minister of finance, the chairman of the board of the National Bank, the ministers of power and labor, and the chairman of the State Customs Committee. As Taras Nahulko, a deputy from Shepetovka, rightly observed, they did not propose anything specific and no calculations were presented to deputies.

The report by Justice Minister Vasyl Onopenko on legalizing associations of citizens and on Ukraine's national security reported that 29 political parties and 508 public organizations are currently registered in Ukraine. It was again stressed that the Justice Ministry prohibits the activity of, and will not register militarized groupings of the Ukrainian National Self-defense type. The justice minister reported that his department had recently warned the leadership of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Peasants' Party of Ukraine and the "State Self-Determination of Ukraine" [Derzhavna Samostiynist Ukrayiny] Association for violating the norms of the law on political associations. The speaker advanced the initiative that the minimum number of members of a party should be no less than 1,000 persons, and should be written into current legislation (the Liberal Democratic Party - 309, the Labor Party - 321, The Beer Lovers Party - 315 persons). [sentence as received]

Report on Afternoon Session

LD2010201293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev, 20 Oct—At the afternoon session of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, deputies completed discussion of Ukraine's national security. Reports were delivered by Oleksandr Yakymenko, chairman of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (on certain issues of exercising legislation by courts which guarantees Ukraine's national security), by Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko (ecological security as part and parcel of the national security of Ukraine), and by Mykola Shpeynberh, chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Radiation Safety, (on measures to guarantee safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine).

The measures proposed by Mr. Shpeynberh include approval of the draft resolution "On Certain Measures to Supply the National Economy With Electricity". In particular, the draft envisions that the Ukrainian SSR

Supreme Soviet resolution of 2 August 1990 on a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power stations on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR be lifted. Mr. Shtenberh [name as received] also proposes to agree to the proposal of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers to continue operating the Chernobyl AES within the period of time determined by its technical state.

Plyushch Urges 50-Seat Limit

LD2010220193 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2020 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev [no dateline as received]—On 20 October, during a break in between the sessions of the Supreme Council, Ivan Plyushch held a conference with representatives of political parties in connection with the adoption of a new Election Law. The representatives of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Ukrainian Party of Justice, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, the Labor Congress of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Democratic Party of Ukraine took part in the conference.

In the opinion of Ivan Plyushch, if the Supreme Council does not pass the new Election Law, the president may supplement the law, that is currently in force, with his decree, but this may cause a confrontation in society. "If many seats in parliament are run for according to party lists, people will not accept this and the elections may fail to take place. Our task is to [achieve it], that the elections be held and that they be held in compliance with the law but not a decree," said the Supreme Council chairman. In the opinion of the Supreme Council speaker, the parties should not apply pressure on the president, but they should "agree to realities, i.e. to the possibility of electing only 50 candidates who are to run in the elections according to party lists."

The representatives of the majority of the parties spoke out for a mixed election system, but remarked that the small number of mandates that are to be received according to party lists, will only discredit the proportional system of elections and the parties in general. Stepan Khmara, and a representative of the Labor Congress Party spoke out for a majority system.

Council Decides To Maintain Chernobyl

LD2110104093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 21 Oct 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Council session on 21 October, carried live by Ukrainian radio, has resolved that the Chernobyl nuclear power plant should continue operation. The resolution adopted contains, in particular, the following provision, read out by Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch:

The Cabinet of Ministers' proposal to continue the operation of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] for a term determined by its technological condition, under the supervision of DerzhAtomNahlyad [State Committee for the Control of Work Safety in Nuclear Engineering], the Nature and Environment Ministry, and the Academy of Sciences, should be accepted.

The resolution itself was not read out.

Protocol on Demarcation of Powers Signed with Crimea

PM2010141593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 93 First Edition p 1

[Nikolay Semena report: "Crimea: Yet One More Step Toward Autonomy"]

[Text] Simferopol—N. Bagrov, chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, and B. Samsonov, chairman of the autonomous formation's Council of Ministers, have told journalists that a protocol of instructions was signed at a meeting with Ukraine's President L. Kravchuk, envisaging measures for the future demarcation of powers between Ukraine and the Crimea and the implementation of a system of unrestricted economic activity.

The protocol, which they read out to journalists, provides for the creation of the Crimean Republic Bank, the Crimean Interbank Currency Exchange, and the Crimean Customs Control Administration as early as this year.

The leaders of Ukraine and its autonomous republic have reached agreement on implementing the final demarcation of property between them and on budget interrelations, which means in practice the introduction of a single-channel system of taxation in the Crimea. Ukraine has also offered the Crimea the right to register representatives and branches of foreign firms on its territory, and the right to issue licenses for hard currency trading.

General Supports Calls for Armed Forces Reduction

LD2010133693 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0755 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev 19 Oct—Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, chief of the General Staff of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has told a UNIAR correspondent that the events in Moscow are having repercussions in Ukraine. He therefore considers the presence of the Ukrainian military to be necessary at the Supreme Council session, particularly during discussion of national security. "If in Moscow it is getting colder, then the first frost has appeared in Kiev, and this worries us greatly. Concerning the military doctrine, we would like to determine the size of our army and other issues connected with strengthening the Ukrainian armed forces."

General Lopata stressed the need to reduce the Ukrainian armed forces. "He said, however, that one must not forget the quality of the army or armaments".

It is planned to reduce the Ukrainian armed forces from 500,000 to 420,000 by 1995. In reply to a question about the formation of Ukrainian military forces with a space capability [kosmichni viyska], General Lopata said that there are no such plans. He did not, however, deny that there was a concept to create a space navigation system. General Lopata noted that with regard to the issue of the Ukrainian armed forces helping the evacuation of the Georgian population in Abkhazia, 17 helicopters, two An-12 and two Il-76 planes were brought in to help.

Defense Minister Supervises Command, Staff Training

AU2010145793 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 19 Oct 93 p 1

[Report by the Press Service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense]

[Text] Under the leadership of Ukraine's minister of defense Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy, strategic command and staff training of Ukraine's Armed Forces was held.

The exercise was intended to develop interaction between the administrations of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, who is also commander in chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces, took part in the command and staff training. He presented Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy to the leading personnel of the Defense Ministry and wished him success in his new post.

Nationalists Urge Kravchuk To Recognize, Arm National Guard

AU2010212893 Kiev UKRAYINSKI OBRIYI in Ukrainian No. 16 (25), October 93

["Open Appeal by the Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly to President Leonid Kravchuk"; place and date not given]

[Text] Your Excellency,

Recent circumstances compel us to appeal to you. Being aware of the fact that the level of your position does not, unfortunately, enable you to obtain objective information on events or their probable outcome, we will take the liberty of offering a short commentary on the political situation in Moscow and on the political situation in Ukraine in connection with that in Moscow.

1. If Yeltsin wins, Moscow will be able to pursue a purpose- oriented external policy from one center only.

In the very near future, Yeltsin will have to counterbalance the negative opinion that prevails among the broad masses on the economic reforms by making certain concessions to patriotism. His policy in Tajikistan, in the Caucasus, and in Ukraine will become more uncompromising and decisive, especially considering that Yeltsin will have carte blanche from the West as a patent democrat and reformer-martyr.

2. If Khasbulatov and Rutskoy win, the likelihood of celebrating the third anniversary of our independence will become even more problematic.

3. In view of the fact that, today, Moscow has become the main factor of instability in eastern Europe and Eurasia, Western countries may start looking toward Kiev. Ukraine may play the role of a stabilizing factor in the region, provided that there are forces capable of countering destabilization inside of it. The problem of the availability of forces is the key one. You are aware of the pro-Moscow orientation of Ukraine's Security Service. As the events in Moscow have shown, the militia is, in principle, not combat ready. There are doubts as to whom Ukraine's own military units and subunits will obey: Yeltsin or Rutskoy?

Mr. President, Ukraine is, in fact, on the verge of total destabilization. In order to allay this, it is necessary, today, to gather forces wherever possible.

Recognizing and arming Ukraine's National Guard could be the first real step in this direction. The state can no longer rely on the state apparatus. It must rely solely on the people and their powers of self-defense.

President Kravchuk's Preelection Tactics Viewed

WS2110094493 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 9 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by UNIAN correspondent Levko Serebryakov: "The President Helps To Determine Whether Ukraine Is Still Alive"]

[Text] Leonid Kravchuk's recent actions (assuming the prime minister's functions and appointing old ministers to the new government) can hardly be deemed unexpected, given Kravchuk's intentions to keep his post. The unusual ease with which the president decided to call early elections is just another argument in favor of this supposition.

Until recently, all Kravchuk's actions made a logical string—to avoid efforts, to keep off any political forces, to wait until the next crises, and to make the best use of them. Our political system is peculiar, because it is unable to adequately respond to developing situations and to resolve contradictions and conflicts. As a result of this, mountains of unresolved problems build up around high officials. Periodically, they reach such dimensions, that the official sitting inside the mountain can destroy it with the slightest motion. This does not eliminate problems—the latter simply lose their urgency and are

replaced by new ones. A new mountain starts to build up. The president probably is not going to give up this suitable strategy.

By appointing all the former ministers to the new cabinet and by adding Slepichev to their number, Leonid Kravchuk clearly indicated that there would be no reforms. This is natural, given the high price a reformer might pay. Before a reform can yield dividends, a reformer will be doomed to inevitable failure at the elections. The variant of the president and the government acting separately does not suit the president either. In the first place, the Supreme Council will hardly approve of such a government. Besides, the government's constant clashes with the legislature would make both sides repeatedly seek the president's interference, the last thing Kravchuk wants to be involved in.

The major change on the political arena—the calling of new elections—strengthens Kravchuk's position. The Supreme Council will hardly put spokes in the new government's wheels, the more so that these wheels will not be turning. Clashes regarding the adoption of a new constitution are unlikely, because deputies are rather preoccupied with their own financial problems than with resolving complicated issues. The only thing that can incite conflicts is the new election law. The very ruling on holding the elections on 27 March is quite weak from a legal viewpoint. Communists and socialists will not miss the chance to make use of this weakness. According to some observers, the president, supported by anticommunist apparatchiks, can easily overcome the communists. If a new election law is not adopted by 27 November, the elections will be held in accordance with the old law, which will be very convenient for socialists and communists. However, the Supreme Council chairman's speech in favor of a mixed election system gives grounds to hope that a new law will be adopted. There are rumors that Plushch has his own party.

A new Supreme Council can hardly undermine Kravchuk's position, even if it tries. Time will pass before any structure takes shape (experts assess that a majority and a minority in the legislature may develop in approximately nine months after the elections).

Thus, Leonid Kravchuk's victory or defeat in the elections will depend on one factor—Ukrainian society's durability. So far, all the forecasts regarding the date of the upcoming collapse have failed. In fact, all economic data testify that an economic collapse occurred long ago. However, nothing is happening. We are living as we used to live, because we have an unusually rich country.

The discussion on whether the Ukrainian nation is a hero capable of withstanding all hardships, or a corpse indifferent to all changes, will continue for at least six more months. However, no matter who is victorious in the discussion, it will have very unpleasant consequences for Ukraine.

Article Views Prospects for Presidential Candidates

WS2110083093 Kiev UNIAN OHLYADY, KOMENTARI, PROHNOZY in Ukrainian No 20 18 Oct 93

[Article by Volodymyr Zolotarev and Oleksandr Kharchenko: "If You Are as Resolute as Chornovil, as Liberal as Hrynyov, and Your Last Name is Kravchuk, You Are the Next President of Ukraine."]

[Text] Of the six presidential candidates during the previous elections, only three—Kravchuk, Chornovil, and Hrynyov—remained in fairly good political shape. Each of them could certainly make another attempt next summer. It is difficult to say who else will be able and willing to run in the presidential marathon. Only Leonid Kuchma deserves attention among the people who appeared on the political scene last year.

Leonid Kravchuk has the largest potential for conducting a campaign due to his present position and the structures already in place—the administration and old nomenklatura links. If the president decides to run once again, his campaign could develop along two main scenarios.

The first scenario could be the result of Kravchuk's traditional wait-and-see policy. In this case, nothing serious will happen in the economy and politics. The opposition will be neutralized by the very fact of the future elections—why demand the president's resignation when the elections are tomorrow? This is when we will fight then. A general decline will certainly trigger numerous appeals to the president, who will promise "energetic action" in the event that he is reelected. The question is why would someone who might soon be replaced begin to do anything? A major drawback of this tactic is the high probability of a social explosion.

However, another option is also possible. Judging by the resolve with which Leonid Kravchuk, as head of the executive branch, threw the old guard into combat, he can make a number of populist decisions just before the elections—introduce the hryvnya, for example. Possible temporary improvement might propel the time- seasoned team with Kravchuk at the head to an electoral victory.

It should be added, however, that the idea of Kravchuk's refusal to run for president is gaining ground in the political circles. If so, his recent moves appear quite logical [words indistinct] (the most important thing is to prevent conflicts), to stick it out until the elections and leave "undefeated," passing over the ravaged country to his successor. This would not mean that Kravchuk will drop out of big politics for good. This pattern explains the comeback of Slyepichev— not popular but capable of promoting the establishment of another "Gorbachev (Kravchuk) Fund" on Ukrainian soil.

Today, it is hard to predict according to what scenario Kravchuk will act. Most probably, he himself has not yet made his choice. Whatever the case, he will have to grapple with obvious factors, in particular his low, if not hopeless, popularity rating (public opinion polls conducted but not publicized by the president's services show that only 12 percent of Ukrainian citizens support Kravchuk). This is why the president will be forced to choose between two formulas: "I am still better than they are" if he participates in the elections, and "Solve all your problems without me" in the opposite case.

Vyacheslav Chornovil may garner many votes, but it would be only thanks to the support from the western and central oblasts. Generally speaking, however, his victory is hardly possible because of the nature of the organization that he leads and its ideology. In a bid to combine two irreconcilable ideologies—nationalism and democracy—the "national democracy" has started to come apart at the seams a long time ago. The only reason that it still exists is because the "national democrats" were never put through the test of power-wielding. When in power, they would inevitably have to make a choice in favor of one of the two ideologies. This is evidenced by the developments in Russia, where this kind of evolution has already occurred. The dual nature of the Rukh results in its losing ground in western Ukraine to "pure" nationalists and poor chances in eastern Ukraine, where he has a "nationalistic" reputation.

Rukh's recently visible orientation toward pragmatism does not stem from deliberate politics but rather from the role played by the people in this organization who are paid for their political activities. Romanticism and its other extreme derivatives inherent in amateurish politicians give way to more balanced and realistic attitudes. This is why the Rukh has finally started to display an interest in the economy, supporting the liberal economist Savchenko. However, this turn is not ideological in nature so far, remaining therefore unnoticed among the voters. Moreover, Mr. Chornovil often does not see fit to act through the party's policies, his style resembling "grassroot" activists in the heyday of the perestroyka. There is one more aspect—Chornovil's health condition has considerably worsened, and rumor has it that he is not going to run for president.

Volodymyr Hrynyov has already launched his election campaign. He is traveling extensively throughout Ukraine, assembling the so- called "regional electoral coalitions" that would rally his backers in the legislative elections toward himself in the presidential elections. The prime task for Hrynyov is to became a leader in eastern and southern Ukraine (a hopeless thing in its western regions), which is complicated by his liberal views—unpopular in the "proletarian" regions. Hrynyov significantly lost his "political momentum" by binding himself with the "New Ukraine." Timely and radical decisions are strangled in the straitjacket of the organization's structure, making its leader "sluggish and clumsy." No wonder that Volodymyr Hrynyov is looking for allies outside the "New Ukraine." One of the major ski's that he should learn is to nicely wrap his proposals making them understandable not only to intellectuals but also to everyone else.

Of course, this list of contenders for the presidential post could be continued. But the description of each of them would always include "Yes, but..."

The Ukrainian voter is finding himself in a funny situation and, like the protagonist from one of Gogol's novels, thinks that it would be good if he could take Kravchuk's last name, afix it to Hrynyov's liberalism, add Chornovil's resolve and Lanovyy's image as a staunch reformist, and wrap it all in the youth and wealth of Merkulov. That would make an excellent candidate. Lack of such a candidate in Ukraine makes us choose from what is available on the Ukrainian political horizon. One must say here that former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma is the most suitable person in this situation because he fulfills the expectations of an "average Ukrainian" and his person epitomizes the entire Ukraine.

[Words indistinct] can barely speak Ukrainian, but he has a "correct" last name; he advocates economic ties with Russia, but is not afraid of criticizing it; as most of us, he is wondering "what system we are building," but favors capitalism in the future and socialism today. Mr. Kuchma, as most Ukrainian citizens, is quick to blast the authorities, but again as his fellow countrymen, does nothing to change the situation.

In one word, Leonid Kuchma is an ideal candidate for a nation that is becoming aware of itself. Like the nation, he is full of contradictions and has not yet determined his preferences. Of course, God forbid we should have a president who is growing up together with his people. But the paradox of elections is that people vote not for someone who is capable of leading them to a better future, but for someone whom they "like" most today. Also against L. Kuchma works the fact that the elections will take place next year and that he will be partly forgotten until next summer. If the former prime minister manages to make use of his experienced team, which selected and cultivated his image surprisingly well and ensured a high popularity rating at a time of general disarray, he stands a fair chance of succeeding in the presidential elections.

Justice Ministry Registers New Party in Crimea

MK2010150193 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Unattributed NEGA report in the "Crimea" column]

[Text] On 18 October the Crimean Ministry of Justice registered the Crimean Republican Party (the Party of the Republican Movement). According to its program, this is a right of center party relying on the middle strata of the Crimean population. Its statute says: "An institution of sympathizers is allowed, as represented by the Republican Movement of Crimea. The participants in

the latter are regarded as the party's reserve and may render assistance by taking part in its activities." The basic objectives and tasks of the party and the movement coincide, but the party represents a higher level allowing participation in elections to power bodies and therefore the implementation of its own program for organizing the statehood of the Crimean Republic. According to the party's press center, it is ready to collaborate with all public and political forces for the sake of well-being and peace on Crimean land, based on human rights and excluding the primacy of any ethnic groups or classes.

"Some consider us to be separatists but this is not so," said Vadim Mordashov, deputy chairman of the Crimean Republican Party and deputy of the Simferopol city council, in a conversation with NEGA's correspondent. "We are fighting for an independent Crimean Republic but not in order to be together with Ukraine or Russia." The party intends to contest the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Crimea.

The Republican Party of Crimea is the third party registered in the autonomous republic's Justice Ministry in accordance with the new law of the Crimean Republic "On Citizens Associations." Earlier, registration documents were issued to the Party for the Economic Revival of Crimea and the Communist Party of Crimea.

Belarus

Shushkevich Leaves Bulgaria After Two-Day Visit

LD2010192693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1631 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Abrosimov]

[Text] Sofia October 20 TASS—Belarusian leader Vyacheslav Shushkevich left Sofia today after a two-day visit at the invitation of Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev. He had signed the first interstate agreement on friendly relations and cooperation between Bulgaria and Belarus, met National Assembly Chairman Alexander Iordanov and was received by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov.

The results of the visit were summed up in a joint press conference held by the Bulgarian president and the Belarusian leader today.

President Zhelyu Zhelev and other Bulgarian officials saw Shushkevich off at Sofia Airport.

Kravchenko Hopes Japan Will Aid Removal of Nuclear Arms

LD2010172993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1635 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Vosboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] Europe "has not responded in real terms" to Belarus's call for aid in removing strategic and conventional weapons from its territory in order to subsequently have them scrapped, said Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko in an interview with Interfax. Minsk intends to "continue raising this question," he emphasized.

According to the Belarusian foreign minister, he sets some hopes on aid from Japan. "We have a joint project estimated at ten million dollars. Its goal is to gain nuclear-free status for Belarus," Kravchenko said.

Shushkevich Comments on Banning Communist Party

WS2010125893 Minsk BELORUSKIY RYNOK in Russian No. 26 Oct 93 p 1

[Report by Ales Lipay: "We Are Not Able To Lock Borders With Russia," on an interview with Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkievich by BELAPAN correspondent]

[Text] At the BELAPAN correspondent's request, Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich expressed his opinion on the latest statements of a number of organizations of the Republic occasioned by the recent tragic events in Moscow and by the general instability of the political situation in Russia.

In particular, with regard to demands for establishing passport and customs control on the Belarusian-Russian border, Shushkevich stated: "It is simply an amateurish approach because applying the mentioned measures in a more or less short time is impossible due to the big expanse of the border. However, definite steps toward nonadmission of armed people from Russia onto the territory of our Republic were taken by the appropriate structures."

Are they sufficient? "Frankly speaking," answered Stanislav Shushkevich, "there is no possibility of setting a continuous cordon. But the conflict in Russia is already resolved, and this allows us to be more open and sincere in our relations with the neighbor state."

The Supreme Soviet chairman also noted that he did not see grounds for the legal ban of communist organizations in the Republic, which is being demanded by democrats. "If those who speak of it have some concrete evidence, let them produce that evidence and later raise the question of banning," said Stanislav Shushkevich.

Myasnikovich Briefs Foreign Envoys on Economic Reform

WS2010141993 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian No. 202 14 Oct 93

[Report from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry press service: "Diplomatic Prearrangements"]

[Text] On the eve of the World Bank consultative group debate on Belarus, scheduled for 27 October, First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich met with the heads and representatives of the U.S., French, Italian and German Embassies in the Republic of Belarus. He briefed the foreign diplomats on the primary direction of economic reforms in the Republic.

Appreciation was expressed by World Bank representatives during their recent visit over steps taken by the government, though they did make some remarks concerning the execution of the privatization program. The deputy prime minister also touched upon questions of interaction between Belarus and international financial and credit organizations, and he discussed prospects for economic cooperation within the framework of the CIS.

The meeting was held with the participation of leaders of the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Finance, and the Belarusian Council of Ministers.

Opposition Popular Front Holds Rally To View Moscow Events

WS2010125493 Minsk DOBRY VECHAR in Belarusian 11 Oct 93 p 1

[Report by Ales Mikalaychanka under the "Echo of Moscow's Events" rubric: "We Are Sorry About Russia But We Are More Concerned About Belarus..."]

[Text] Though the meeting of the legislative opposition from the Belarusian People's Front [BPF] was expected to be held at 1800 and night was fast approaching, many citizens of Minsk arrived at the House of Officers for the planned rally. The supposed purpose of the rally was to assess the massacre carried out by Bolshevik-fascist rascals in Moscow and the lessons of that armed violence for Belarus.

After BPF Council Deputy Chairman Yury Khadyka asked the people assembled to honor the memory of those people who had perished in Moscow with a minute of silence and this honor was performed, the deputies began delivering speeches.

Having no opportunity to adequately recount all of the speeches, I am going to acquaint you with some of their general pronouncements.

Lyavon Barshchewski: As comrade Belarusian Communist Party Chairman Chikin has announced recently, the wheels of history are moving forward. At first, we were building communism while currently we have started to build socialism according to the Latin America models. Anyway, the same "engineers of the happy future" are currently building a new and very cozy historic cottage for themselves. In this new cottage, 1 percent of the population will own 90 percent of the nation's wealth, while the remaining population will live in poverty, hunger, and cold. The communist moneybags have robbed all of us to such an extent that they are not ashamed of quarreling in front of us. The weapons are in their hands. They will not care for the people, they are ready to shed our blood just as their accomplices did in Moscow.... Currently, in an effort to ward off Yeltsin, they will shout about our sovereignty. They have begun to badly need Belarusian independence of late, however, to install a communist reserve in the Republic. They will have a lot of assistants in this undertaking— ranging from those Moscow rascals who escaped justice to the members of former special militia detachments in Riga.

Valyantsin Holubew: The Supreme Soviet majority neglects our sovereignty. Their representatives have not even been ashamed of going to Moscow and selling out our state. It is interesting to note that in Israel people who do not recognize that country cannot be elected to parliament. Their deputies take an oath of loyalty to their country. Times demand that an oath of loyalty to Belarus be taken by our deputies.

Syarhey Navymchyk: The government has literally bought the Republic's mass media. ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA, Chikin's MY I VREMYA, and the television are openly protesting our sovereignty and insulting our national symbols. Today, a session of the Supreme Soviet commission for mass media was held. The commission has adopted a decision on its obligatory participation in the distribution of finances from the state budget to the mass media; on the elimination of the press departments within the Council of Ministers; on the dismissal of Mr. Stalyarow from the post of a chairman of the State Radio and Television Company.

Zyanon Paznyak: We should understand that Kebich's government, which enjoys the protection of such Supreme Soviet leaders as Stanislav Shushkevich, will not undertake any economic reforms.... As for the events in Russia, Belarus should remember: First, in a normal civilized country, there should exist no communist or fascist organizations; second, our independence is a great thing. Currently, it is still weak and helpless, however, it has saved us.... In my opinion, Yeltsin's rule does not exclude the great power of Russian policy toward the erstwhile USSR republics.

Deputy Outlines Proposals for Supreme Soviet

WS1410131293 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 28 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by People's Deputy Aleh Trusaw, chairman of the Central Council of the Belarusian Social Democratic Association, under the "My Opinion Is That" rubric: "Coalition Government Is the Light at the End of the Tunnel"]

[Text] The regular fall session of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet is fast approaching. I am interested in knowing which issues are going to be the most pressing? Moreover, our economic situation is becoming more dire each and every day.

If you skim through the newspapers, especially through those under the Council of Ministers' control, the scenario of the upcoming session is almost clear. The influential pro-governmental faction "Belarus," which unites the former party and current nonparty nomenclature with the communists, will propose a dozen issues which they consider necessary for the betterment of our neglected economy.

First of all, Shushkevich should be dismissed because he has not finished a party school, has not worked in a full-time party position, and therefore is unable to run a state. In addition, the offended Russian language should once again become the national language, the state emblem "Pursuit" should be changed into a picture of an urus, and a tricolored imperial flag borrowed from the Slavic Assembly should be raised over the halls of government.

These new symbols will surely serve for the creation of a confederation with Russia, and later, at the proposal of one of the most "independent" deputies, the most active fighter against corruption and privatization, we will "create a single and indivisible state."

Then, we will have no problems with oil and gas, our shops will be selling cheap "Moskovskaya" vodka, "Sovetskaya" sausages, and "Russkaya" vodka will again cost 4.62 rubles. The greenhouses of kolkhozes will grow bananas and pineapples, the workers of Minsk

factories will have vacations not only in Sochi and Kislovodsk, but in Florida and Hawaii as well.

In the 21st century, the streets, ships, kolkhozes, schools, and even spaceships of Belarus will bear the names of the members of the Belarusian Government who implemented this program. On the main squares of Moscow, Minsk, and Shklov, the grateful working people will erect high bronze statues of the initiator of the creation of the united Belarusian-Russian state under the name "Bel-Ros" that will finally outproduce the United States in milk, meat, and butter. A profile of the last prime minister of an independent Belarus and the first governor-general of the "North-West Region" within Bel-Ros will be pictured on the national currency, which could be converted into dollars at every village bar, including the beer halls. All this could happen at the upcoming session, especially if a deputy presses not only his voting button, but that of his neighbor as well. (Surely, someone has to be away on a business trip abroad, on vacation, in their office, or simply at home or their summer cottage.)

It will be interesting to see what our government—which, according to communist professor and philosopher Ivan Antanovich, is "generally experienced, competent, and performing difficult tasks with honor"—will promise at the session?

We have been promised stability, an improving economy, a national currency, a Naval fleet, cars, buses, and even cheap vodka.

However, what was the cost of the government's promises during the last session; promises that kolkhozes would have no problems obtaining diesel and petrol in summer and fall? As it has turned out, only Belarusian owners of foreign cars have no problems obtaining petrol.

The greatest mistake of our government is not that it does not believe its own promises, but that during the last two years of independence it has not understood that it is the government of an independent state and it is impossible to blame one's mistakes on Gorbachev or the Moscow ministries. Please, pay attention to the fact that many of our ministers do not like the words "our state" or "our country"—they modestly say "our Republic." Moreover, the majority of them do not use the Belarusian language even though they can speak it.

Therefore, the people who are far away from the national revival, who were brought up in an atmosphere of intolerance for the national Belarusian culture and history, cannot—even if they want to—pursue a correct economic policy, just as a blind man cannot walk without a guide.

Therefore, being a people's deputy, I propose the discussion of these three most important issues at the upcoming session:

1. The dismissal of the current government and the creation of a coalition government of people's confidence.

2. The adoption of a new electoral law.

3. The introduction of appropriate corrections to the Constitution and the announcement of early elections in spring 1994.

Representatives of all political parties, movements, trade unions, and public organizations which are able to unite on these three [as published] principles—the independence and complete neutrality of Belarus; the planned and gradual transfer to a market economy; the social protection of working people and pensioners during the transitional period; a system of conservation and saving of energy and natural resources; a state monopoly on the sale of vodka, cigarettes, medicine, and weapons; cardinal changes in tax policies to benefit enterprises working toward exports and producers of agricultural products; the introduction of a national currency; and a strict monetary policy (inflation should be no higher than 3 percent per month).

As for the structure of the government, I propose to establish 15 ministries, to abolish all state committees, departments, and divisions and subordinate them to the respective ministries. The prime minister should have a deputy prime minister fulfilling the functions of minister of economy, and two deputy prime ministers, fulfilling the functions of a foreign minister and a minister of finance.

In addition to the three above-mentioned ministries, I propose to create Ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, Culture and Education, Information and Communications, Transportation, Health Care and Ecology, Justice, Social Security and Employment, Natural Resources, Agriculture and Foodstuffs, and Trade and Privatization of State Property. The president of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences should become an optional minister.

Thus, each party or movement can nominate someone to be elected to these posts (these people do not necessary need to be party members) on the condition that after discussion on the positions at "a round table" and agreement on these specific people, the Supreme Soviet at first nominates the new structure of government, and then simultaneously members of the government along with the prime minister on one list.

I do not doubt that some competent members of the existing government—there are such people— will become members of the new government and thus we will manage to keep the succession of power. I hope that other deputies will discuss my proposals. Because the sooner we stop building fairy castles and begin having hope in ourselves, the sooner our lives will make sense.

Experts View Outlook for Economic Union

WS1910090093 Minsk FEMIDA in Russian 4 Oct 93 pp 1, 2

[Article by economist Leonid Zlotnikov and political expert Aleksandr Sdvizhkov: "Economic Union: Drug or Medicine?"]

[Text] What is the aim of the economic union? If we remove the ideological makeup, we will see that the union is aimed at receiving guaranteed access to Russian power supplies. Before August, there were delusions that Russia will wait with payments for oil and gas because it has strategic interests in Belarus. There were even speculations about the blood relationship between Slav republics. Then, came the August shock—gas supplies were reduced by 50 percent and oil supplies were cut off. We had to pay! However, we had neither Russian rubles, not to mention convertible currency, nor products for clearing operations. Look what happened then: Instead of looking for economic solutions, we started looking for political ones. A group of deputies from the deputies association in Belarus went to the Russian Supreme Soviet in search of power supplies and our speaker went to the Russian president. Only the government was competent enough not to get involved in political schemes, and to suggest a businesslike project instead. Later, this became an economic agreement and a basis for an economic union. However, sometimes dreams are not alien to professionals either. At a news conference on the Moscow talks' results, National Bank Chairman Stanislav Bagdankevich provided this argument: In a single economic union, power resources will be much cheaper for us than for foreign customers. Is this not charming! Russian provinces will subsidize our economy and add our inflation rates to their own! This was possible in the Soviet Union, but now, regions and enterprises will trade with others watching out solely for their own profits. The economic union is being formed in the framework of a diminished former Soviet Union. All the same, regardless of all unions and confederations, gas and coal prices will have reached the world level by the end of 1994. Fixed oil prices will not last long either. According to forecasts, Russia itself will have to import oil beginning in 1995. Speaking of the current situation, the oil production volume has exceeded the volume of prospected oil fields. This means that Russia badly needs new deposits, great investments and technologies, and the reconstruction of existing refineries. Even if the potentials of all the 15 former republics were put together, there would be no chance to collect these funds. Thus, here is the conclusion—there will be no cheap power resources. Of course, some "red parliament" or "black dictator" can regulate prices at the demand of the military-industrial complex or the agroindustrial lobby and earmark lavish loans. However, oil production will then have to be subsidized, including subsidies for machine building industries supplying equipment, the social infrastructure, and so on.

These are not arguments against an economic union. When we learn how to earn money, when we buy instead of begging, only then a strong union, a commonwealth, or a confederation may be formed. By the way, for the sake of simplicity of definitions, such a union should rather be called a common market.

Why did the August crisis occur? Debts are not the cause, they are the outcome. The entire oil policy of our government was anti market, including attempts to resolve fuel problems at the level of private intergovernment deals and a monopoly on oil procurement, refinement, and sales. Activities of market structures were limited; oil products belonging to private companies were expropriated. A conflict developed between laws of the oil market and socialist principles pursued by our managers.

Today, commercial structures are given, or at least promised, a free hand. Licenses for imports and exports have been canceled, private gasoline stations will be opened. The experience of the Baltics demonstrates that if priority is given to business, a few months are enough to put an end to a fuel crisis. In this case, an economic union with Russia will pave the way for importing market reforms from Russia. Moreover, more advanced market reforms of our eastern and western neighbors helped Belarusian businessmen withstand the administrative pressure, by transferring their capital and products to these countries.

Private oil companies have in fact, defeated the mighty Belneftekhim. Using the Russian lobby, they probably brought about a reduction of obligatory oil deliveries, envisioned by intergovernment quotas, and alleviated sanctions for debts.

However, government structures should not be deemed absolutely antimarket. Certain administrators were creating a business environment for their own advantage. Apparatchiks' business emerged, and capital from state-run enterprises was pumped there. There were no other sources for obtaining starting capital. Economy is the art of attaining what is possible to attain. Due to the government's pragmatism, Belarus has been receiving power resources at favorable prices and was able to withstand the August shock without "intensive care" measures.

The opposition is accusing the government of failure to find alternatives to "the eastern union." Their main argument is: We could choose the Baltic path for reaching the market. In theory, we could, but in practice, we have a different industrial structure, because we are very strongly attached to Russia technologically. We have no ports in the Baltic Sea that earn convertible currency on semi-legal reexporting of products. Finally, we have no national idea that would be able to help resist a power blockade and cold winters. In other words, there is no alternative to a union with Russia. This is why the Moscow agreements were signed—socialist principles will not provide people with heat.

Let us go back to the initial postulate—the economic union being prompted by a power crisis. However, this crisis was evoked by price increases rather than a deficit in power resources. Thus, we will have to buy and sell products at world prices. Then, how is an economic union going to help? How can a beggar help another beggar? World prices for raw materials plus obsolete technologies may only result in uncompetitive products

with crazy production costs. We will be wasting our natural resources. In the end, those who have rich deposits of resources will find partners in the West. Who will need Belarus with its expensive low-standard products? Probably the Russian military alone will need it as the first line of their strategic defense.

Yegor Gaydar in his recent interview warns against excessive expectations regarding the economic union. He hints that Russia, having its own problems and interests, will no longer be a donor feeding others with power and credits. In fact, it does not matter whether this is Gaydar, Fedorov, or Shokhin. Even if, God forbid, a Baburin-Konstantinov-Sterligov government assumes power, all the same sooner or later, it will have to act in accordance with economic logic.

The economic union is a drug lasting for a short moment. It will create conditions for developing business and might last through the winter and maintain social stability. Its potential will be exhausted in half a year or a year at most. What will happen then? One of the new pseudo-market illusions is the creation of transnational corporations within the union, mainly on the basis of the former Soviet military-industrial complex. The model seems simple—cooperation will be restored, the problem of mutual payments will disappear, and the hi-tech sector will recover its might. However, post-Soviet transnational corporations will inevitably become monopolists in domestic markets. Monopolism and lack of a competitive environment are bound to result in technological backwardness. There is neither hope for an influx of investments nor petrodollars for buying the know-how. As a result of this, transnational corporations will disintegrate or transform into more flexible structures able to earn convertible currency.

Thus, the economic union may expand the domestic market and vivify production, but it will not resolve the problem of the economy's indepth structural reshaping, because the domestic market does not stimulate this. The Moscow agreements should be assessed as a tactical move to halt the downfall—nothing more, nothing less.

Shushkevich Adviser Views Absence of Reform Program

WS2010152193 Minsk EVROPEYSKOYE VREMYA in Russian No. 9 Oct 93 p 4

[Interview with Valeriy Tsepkalo, adviser to the Supreme Soviet Chairman, by Aleksandr Stupnikov: "We Do Not Have a Concept of Economic Reform"]

[Text] [Stupnikov] What are the duties of an adviser?

[Tsepkalo] The duties and activities of an adviser are not really very visible. A political leader should be well oriented in many issues, but he often does not have time to carefully study a problem. My duties are connected with the issues of foreign affairs and external economic relations.

[Stupnikov] Do you think that Belarus should look to the West or rather to the East?

[Tsepkalo] First of all it should look into the future. We are historically and economically connected with Russia. This determines our geopolitical preferences. We have no choice when it comes to the economy. Certain facts exist regardless of our wishes. We receive energy sources and other goods from Russia. Hypothetically, we could buy oil elsewhere paying world prices, but how much would it cost, taking into account delivery, freight, and reloading expenses?

[Stupnikov] How do the Baltic republics cope with their energy problems?

[Tsepkalo] Our production is very energy- and capital-consuming. Neither Estonia nor Latvia produce heavy trucks and tractors. Their industries are oriented toward mass-consumption production that is more energy-saving in comparison with our production. The Belaz company alone is consuming more energy than the entire Estonian industry. In addition, we do not have any alternative energy sources. Lithuania has a nuclear power plant and Ukraine has several. It is easier for them to cope with energy problems.

[Stupnikov] Does it mean that we should reconcile ourselves to full dependence?

[Tsepkalo] Belarus, like other industrial countries, should develop energy-substituting branches of industry. Even in this field we are no match for the Baltic republics. Before, thanks to deliveries from Russia, we had low prices on energy sources, and even when we wasted huge amounts of energy, we were able to produce cheaper Belarus tractors, for example. We would even violate Western Europe's and North America's antidumping agreements in order to sell our products. Now, the situation has changed. We are receiving energy sources in prices that are comparable to world prices. However, we have not managed to convince Western Europe to buy our tractors. We cannot compete on the world market with such products.

Look at the Grodno Azot company. It was one of the best factories in the USSR. Now it is standing idle most of the time. At the same time, a similar factory in Liepaja in Lithuania is thriving, despite the fact that gas prices are identical for both factories. They have managed to convince the West that they are paying for gas in world prices, we have not even tried to do this.

[Stupnikov] Have we ever developed an economic program that would take advantage of other countries' experiences?

[Tsepkalo] There have been such programs in Russia, for example the ones prepared by Yavlinskiy, Shatalin, and Gaydar. In Belarus, there have been no such programs. We do not have a strategy for carrying out economic reforms. We do not have specific goals and perspectives.

[Stupnikov] However, you do understand that there is a need for such a program... Probably, you are not the only one...

[Tsepkalo] We do not have the concentrated political will, and any idea could become stuck in the bureaucratic network. It has been only three months since I became an adviser to the Supreme Soviet Chairman, and I often cannot reach an understanding with the people from the Cabinet of Ministers or the Supreme Soviet. There is no precise program nor any decisive actions. How can a state operate without a normal banking system? How can it operate if it issues money without any responsibility? Money is one of the state's responsibilities. How can we speak about confidence, when bank deposits have shrunk 150 times? In our country, money is being accumulated not in capital, as in normal states, but in goods. Normalization of the banking system is only one of the current problems. We must stop following circumstances that dictate what we do.

Moldova

Commander of 14th Army Gen Lebed Departs for Moscow

AU2010181393 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2139 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Tiraspol, BASAPRESS, 19/10/1993—A BASA correspondent was acknowledged from well-informed sources that General Lebed, Commander of the 14th Army, will leave tomorrow, October 20th, to Moscow. One of the reasons is that his son will marry there. However, the same sources communicated that General Lebed will also meet with some persons from the Russian leadership with whom he expects to discuss some perspectives of the 14th Army withdrawal, which is currently located in Tiraspol. Formerly, the Commander of Russian Army troops from Tiraspol, Mihail Bergman, went to Moscow in order to take part in a session organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Tiraspol Supreme Soviet Opposes Lebed's Resignation

AU2010185093 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2139 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 19/10/1993—Today, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic refused to accept the demand of General Lebed to dismiss him from the post of deputy. Deputies argued that his demand has no real basis and the hurts interests of electors. During the session they criticised Lebed for blaming Tiraspol authorities of sending troops in Moscow. The Transdniestrian Vice-Minister Nicolae Kiba indicated that Russia blocked any bank operations with Transdniester through the military bank of the 14th Army. According to the Tiraspol dignitary recently 7 billion rubles were transferred through this bank. Kiba underlined that deliveries of fuel from Russia to Transdniester continue. In nine months the Roscontract firm delivered to Nistria fuel and lubricants totalling 35 billion rubles. Deliveries are fulfilled through the commercial firms Nistru and Arteria from Tiraspol. Kiba declared that deliveries of combustion are granted for credits presented before. According to the Tiraspol vice-minister, Moldovan debts towards Transdniester for gas and electric energy are 24 billion rubles.

Snegur Appeals to Dniester To Help Enhance Independence

AU2010134593 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2014 GMT 18 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 18/10/1993—It is time to forget all prejudices and mutual blames behind us, unite our efforts to consolidate Moldova's independence, recently stated Mircea Snegur in an appeal to people from the left bank of river Dniester and of the city of Tighina (Bender). In fact, Chisinau authorities have more favorable conditions now to solve the problem of the Eastern districts. After the Moscow rebellion failed, the arguments of Chisinau against Transdniester are easily understood by Russian authorities and public opinion. This would never have happened in 1991, for example. The involvement of Transdniestrian commandos in the bloody events in Moscow created for Transdniestrian leaders a political and economic discomfort they have never had before. An increasing number of "godfathers" of Transdniester are attacked in different instances. In these conditions, "the new elite" or the Tiraspol political class make propagandistic efforts to change the situation in their favour, Mircea Snegur said that the constructive efforts of the Moldovan leadership were blocked by a conservative group of dignitaries of the Tiraspol Supreme Soviet. President Snegur states in his appeal that "in Transdniester there are people of goodwill ready to assume responsibility for the lives of Transdniestrians." Who are those people who would bring back Transdniester to Moldova by a political, economic or military force? Whom from Transdniester does Snegur rely on, declaring himself available to continue the political dialogue? The present Transdniestrian deputies seem not to be included in this list due to the fact that they denied so easily the revelations of General Lebed [14 Army commander] about the role of Transdniester in the Moscow bloodshed. However, Moscow seems to have let Lebed change several Tiraspol dignitaries. Has something changed in Russia's attitude towards Transdniester and Moldova in general? Andrey Kozyrev, Russian minister of foreign affairs, stated in a press conference that "it is necessary to give Transdniester a special status." Mircea Snegur also said in the appeal that it is possible to solve the problem of Eastern districts by granting Transdniester a special juridical status. Nicolae Tau, Moldovan minister of foreign affairs, said at the recent UN General Assembly that "the conditions for the withdrawal of the 14th Army, granting special juridical status to the Eastern districts is an attempt to keep Moldova in the Russian sphere of influence." Is Tiraspol so sure even in its

confrontation with General Lebed because of Moscow's reaction on Kozyrev's speech? Several Tiraspol leaders state that Russia did not sanction Transdniester and the economic banking relations will have a good-looking perspective. Although these statements are mere propaganda, their "spontaneity" should be taken into account. On the other hand, it is not clear who from Chisinau will finalize the political dialogue with the "people of goodwill" from Tiraspol. Mircea Snegur stated that "the parliamentary majority" would do that. He meant a part of the legislative that is no longer a state force that functions efficiently. The deputies are more concerned with the parliamentary campaign or with other problems. "The reunification" of Transdniester could be done only by the president and government. This perspective consolidates the position of President Snegur.

Politicians Discuss Resolving Dniester Issue

AU2010202693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2139 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 19/10/1993—The problem of Dniester is going to be solved by the future Parliament or to be more specific by the party with the majority in the future Parliament, stated Iurie Rosca, Christian Democratic Popular Front chairman. Valeriu Matei, speaker of the Congress Intelligentsia declared that the problem can be solved only if all external and internal consequences are analyzed. "This problem is very difficult to settle since it is controlled by external forces. Without a special agreement by which Russia will be obliged not to interfere in internal affairs of Moldova, the crisis will not be overcome," argues Matei. The quoted source underlines that there are no economic, geographical or ethnic criteria to explain the existence of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic. "The only factor which played a role while proclaiming the anti constitutional formation was of political nature. In this region of Moldova the former Soviet Empire created its instrument of blackmail," concluded Matei.

Official Urges Political Dialogue With Dniester

PM2010102593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Nikolay Andronik, member of the Moldovan Parliament Presidium and chairman of the Commission for the Settlement of the Sociopolitical Conflict in the Dniester Region, by Svetlana Gamova; place and date not given: "Moldova's Future: With the Dniester Region or Without?"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] The announcement of the date of the talks on early parliamentary elections in Moldova has resolved the protracted crisis of legislative authority but has set the republic another difficult problem.

The current relations between Chisinau and the eastern as well as the southern regions prevent one-quarter of the population from taking part in the coming elections. First, only citizens of Moldova enjoy the right to vote and be elected, but there are not many such in either the Dniester region or the rayons populated by Gagauzes. Second, it is unlikely that people will set up polling places in those regions.

Nikolay Andronik, member of the parliament presidium and chairman of the Commission for the Settlement of the Sociopolitical Conflict in the Dniester Region, considers that the talks between Chisinau and the Dniester region administration take on a special significance in the prevailing situation.

[Andronik] Our commission has taken the agreement on the settlement of the conflict in the Dniester region signed by Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur in July of last year as the basis for the talks. It contains two fundamental points: Russia recognizes the integrity and independence of Moldova and thereby indirectly assumes the commitments of mediator in resolving the problems of the Dniester region; second, Moldova is obliged to grant special political status to the region. That status was not accepted by the parliament of Moldova: The opposition blocked the decision.

[Gamova] The draft law on the status of the Dniester region, which has not actually been adopted, proposed, as I recall, that it be called a district [uyezd], one enjoying extensive rights.

[Andronik] That draft was not accepted by the Dniester region either. The leadership of the region insisted on the wording "confederation."

[Gamova] Has the situation changed now?

[Andronik] The Moldovan president's expert commission drew up principles for resolving the conflict which were subsequently agreed by the Dniester region leaders. We considered those principles as forming the basis of our meetings. At the same time, aware that the process could drag on, we began talks on restoring a single economic complex based on the fact that single structures—the banking system, single customs, army, and so forth—should operate regardless of the decision taken. We achieved some things and were glad when mutual settlements got under way. But opposition started up in both Chisinau and Tiraspol. In Chisinau the government was accused of sympathizing with the Smirnov regime. Yet the talks continued. However, the Dniester region deputies resolved that the Tiraspol side should be guided in its activity by the Dniester Region Supreme Soviet Decree "On the Formation of a Moldovan Confederation."

[Gamova] Moldova cannot accept a confederation, can it?

[Andronik] While the population in the Dniester region continues to be intimidated by the slogan of unification with Romania, any mention of a possible confederation treaty is seen on the Right Bank as a threat to dismember the republic. True, the Social Democratic Party of Moldova has come forward with a proposal to convene a

constitutional assembly to would adopt a new constitution—which does not rule out a federal system for the republic. But a referendum would then be necessary.

[Gamova] If the leadership of the region turns down this proposal, the population will in effect not be represented in the Moldovan parliament...

[Andronik] The elections will be held on multiparty lists. People from the Dniester region will certainly figure on them. There are members of the Agrarian Christian Party and social democrats. And also people belonging to the People's Front. The Dniester region leaders, however, will be cut off from participation in the political life of Moldova if that happens.

[Gamova] And an autonomous formation? Is such a wording acceptable?

[Andronik] It is acceptable. But everything must be discussed.

At the start of the summer, after the arrival of Russian deputies headed by Baburin in Bendery on Memorial Day, we were advised to delay talks in the Dniester region until the fall because of possible events in Moscow. The events, unfortunately, did occur. But we think that if it is our historical lot to live together on this plot of land, it is more sensible to try to reach agreement ourselves. Therefore we propose that we again engage in political dialogue.

Tiraspol Regards Tau's UN Speech as Anti-Dniester

AU2010181493 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2139 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Tiraspol, BASAPRESS, 19/10/1993—The Supreme Soviet of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic approved today a declaration regarding the speech of Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Tau, at the UN General Assembly. Tau's speech on October 8th was qualified by Tiraspol deputies as anti-Russian and directed against Dniester, aiming to gain the support of the world community for urging the withdrawal of the 14th Army and liquidation of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic.

Reintegration Party's Druc Foresees Union With Romania

AU2010192993 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 16 Oct 93 p 3

[Viorel Patrichi report on statements by Mircea Druc, former Moldovan prime minister and president of the National Reintegration Party-Pro Bessarabia and Bukovina, "Time Is Working for Us"]

[Text] After the [leader of the Dniester separatists, Igor] Smirnov fans supported Rutskoy, by actually participating with arms in the Soviet rebellion against Yeltsin, it is difficult to expect the Russian president openly to support the imperialist group in Tiraspol. On the other hand, Yeltsin cannot completely abandon the Dniester region, which otherwise, without [Russian 14th Army commander] Lebed's Kalashnikov, no doubt would definitely unite with Bessarabia, because the population can no longer suffer the tension. Since they are losing ground, the Smirnov fans must force the Ilascu trial forward. Therefore, it is possible that they will pass the death sentence, but, on appeal, the trial must be transferred to the High Court of Chisinau. If the sentence were carried out, a civil war would break out, and Snegur would have to give up power. This would definitely be meant to provoke Chisinau, something that the Kremlin does not desire at the moment and the only objective remains to push Bessarabia away from Romania.

Moscow is not to be envied. "Yeltsin is in the situation that Gorbachev had to face in 1988-89" says Mr. Mircea Druc, president of the National Reintegration Party—and the disintegration of the Russian Federation will continue. That is how I see the course of history because of the accumulation of energy there. The Russian people will become happy only when they come home. Only then will the Russian state enter Europe." The Tiraspol leaders are duty-bound to hold dialogue with Chisinau, because Yeltsin can no longer impose Bessarabia's federalization, even if he wanted to do so. No normal person could assume the responsibility for a civil war, otherwise the Smirnov fans might be thrown into the Dniester River with their hands up by the Dniester population itself.

The situation is getting increasingly complicated for the Smirnov fans also because of the elections in Bessarabia, scheduled for 27 February 1994. Three major orientations have taken shape in Chisinau: the pro CIS-gang, which includes the Smirnov fans in Dniester, the Romanian unification promoters (the Christian Democratic Popular Front and the Congress of Intelligentsia), and the pro-Snegur block called "the Civic Alliance" (a mixture of movements and groups, including Moldovans, Russians, Gagauz people, and Ukrainians, who have no connection whatsoever with the Civic Alliance in Romania). Snegur's alliance derives from the "Grazhdanskiy Soyuz" [Civic Alliance] in Moscow, under the slogan "A free, independent, sovereign, and indivisible Moldova." "Snegur should not accuse Smirnov that he is establishing a republic with five rayons of Bessarabia, because he himself is doing the same with six Romanian counties" says Mircea Druc. "Time is working for us. Romania has been accepted to the Council of Europe, received the most-favored-nation status from the United States, and is helping the Bessarabians. These are unimpugnable arguments for the Bessarabian unionists in the electoral campaign. Could Mr. Snegur tell what he has received from the CIS?" (By the way, Romania's billions are administered by the Snegur-Sangheli tandem, consolidating the Romanophobe group "the Civic Alliance" in Chisinau. Thus, the Romanian lei is serving goals that are opposite to the national interests.) "However, the world is changing there—the president of the National

Reintegration Party continues. One Tabunshchik, a Romanian from the Dniester region (whose name derives from the Tartar word "tabun," meaning a herd) was party secretary in the Chisinau Politechnical Institute, and expected to be promoted, after over 100 members of the teaching staff had been dismissed for their unionist ideas. At that time I was being sent to sweep the yard of the Chernovtsy furniture factory. The other day, the same Tabunshchik was in charge of sending groups of children over the Dniester River to learn the Romanian language in... Arad. People with strong nerves are needed, both in Chisinau and in Bucharest. It is not important to declare a union, but to establish it. Germany decreed a union six years ago, but it is still not completely united." Romania's unification is not regarded as a simple geographic unification. The unification requires the cultural, economic, and psychological revitalization of the whole nation in order to pass into the third millennium.

Regardless of Snegur-Yeltsin arrangements, there is an undercurrent of unification that can no longer be halted. Nevertheless, the unionists must close ranks, abandon their petty disputes, and follow the same current, namely the national will. It is obvious that our major adversary is innate opportunism.

Parliament Session Adopts Election Law

AU2010193393 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2139 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 19/10/1993—Today, the Parliament of Moldova examined the mechanisms of application of legislation on elections in parliament. The 245 deputies agreed that the Electoral Commission will include 7 members of the Moldovan Supreme Judicial Court and one representative for each of the 27 parts and political movements registered by that time. Deputy Mihai Polata proposed to adopt a decision by which future MP's [members of parliament] will be obliged to present in the Electoral Commission a medical certificate. With 194 votes "pro" the decision was approved. The decision was canceled though there was no special voting for that. Bulletins will not include names of candidates from political parties and movements but only names of independent candidates. Victor Puscas, deputy speaker of the parliament, demanded to furnish him with special potentials to adopt decisions of normative character. With only 114 votes "pro" the decision was not approved. With 185 votes "pro" the parliament adopted the Law on Elections in parliament. Speaker Petru Lucinschi announced the convocation of the next session with the present composition for November-December this year.

Production Declines; 11-Percent Unemployment

AU2010145193 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2014 GMT 18 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 18/10/1993—According to the data of the State Department for Statistics, the net material product reduced in 9 months of 1993 by 8.6 percent in comparison with 1992. The continuous decrease in the production of goods along with the increase in the quantity of money led to the aggravation of the deficit of goods and the increase of inflation. It was over 340 percent beginning with the early 1993. The industrial production increased by 7 percent in comparison with the same period of 1992. Economic experts say that the increase noticed last months stopped as a result of the financial difficulties in industry. According to the statistical report, the physical volume of the industrial production reduced by 18.4 percent during January-September in comparison with 1992. The agricultural production reduced in the same period by 12 percent. "The tiny improvement in the third part of 1993 did not result in essential changes in the national economy," states the report of the State Department for Statistics. According to the same report, stabilization in the economy was interrupted. The exports decreased during nine months, whereas imports increased. The trade balance represented a deficit of $30.5 million. There is an aggravation in the rate of unemployment: 11 unemployed per one vacant job.

Kyrgyzstan

Iran's Rafsanjani Arrives in Bishek From Uzbekistan

LD2010211593 Tehran IRNA in English 2038 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Bishek, Oct 20, (IRNA)—Iran's President Hojjat ol-Eslam Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani arrived here Wednesday at the end of his visit to Tashkent, and was welcomed at the airport by Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and a group of the country's officials.

In an interview with reporters minutes after the arrival here of President Rafsanjani the Kyrgyz President Akayev hailed Iran as one of the oldest and most powerful countries of the world.

The Kyrgyz president also lauded President Rafsanjani as one of the most prominent politicians in central Asia and the Muslim world and expressed hope as a result of the visit to Bishek of President Rafsanjani mutual poltical, economic and cultural ties will be promoted.

The president of Iran responded by saying that the Islamic Republic looks forward to broadening relations between Iran and the republics of central Asia.

With an area of 198,500 square kilometers and a population of 4,250,000 the Republic of Krgyzstan lies in eastern central Asia. The Kyrgyz were exposed to Islam in the seventeenth century.

President Akayev has headed the republic since the post-communism political upheaval in 1990.

In last July, and in the course of a visit to Tehran by President Akayev seven agreements for cooperation were signed between Iran and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Before arriving in Bishek President Rafsanjani completed a three-day visit to Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

In Tashkent airport minutes before flying to Bishek, President Rafsanjani said in an interview that his visit there had been fruitful, and that while in that city, seven committees had discussed various topics in the relations between Iran and Uzbekistan.

President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov said in the same interview that as the result of his talks with President Rafsanjani the situation was now better for the cooperation of the two countries in economic, and cultural areas, as well as for upholding peace in the region.

Before leaving Tashkent, President Rafsanjani officially opened a sales center in the city that offer only Iran-made products. The sales center has been organized by the Mostazafan Foundation of Iran.

Also Hojjat ol-Eslam Mahmud Doaie [name as received] who is a member of the Iranian dlegation on Wednesday opened another sales center of the private sector in Tashkent.

Meanwhile Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati who is accompanying Rafsanjani, on Wednesday discussed topics of mutual interest with the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Abdulkhashim Mutalov.

In their meeting, Foreign Minister Velayati and the prime minister of Uzbekistan signed three agreements in relation with a joint economic commission between the two countries and also on scientific and technical areas, transit and surface transport and banking, as well as an agreement for the opening in Tashkent of a branch office of the Bank Saderat of Iran.

Meets With Akayev

NC2110071993 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0330 GMT 21 Oct 93

[Telephone report by correspondent Ruhaninezhad from Bishkek—recorded]

[Text] Dear listeners of the morning news of the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran: I am speaking to you from Bishkek, the capital of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

The first round of talks between Askar Akayev and Hashemi- Rafsanjani, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, took place last night after the president's arrival in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. In this round of talks, which was attended by a number of officials from both countries, Askar Akayev welcomed our president, saying: The Kyrgyz people admire Iran's culture and history and with the establishment of the Iranian Studies Department at the National University of Kyrgyzstan, our students have the opportunity to study Persian language and history in a scientific and academic manner.

The Kyrgyz president referred to the very favorable outcome of his visit to Tehran, saying: The signing of the agreements on expanding air, land, and especially rail transportation between the two countries greatly pleased the Kyrgyz people. Our people are confident that Your Excellency's historic visit to Kyrgyzstan will also have many practical outcomes.

Thanking the Islamic Republic of Iran for its efforts to linking the Central Asian countries to other countries of the world by rail, he said: The Republic of Kyrgyzstan is very interested in the expansion of regional cooperation. The Central Asian countries thank the Islamic Republic of Iran for its initiative in bringing these countries closer to each other. The implementation of this project will play a major role in the exchange of commercial goods and in the transit of these countries' goods to foreign countries.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani then stressed the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in assisting the newly independent countries of Central Asia, saying: We are greatly interested in helping these countries as much as we can so they can achieve full and true independence sooner.

The president referred to the expansion of the Iranian railway and the linking of this railway with the Central Asian countries as a clear witness of Iran's efforts to expand these countries' links with the foreign world, saying: The Silk Road can be revived for modern use by our peoples with advanced transportation and telecommunications so that these countries can expand their commerce, economy, and civilization through regional and world trade and by gaining access to other nations.

Our president noted our country's successful experience in setting up markets and exhibitions in the Central Asian countries, adding: Iran is ready to do the same by activating the private sector and by expanding Iranian markets in Kyrgyzstan.

Tajikistan

Troops Killed in Battle With 'Islamic Opposition'

LD2010203693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1821 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Nearly 10 Tajik servicemen were killed in the battle, now in its sixth day, with the Islamic opposition in mountainous areas of the Tavildar District. An informed source close to the Tajik government told INTERFAX that the Islamic fighters had knocked out two tanks and one armored personnel carrier with anti-tank rockets and one APC had hit a land mine. Reinforcements were sent Wednesday to the upper reaches of the Obi-Khingou river.

A government serviceman involved in the fighting who preferred to stay anonymous told INTERFAX that there were 30 to 40 men in every Islamic anti-government unit, the largest of them having 250 men. He said that they compensated their small number by good knowledge of the terrain and high mobility.

The officer also said that a billboard saying Islamic Republic of Badakhshan was erected on the boundary between the Tavildar District and the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region. The billboard also said that the republic's leader was Mullo Rezvon, a most active field commander of the Islamic opposition.

"We find Mars and Snickers wrappers in the enemy positions we capture and take out truckloads of captured weapons and munition." In his view, such amounts of weapons and foodstuffs could be delivered only in helicopters, which, he thinks, is plausible because the Tajik air defense does not cover the entire border.

The officer also said that, he believed, the Islamic fighters had captured at least 20 government troops. "What is in store for them is hard to say," he explained because "the Islamic fighters generally don't take prisoners." He did not rule out the possibility that the prisoners could be used "as hostages when the fighters will try to have a breathing space before the winter sets in."

Russian Border Guards Detain 8 'Infiltrators'

LD2010162193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1327 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Russian guards have detained 8 infiltrators on the Tajik-Afghan border who crossed the frontier section of the 9th Outpost of the Moscow Border Guards Unit. A spokesman for the Dushanbe-based Russian Border Forces Command told Interfax that the detainees were unarmed.

Experts suggest that the group was sent to the area to pave the way for illegal frontier crossing. It was there that the Tajik Islamic Opposition had tried to gain a foothold and then penetrate deep inside Tajikistan.

Prime Minister Abdullodzhonov Meets Officials in Moscow

LD2010174193 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1200 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Abdumalik Abdullodzhonov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan, is in Moscow on a working visit.

He met Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia, Yuriy Shafranik, minister of fuel and power engineering of the Russian Federation, Sergey Shoygu, chairman of the State Committee for Emergency Situations, and Vladimir Mashets, chairman of the State Committee on Cooperation, on 19 October. The issues pertaining to bilateral cooperation, providing Tajikistan with fuel and lubricants, as well as other issues were discussed in the course of these meetings.

Muhtoshev and Yeliseyev, deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan, and Nasriddinov, plenipotentiary representative of Tajikistan to the Russian Federation, were present at the meetings.

Abdullojonov met Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation on the same day.

State Monopoly on Sales and Production Increases

MK2010140093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Oleg Panfilov report: "Tajik Market According to Abdulladzhanov. Merchants Disappointed"]

[Text] As late as one month after the Tajikistan Council of Ministers adopted the decree "On Rules of Sale of Products on Which the State Monopoly Has Been Instituted," the Tajik press published its text leaving the main points of the document unexplained. After the assurances to the CIS countries and foreign investors that Tajikistan did not see its future without a market-oriented economy, the Council of Ministers decree cancels the habitual promises and institutes a state

monopoly on sales of raw materials. The decree says: "... with the aim to concentrate the export resources managed by general contractors, to increase state control over their utilization." The document decrees that all available export products (cotton, wool, primary aluminum and articles made from it, and so forth) should be sold to general contractors within a month's time (not later than 12 October). As if it were not enough that the decree was published toward the end of the deadline for the obligatory sales, the government, as is seen, took over the function of determining to whom the collective and state farms and enterprises should sell their products. The decree refers to the monopolists as "contractors" who are free to buy export products at as little as half their cost, considering even the cost of production, storage, and transportation. Point 3 of the decree says that products unsold before 12 October "are subject to forcible seizure in favor of the state in their totality with the reimbursement of only the incurred charges."

Despite the declarations by government head Abdumalik Abdulladzhanov that the republic is entering the market, the state monopoly on production and sales is being preserved and strengthened. The majority of merchants and businessmen do not hide their disappointment and frankly detail numerous facts of corruption in obtaining licenses.

Turkmenistan

Article Questions Official Version of Afghan Bombing

MK1910141693 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 67, 19 Oct 93 (signed to press 18 Oct) p 4

[Igor Zhukov report under the "Border" rubric: "An Accidental Assault With Precision Bombing? Violations of the Turkmen-Afghan Border Are Becoming a 'Tradition'"]

[Text] The recent week in Turkmenistan was overshadowed by a scandal. Its cause was a report disseminated 11 October by POSTFACTUM news agency. It claimed that in early October Turkmenistan was subjected to a bombing strike by the Afghan Air Force. One aircraft was shot down and the other managed to escape to Afghanistan. According to POSTFACTUM's correspondent, the republic's Defense Ministry was keeping the details of the incident a secret.

Literally the following day Turkmenistan's Defense Ministry came out with an official statement signed by its head, Danatar Kopekov. According to the lieutenant general, the report does not correspond to reality, is of a provocative character, and misleads the public. The Afghan Embassy in Moscow in its own statement denied the report about the trespassing of Turkmenistan's state border.

On 12 October the subject of the attack was raised during a telephone conversation between Turkmenistan President Saparmurad Niyazov and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. A release from Niyazov's press service on this count says that the interlocutors deemed the report "about an alleged bombing by Afghan air forces of Turkmenistan's territory as not corresponding to reality."

If the account of the telephone conversation published in the local press is to be trusted, one circumstance immediately jumps to the eye: Niyazov and Grachev denied only the fact of the bombing. In contrast to the Afghan diplomats, they did not refute the very fact of the sovereign Turkmenistan's airspace being violated by Afghan air forces. What was the situation in reality?

Some sources in Turkmenistan's power structures have suggested other versions. According to one of them, Afghan aircraft, controlled by the leadership of an unknown grouping in the north of the Afghan republic, has indeed violated Turkmenistan's air border but did so unintentionally. Experiencing an acute shortage of fuel, one of the pilots tried to make the machine lighter by dropping a few bombs on desert territory.

According to another interpretation, the Afghan pilot tried to punish an enemy but deviated off course and pressed the release pedal not over its positions but over Turkmenistan's territory.

Another version, however, appears to be the most plausible. According to it, on 2 October at approximately 1000 two combat aircraft with Afghan Air Force markings violated Turkmenistan's airspace near the settlement of Takhtabazar in the republic's far south. Moving in circles and imitating an air battle, they penetrated 20 to 25 km inside the territory. After that one of the pilots released the bomb load over a railway stretch between Takhtabazar and the city of Kushka.

Air combat specialists explained that there is an emergency bombing, the so-called systemic [sistemnyy] bombing. In this case the character of the bomb dispersion and a number of other parameters point to a systemic, i.e., aimed bombing.

The unavailability of an official confirmation or a convincing denial of the above makes it necessary to recall once again that this is merely a version of events. Nonetheless, the motives of this incident remain unclear. How extraordinary is the very instance of Turkmenistan's border being violated? What are the concrete objectives of the organizers of the incident? Who are they?

It is not hard to obtain an answer to the first question. In spite of the protestations of friendship and calm on the Turkmenistan-Afghan border by the leaders of both countries, its violation on the part of Afghanistan are not at all rare. And whereas the instances of the ground border's being trespassed can be traditionally written off to shepherds or stray local residents, this cannot possibly

be done with respect to Turkmenistan's airspace, no matter how one might wish.

In the opinion of some observers, the sovereignization of Turkmenistan, which has brought the republic a number of obvious gains, has also had some negative implications. These include the obvious decline of its capability to ensure its own security.

In this situation the policy of positive neutrality which evokes approval from Western leaders is receiving mixed reaction in the East. Many local leaders, accustomed to resolving their internal problems by force, cannot accept the proposed rules of the game, trying instead to expand their influence over Turkmenistan and its leadership in a more habitual manner.

It is hardly likely that the demonstration of political flexibility on the part of Turkmenistan's president will be perceived by his southern neighbors other than as a sign of weakness. If these suppositions are correct, then, in spite of the assurances from Kabul officialdom, tests of durability will continue. Today only rapprochement with Moscow can offer a guarantee against them. Such is the objective reality in the conditions of power redistribution in the Central Asian region.

Meanwhile, in an atmosphere of general instability Turkmenistan is doing its best to preserve a state of calm. The republic's authorities did not demand explanations from the central Afghan leadership over the air strike, confining themselves to notifying only border troop commanders about the incident. The incident did not prevent President Niyazov from inviting regional Afghan leaders Rashid Dustum and Ismail Khan to take part in the celebration of the second anniversary of Turkmenistan's independence on 27 October. Within the framework of this triangle new talks are expected. Apparently, afraid lest they should be thwarted, the authorities hastened to accuse the Russian press of unkind intentions which so inappropriately revealed an uncomfortable fact. Well, at least now it is known who is not responsible for further successes of Turkmenistan's diplomacy and who will be to blame for its miscalculations.

Niyazov Discusses Security With Russian Commander

LD1510134993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1223 GMT 15 Oct 93

[Text] Ashgabat October 15 (TURKMEN-PRESS-TASS)—Worries about the security of that part of Turkmenistan's border which is also part of the Commonwealth of Independent States' border was one of the topics of discussion between Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov and the Russian deputy security minister, commander of the Russian Federation's border guards Lieutenant General Andrey Nikolayev.

Besides discussing their mutual interests in the security of the CIS border in their Monday meeting the two sides confirmed earlier inter-governmental agreements on mutual aid and cooperation and ensuring each state's territorial integrity. They looked at the questions of regulating the service conditions and social welfare of Russian officers in Turkmenistan, as well as ways to ensure the adequate supply and training of Turkmen national military personnel.

During their meeting the two government officials also examined possible cooperation in policing their borders on the Caspian Sea.

This discussion having prepared the basis, concrete agreements between Russia and Turkmenistan are to be drawn up for the next meeting between the heads of the CIS states, which is scheduled to be held in Ashgabat in November.

Niyazov Confirms Date of Introduction of Currency

LD2010092393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1928 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov today confirmed the date of the introduction of the republic's national currency, the manat, on November 1. Speaking at a press conference in Ashgabat, he pointed out that the new currency was an essential element of the true economic and political independence.

The president made public proposed prices of some food staples. He said that one kilo of meat will cost 6 manats, while a loaf of bread 27 tenges (100 tenges = 1 manat).

Some observers point out that the prices indicated by the president were 1.5-2 times higher than those he named on October 8. The proposed initial rate of the manat against the dollar was axed down by twice, from 1:1 to 2:1.

Uzbekistan

Iranian Leaders Continue Visit in Tashkent

PM2010162993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Shakhabutdin Zaynutdinov: "Uzbek-Iranian Dialogue in Tashkent"]

[Text] Tashkent—President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who is visiting Uzbekistan at the head of an Iranian state delegation, has expressed support for President Islam Karimov's idea of creating a standing seminar on the security, cooperation, and stability of the countries of Central Asia with its headquarters in Tashkent.

During talks the leaders of Uzbekistan and Iran expressed their opinions on the situation in the Central Asian region and in particular focused their attention on events on the Tajik-Afghan border. The two presidents agreed that this problem can be resolved only by means of talks and must be resolved by the people and the government of Tajikistan.

Velayati Meets Mutalov, Asymov

LD2010163993 Tehran IRIB Television Second Program Network in English 1430 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Iran's Foreign Minister Mr. Velayati met with the Uzbek Prime Minister Mr. Mutalov in Tashkent today.

At the meeting three memos of cooperation were signed in the fields of joint economic, scientific and technical cooperation; transit of goods; and road transport. It was also agreed at the session that an Iranian bank be established in Tashkent.

In conclusion of the meeting, the Uzbek prime minister lauded Iran's efforts and cooperation and considered President Hashemi- Rafsanjani's visit to Uzbekistan effective in promotion of bilateral ties.

Foreign Minister Mr. Velayati today also met with his Uzbek counterpart Mr. Asymov in Tashkent, discussing with him bilateral ties as well as regional and international issues.

Praising programs of the Uzbek government and agreements reached during the visit, Mr. Velayati described President Rafsanjani's visit to Uzbekistan as a boost to regional peace and stability, and noted that Iran attaches great importance to stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan and supports any measure which leads to the settlement of Tajikistan's problems and is favored by the people of that country.

The Uzbek foreign minister considered President Rafsanjani's visit to Uzbekistan an important development in bilateral ties which should help solve regional issues and stated that the regional states should try to solve their problems before winter.

Expressing satisfaction over agreements reached in the recent visit, he said a delegation will be dispatched to Iran within the next month to establish Uzbekistan's embassy in Tehran.

The two sides also agreed to exchange political and economic delegations in various fields.

Documents Signed

LD2010173493 Tashkent UZBEKISTAN APN in Russian 1203 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] [no dateline as received]—The business part of the visit to Uzbekistan by the Iranian delegation, headed by President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, was concluded with the signing of a package of documents. A protocol was signed in Tashkent on the creation of an Uzbek-Iranian commission for cooperation in the commercial, economic, industrial, scientific and technical fields. Agreements were reached on transit carriage and motor vehicle links. Documents were also signed on cooperation in the area of road- building, development of transport, the oil complex, agriculture, banking and commerce, and on the opening of air links between the capitals of the states.

During the talks between the presidents of Uzbekistan and Iran, there was discussion on the situation in the region, in particular, the position on the Tajik-Afghan border and ways of settling the conflict.

Armenia

Parliament Discusses Economy, Security Aid for Georgia

NC2010214093 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 2000 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] The Armenian parliament resumed its work today in an extraordinary session with the confirmation of the agenda proposed by the Supreme Council Presidium. The agenda included the government's account on the fulfillment of the 1993 state budget and socioeconomic development plan, and issues left over from the previous session.

Deputy Chairman of Supreme Council Ardashes Tumanyan, who chaired the meeting, presented the proposal of the standing commissions and of the Presidium on the procedure to debate the government's accounting report.

The Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan made a general evaluation of the situation. Referring to the socioeconomic situation in the republic in the first quarter of 1993 and for the last seven months, the prime minister specifically noted that the demands of the main macroeconomic plan were not fulfilled. While expressing the hope that the goals indicated in that plan could be attained by the end of the year, the prime minister dwelled on major problems preventing their realization, such as the blockade of the main communications routes. And, this is happening at a time when the goals indicated in the plan were calculated on the assumption that the main railways would work at 70 percent capacity. He also cited financial and energy crises as two other factors preventing the fulfillment of the plan.

In referring to the credit emissions, prime minister noted that this is beneficial and basically serves its purpose, and added that the credit emissions are enabling us to activate the republic's industry and bolster the state enterprises, despite the fact that at the same time the share of industrial output (?in the overall production) has artificially fallen.

Regarding the state budget, the prime minister informed the parliament that for the first time in the last two or three years the budget is not only trying to balance itself out but also shows surplus revenues.

In reference to the social sector, the prime minister noted that the aim of the 1993 socio-economic plan is to stabilize the living standards of the population and to create the necessary prerequisites for future growth with the aim of maintaining economic development and solving the unemployment problem.

He also said that the difference between average inflation over the last seven months and the average wage (?at the state enterprises) is 14 percent.

The prime minister also spoke on the consumption of main foodstuffs, and said that it was possible to reduce the drop in living standards to a minimum.

In assessing the socioeconomic situation in the republic as quite tense, the prime minister noted that despite some positive trends this process is not yet irreversible.

The parliament then continued its session behind closed doors under the chairmanship of the speaker of parliament, Babken Araktsyan. At the suggestion of the Armenian president, parliament started an urgent discussion of the call made by the Chairman of the Georgian Parliament Eduard Shevardnadze. In briefing the deputies on the request made in the appeal of the Georgian leader—that is, to assist them in securing the unhindered operation of the railways—President Levon Ter-Petrosyan stressed that, considering the importance of the issue, he considered it necessary to consult the Supreme Council [words indistinct] and act jointly.

The representatives of the parties and deputies' groups, independent deputies, the Chairman of the Standing Commission on Foreign Relations Gagik Vardanyan, Interior Minister Vano Siradegyan, and Chairman of the Supreme Council Babken Araktsyan expressed views on the issue.

The parliament's extraordinary session will continue tomorrow.

President May Send Aid Unilaterally

NC2010205493 Yerevan SNARK in English 1603 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Yerevan, October 20, (SNARK)—The Armenian parliament hasn't made any decisions concerning the assistance to railroads guarding in Georgia. SNARK was informed by the press-center of the parliament that according to law of the republic, president can make the decision to send the military limited forces to neighboring country on the condition that the edict will be submitted to the parliament during 24 hours, but the edict hasn't been accepted yet.

Official: UN Resolution on Karabakh 'Acceptable'

NC2010173893 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1409 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] In connection with UN Security Council Resolution 874 adopted on 14 October, Zhirair Liparityan, first deputy foreign minister of Armenia, made the following assessment: "The latest UN Security Council Resolution 874 is acceptable to us." He noted that this is a considerable improvement on Resolution 853, but there are points in it which are unacceptable to us. He specifically mentioned the point which speaks of Karabakh as being part of Azerbaijan. The other point concerns Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, which, though it describes the current legal situation, has a certain political tendentiousness.

Karabakh Leader Welcomes UN Resolution, Faults Wording

NC2010182893 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1449 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Karen Baburyan, acting chairman of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] Supreme Council, sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and to the President of the UN Security Council Mr. Sardenberg on 19 October in connection with Security Council Resolution 874. He welcomed the changes in the UN's position, which confirm a better understanding by the international community of the aspirations of the Karabakh people and their natural desire to obtain concrete security guarantees.

The letter expressed the hope that the UN would use its influence to persuade the Azerbaijani leadership to renounce its unconstructive position, to show realism, and not to endanger the progress achieved thus far.

At the same time, the letter considers as totally unacceptable the term "Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan Republic" used in the Resolution. This is seen in Karabakh as an attempt to predetermine the NKR's status, which is the prerogative of the Minsk conference.

The letter notes: "If the UN Security Council in fact intends to prejudice the main issue before the Minsk conference, then it might make our participation in that conference doubtful."

A copy of this letter was sent to Mario Rafaelli, the chairman of Minsk Group, by NKR Foreign Minister Arkadiy Gukasyan.

Gukasyan also drew Rafaelli's attention to a number of statements made by Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev which amounted to saying that Azerbaijan will solve the Karabakh conflict by military means.

Further on Objections

NC2010210993 Yerevan SNARK in English 1445 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Stepanakert, October 20, (SNARK)—The Karabakh Parliament head Karen Baburyan said his own notes concerning "schedule of pressing measures" developed by the Minsk group of CSCE in the message from Mario Raffaelli, the chairman of Minsk conference.

In the message it was paid attention to the lack of accurate guarantees for non-renewing of enemy's actions and to predicated sanctions in the case of diversion on communications.

In the message the hope was expressed that these notes and others would be discussed at the current meeting of the Minsk group of CSCE, and that agreement on these questions would be achieved.

Positive Assessments Made of President's First 2 Years

MK2010150793 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 3

[Armen Khanbabyan report under the "Armenia" rubric: "Two Years After Elections. President Is Still Respected"]

[Text] It has been two years since the first presidential elections took place in Armenia. No official ceremonies were held on the occasion. But the republic's mass media have published numerous analytical materials devoted to the activity of Levon Ter- Petrosyan, and Armenian television and radio aired a series of interviews by prominent representatives of the country's intelligentsia and the so-called "man in the street." The range of assessments of the Armenian leader's performance is fairly wide. For the most part, however, his two years as president draw generally positive assessments. People point to the qualities characteristic of Levon Ter-Petrosyan, such as tolerance and democratic outlook combined with firmness and consistency in making and enforcing decisions, the ability to keep his head and to assess the situation adequately. In observers' view, all this helps the Armenian leader confidently to control the social and political situation, to prevent it from growing overly tense, to avoid both the heightening of civil antagonisms and Armenia's direct involvement in the Karabakh conflict. Also respected are the president's diplomatic skills, which have been largely credited for Armenia's foreign policy achievements. At the same time, however, the internal policies pursued by the executive authorities under the president draw much more critical assessments. Most analysts agree that many problems faced by the republic, including the continuous slump in living standards, are not directly related to the government's performance, but are attributable to the continuing transportation and electric power blockade and the unsettled Karabakh problem. Despite all this, however, the opinion is gaining ground that as for ensuring social justice the president was not steadfast enough, as he allowed an excessive polarization of society in terms of people's incomes.

Georgia

Fighting With Gamsakhurdia Forces Continues in West

Attack Launched Toward Tskhaltubo

LD2010122393 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1100 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 20 Oct—IBERIA has been told by the Georgian Interior Ministry press center that at about 1200 today, units supporting Zviad Gamsakhurdia launched an attack from Khoni and the village of Gvishtibi toward Tskhaltubo. Gamsakhurdia's supporters were using artillery and heavy military equipment during their offensive. Fierce fighting is going on at the moment.

Clashes in Khoni Area

LD2010135593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Neighboring Georgia is an example of the dangerous line that we approached, and almost crossed, at the beginning of October. A civil war is taking place there. As of today the armed supporters of the former president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, control practically all Mingrelia and a number of populated localities in Imeretia and Guria.

Nikolay Mamulashvili, correspondent of the Georgian IPRINDA agency, reports on the operational situation in Georgia:

[Mamulashvili] The night and morning hours of 20 October were relatively calm along the whole line of confrontation in western Georgia. According to a report by Georgian official sources there were clashes between state troops and armed Zviadists near the town of Khoni. There are casualties on both sides. The same sources report that Gamsakhurdia's supporters are concentrating their forces, including military hardware, in the region of the spa resort of Tskhaltubo, and that in that direction, North Caucasus mercenaries—probably soldiers of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples—have joined the Zviadists. Today, the full attention of specialists and observers is riveted on the town of Kutaisi, which is quite strongly fortified, and which—according to Temur Shashiashvili, the town's mayor—is ready for any development of events. The situation is aggravated by the fact that as of today there are about 15,000 refugees from Abkhazia in the town. Their ranks have been swelled by civilians from Samtredia and Khoni, after these populated localities were captured by the former president's supporters. The mayor of Kutaisi also reported that there are 6,000 women and children in the Svanetia mountains awaiting evacuation from the zone of the Georgian- Abkhazian conflict. It is impossible to bring them down to the town due to the extremely complicated situation that has developed in the Kutaisi region.

Because the situation has become more complicated, Georgiy Karkarashvili, the republican minister of defense, has arrived in the town. In an interview to Georgian television the other day he refuted rumors claiming that there are disagreements between him and Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the Georgian state.

Lanchkhuti Recaptured From Zviadists

LD2010131493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1213 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—Georgian government troops have recaptured the city of Lanchkhuti earlier seized by supporters of ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, TASS learned by telephone on Wednesday from a reliable source which quoted Georgian government circles.

However, the source stressed that no positional changes had taken place in the situation in Georgia.

'Rebels' Capture Tskhaltubo, Gvishtibi

AU2010131893 Paris AFP in English 1247 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Report by Isabelle Astigarraga]

[Text] Kutaisi, Georgia, Oct 20 (AFP)—Georgian rebels fighting to reinstall ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia advanced closer to this vital western center Wednesday as government forces moved to shore up the city's defense.

There were reports of deaths in fighting as the Gamsakhurdia loyalists, advancing from the west, took the small town of Tskhaltubo, then occupied the nearby village of Gvishtibi, only 12 kilometers (about seven miles) from Kutaisi, the headquarters for government forces here said.

The rebels were making a two-pronged offensive on Kutaisi, Georgia's second city with a 250,000 population that lies astride the main road to the capital Tbilisi and which President Eduard Shevardnadze has vowed to defend at all cost.

Tskhaltubo lies due north of Kutaisi. Gamsakhurdia's forces are also advancing along a more southerly road, but have been held for the past two days at the village of Ianeti, about 16 kilometers (10 miles) to the west.

Kutaisi's capture could effectively cut the country in two since it is a critical passage for food and supplies sent from Black Sea ports to the capital. Its loss would leave virtually all of western Georgia under Gamsakhurdia's control.

More reinforcements and heavy equipment arrived here overnight from the capital Tbilisi and were being deployed on the different fronts around Kutaisi.

"The Zviadists arrived in Tskhaltubo on foot and without support equipment, whereas government forces at midday sent in armored vehicles and technical equipment to push back the offensive," AFP was told by an officer in the militia of Dzhaba Iosseliani, the man Shevaradnadze put in charge of the state of emergency.

Iosseliani's militia, known as the Mkhedrioni or Horsemen of Georgia, is a 2,000-member paramilitary unit, officially civilians.

But such troops now form a key part of the government's forces after the army suffered humilitating defeats first against separatist rebels in the western Abkhazia region and then against the Gamsakhurdia loyalists who captured the Black Sea port of Poti on October 2.

Earlier this week Shevardnadze made a desperate plea for military help from Russia and other countries in the region, but so far none has been offered.

Rivalry among the different commanders fighting under the Georgian banner threatened to undermine their

unity—and Kutaisi's defense—on Tuesday, but order appeared restored on Wednesday.

Many soldiers on Tuesday were seen wandering aimlessly through Kutaisi's streets. But new Georgian National Guard units who arrived overnight immediately headed to the front, while a dozen tanks and some cannon were readied to be sent in after them.

The heavy equipment and troop movements raised tension among the city's residents, many of whom crowded around the city hall—transformed into temporary military headquarters—for information.

A western diplomat passing through Kutaisi who stopped in at city hall said the disparate Georgian troops had "finally managed to coordinate their efforts" and on Wednesday were more optimistic about being able to save Kutaisi from the rebels.

Government forces were under the command of Defense Miniter Georgi Karkarachvili while Iosseliani retained the command of his Horsemen.

Shevardnadze announced a general mobilization Sunday night, after the Gamsakhurdia fighters captured two more towns in their drive east to Kutaisi—Khoni and Samtredia, the latter a key rail link between the capital and the Black Sea ports that supply all of Georgia.

Twenty people were killed in the battle for Samtredia.

Though Russia has rebuffed the plea for miliary aid, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said the road linking Tbilisi to the Black Sea port should be re-opened, using force if necessary.

Gamsakhurdia became Georgia's first popularly elected president in May 1991, but after cracking down on all opposition, he was ousted in a violent rebellion the following January.

Karkarashvili in Kutaisi

LD2010161293 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1507 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kutaisi, 20th [dateline as received]—An IBERIA correspondent reported at 1700 that the situation remained unchanged. The city is under the control of government forces and in full combat readiness. Georgian Defense Minister Gia Karkarashvili is there.

Armed units supporting Z. Gamsakhurdia took up positions along the Gubistskali River [between Kutaisi and Khoni].

At 1700 fighting was still going on in Tskhaltubo [town about 15km northwest of Kutaisi] that was under the control of government forces.

Zviadists Attack Kutaisi, Gvishtibi

LD2010200693 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kutaisi Mayor Temur Shashiashvili told our correspondent that at about 1100, the ex-president's armed forces started an offensive. They were sure that this unexpected attack would induce confusion among government troops, which failed to settle on the positions on time.

But then, the reserve groups that are in abundance in the town [Kutaisi] stood as a firm wall before the opposing side. The attackers' front line was broken by one of the reserve groups, which not only repelled the opposing units, but also blew up an armored vehicle, a new, heavy combat vehicle, and snatched a howitzer, an antiaircraft gun, and several machine-guns. Over 20 men from the opposing side were killed. Fighting took place in the village of Gvishtibi near the buildings of Intourist and a meat processing factory.

In the village of Dapnari, government troops blew up an armored vehicle. There are a great number of casualties.

The commanders of the ex-president's armed units purposefully lead their men to the slaughter. They broadcast by transmitter that they have captured this or that town, deceive their fighters, and encourage them toward further attacks.

At the moment, official forces, as well as the Rescue Corps, are overwhelmed with the feeling: No defense. We have endured enough. We will turn to the offensive and bring an end to their brigandage.

We regret to say that we are forced to act like this because no persuasion and no political moves have succeeded.

State Troops Reportedly Recapture 3 Towns

LD2010201193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] About 1600 local time today, Georgian Government troops started a large-scale offensive in the west of the republic, against the supporters of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. By 1700, the Georgian Army took the towns of Poti, Lanchkhuti, and Khoni practically without fighting, Interfax reports. Zviadist formations retreated toward the rayon centers of Senaki and Zugdidi. They were given an ultimatum to surrender weapons and stop resistance. According to the Georgian Interior Ministry's press center, only in this case will the lives of Gamsakhurdia's supporters be spared.

Recapture of 3 Towns Denied

LD2010215293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Tengiz Chachava, who calls himself Zviad Gamsakhurdia's representative in Russia, has just telephoned our editorial office. Mr. Chachava denied the reports from practically all the news agencies that Georgian Government forces have captured the towns of Poti, Khoni and Lanchkhuti.

Shevardnadze Appeals for Neighbors' Military Aid

PM2010143593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 1

[Georgiy Ivanov-Smolenskiy report: "Shevardnadze Requests Military Support. Moscow Promises Immediate Reply"]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze has asked the governments of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to provide "the necessary military contingents to ensure the normal functioning of the transport arteries of vital importance to those states." The Georgian leader's appeal came after former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia's armed formations seized the city of Samtredia, a key railroad junction.

As Ramin Chelidze, press secretary of the Georgian Supreme Council, told your IZVESTIYA correspondent, stocks of food destined for rayons within the republic have been plundered in the port of Poti, which has been seized by Zviadists. There is sufficient flour for 15 days in the warehouses. There are dry cargo vessels carrying food in the port of Sukhumi, but deliveries cannot get to the population right now because the transport routes are being blockaded by Zviadists.

According to Ramiz Chelidze, combat subunits of the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples did take part in the fighting for Samtredia. This is confirmed not just by the reports of independent observers from the combat region but also by a speech by Gamsakhurdia himself at a rally in Zugdidi where he stated that he had already received reinforcement from outside and will receive more.

The participation of fighters from the North Caucasus was also confirmed by Eduard Shevardnadze, who said in an interview on Georgian Television: "Not only are Georgians fighting one another, we are also dealing with intervention here... There are Chechens, Abkhazians, and fighters of other nationalities fighting on the former president's side. They are the ones who attacked Samtredia led by envoys of the former president."

It will take approximately a week to regroup the Georgian Government's forces, according to the republic's Defense Ministry. After that the government subunits will be able to launch offensive operations against Zviadists. However, this week may prove in many ways decisive. That is the reason for Eduard Shevardnadze's appeal to the governments of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

According to reports from Georgian sources, the reaction by Mikhail Reut, commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, to the appeal for military aid was restrained, to put it mildly. At the same time, Boris Pastukhov, the Russian president's special representative and deputy foreign minister, said in an interview with INTERFAX that the Georgian leader's appeal "will not be ignored." In B. Pastukhov's words, the reaction of Russia's top political leadership to the Georgian leader's appeal will be immediate. "It will be given very soon."

Georgian Defense Minister Georgiy Karkarashvili has stated that he has issued an order rescinding the order of Eduard Shevardnadze as supreme commander in chief on the re-creation of the national guard and has also issued an order on the inclusion of all armed formations in the Georgian Defense Ministry's personnel. A united army, in G. Karkarashvili's words, is the only guarantee of the preservation of the state. He stressed that the failures of the Georgian Armed Forces, including the surrender of Samtredia and Khomi to Zviadists, are a result of the operation of disunited formations, namely the people's volunteer militia, volunteer detachments, "Mkhedrioni," and the national guard, which are not subordinated to a single command.

In the past 24 hours, according to reports from Georgian sources, there have been no combat operations in Western Georgia. Pro-Zviad detachments were seen on the approaches to Tskhaltubo 10 km north of Kutaisi. But the main forces of the anti-government troops and pro-Zviad detachments are concentrated 2 km east of Samtredia, which was occupied by Zviadists on Sunday. Dzhaba Ioseliani, chairman of the provisional committee for the state of emergency in Georgia, told journalists that government troops are being reinforced with men and new combat hardware.

A public meeting has been held at Philharmonic Hall in Tbilisi, according to a report from Georgian journalist Yekaterina Akhalkatsi. Addressing the meeting, Eduard Shevardnadze said that he had arrived at the decision to join the CIS after long and difficult reflection. "The country," he stressed, "needs to expand its living space—economic, cultural, and spiritual living space. The political and economic framework of the CIS provides a new opportunity to do that without denying the possibility of establishing ties with any other partners."

It is obvious that the Russian leadership's "immediate reaction" will largely determine the development of the situation in Georgia. If the participation of the North Caucasian fighters in the combat operations in Abkhazia could still be "justified" in some way, then the external support for Zviad's side can only be interpreted as interference in Georgia's internal affairs. Bearing in mind the tense situation in the North Caucasus, the Russian leadership faces a difficult but necessary choice.

Gugushvili Urges Neighbors Not To Intervene

LD2010130393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1356 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Georgia's Prime Minster Vissarion Gugushvili, who was appointed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia to this post, declared guarantees providing for "unimpeded and continuous" work of all transport and other communications throughout the territory under control of the "legal power," including communications vital to Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Gugushvili's statement issued on Tuesday contains an appeal to the authorities of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan "not to yield to provocations" on the part of Shevardnadze's regime and "*not* to intervene in Georgia's internal affairs under any circumstance."

Having placed the responsibility for the blockade of the port of Poti and railways on Shevardnadze's regime, Gugushvili warned that the intrusion of "third forces" in Georgia's internal affairs under the pretext of communications defense "can catastrophically destabilize the situation in the republic and hamper the processes of stabilization and democratization both in Georgia and in the Caucasus."

Gugushvili's statement was made public after Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze appealed to the leaderships of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for assistance in guarding transport communications in Western Georgia.

Shevardnadze's Press Service Statement on Situation

LD2010190693 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] A statement by the Head of State's press service.

During the past few days, the bandit actions of illegal armed units loyal to the ex-president [Zviad Gamsakhurdia], resulted in the blood of innocent people being shed, the destruction of many buildings and structures, and the further aggravation of the condition of refugees from Abkhazia.

The aggressors, armed with the most up-to-date weapons and supported by numerous foreign mercenaries, have become so brazen that they are creating a deadly threat to Georgian towns and villages, their population, and the authorities of Georgia. The Georgian government is forced to take most severe retaliatory measures to stop this lawlessness.

This morning, the bandits attacked Tskhaltubo using heavy equipment and artillery. There were casualties on the government forces side. In response, the first serious blow was inflicted on the ex-president's supporters near the village of Gvishtibi in the vicinity of Tskhaltubo. Forty men of the ex-president's supporters were killed and 40 were wounded. They lost two tanks, a large number of artillery installations, and one armored vehicle. All these are in the possession of government forces.

Also failed was an effort by Gamsakhurdia's gangs to carry out an offensive near the town of Vani, where they lost 10 men. Several fighters were wounded.

The town of Lanchkhuti has been completely cleared of Kobalia's units. At present, measures are being taken to restore the lawful authorities in the town.

Also failed was an attempt by the opposition carry out an offensive in the direction of Kutaisi. At present, a large number of government troops are accumulated in the area in order to consolidate the success, to take advantage of the change in the situation, and turn from defense tactics to attacking operations.

A real possibility has emerged to have the bloodshed and war initiated at the ex-president's supporters will, to come to an end.

The Georgian head of state's appeal to the leadership of Russia and the Transcaucasian republics has not been left without a response. Joint measures to stop the intervention of foreign hired forces will be taken.

Tbilisi Officials Hold News Conference in Moscow

Tbilisi Ready To Talk With Abkhazians

LD2010140993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1200 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Video report by Aleksandr Ukhov, from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] At a news conference in Moscow today, Sandro Kavsadze, personal representative of the Georgian leader, spoke of a new approach to settling the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. He said Georgia is prepared to enter into talks with Abkhazia's Gudauta government, since—and I quote—however hard it is to conduct negotiations with those people who committed acts of genocide, we have no other way—end of quote. Kavsadze said there are virtually no Georgians left in Abkhazia. He also said over 500 refugees have died in the mountains of Svanetia during their exodus from Abkhazia to Georgia. The world community must condemn genocide and ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, Kavsadze stressed. But at the same time we are prepared to talk about sovereignty for Abkhazia—but within Georgia.

On the subject of the presence of Russian troops in the republic, Georgian ambassador in Russia Valerian Advadze said:

[Begin Advadze recording] At present, Georgia needs protection of its borders and security for the Georgian state. But we cannot do it on our own. And as long as we have no such capabilities—in terms of specialists, economic strength and equipment—Russian troops have to remain. As for Georgia's membership in the CIS, this can be regarded as decided, since the number of Georgian MPs who back Georgian entry in the CIS has exceeded 120 now, whereas

the required number is 112. [end recording] [video shows Kavsadze and Advadze at the news conference, evacuation of refugees]

Tbilisi Presents Terms for Settlement

LD2010163193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1330 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] [Announcer Yuriy Korotkov] A news conference was held today at the Georgian embassy in Moscow. It was attended by our observer Yevgeniy Shirokov, who is with me now in the studio. I shall ask him to explain who held this news conference and what was discussed at it.

[Shirokov] The journalists were addressed by Georgian Ambassador Valerian Advadze, Sandro Kavsadze, chairman of the Georgian Supreme Council's Human Rights committee, who is the head of state's personal representative in matters relating to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, and Ramaz Sichinava, former deputy chairman of the Abkhaz Council of Ministers, the body that wielded executive power in Sukhumi before its seizure by the Gudauta grouping.

The freshest information came from Sandro Kavsadze, who has just returned from Geneva, where he met Edouard Brunner, the UN secretary general's personal representative, and informed him about the Georgian leadership's intention of finding ways to bring about a political solution to the conflict in Abkhazia. He said that if this is to happen, the international community and the United Nations must first condemn the things that are happening at the moment in Abkhazia, the genocide against the Georgian population and ethnic cleansing. Secondly, any settlement must be based on recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thirdly, the leaders of the two parallel bodies of power that used to exist on both sides in Abkhazia must resign simultaneously, on the grounds that they have failed to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Let me point out straightaway that this last point aroused doubts among Russian and foreign journalists. After all, the Gudauta side is hardly likely to agree to such a measure—self-dissolution of leadership bodies—now that it has seized Sukhumi. It feels that it is now in a stronger military position than Tbilisi, which is having to contend with numerous problems of a grave nature.

[Korotkov] Yes, they are unlikely to do that. I think the situation in Georgia is also being complicated by the actions of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia's supporters.

[Shirokov] That also came up at today's news conference. It was claimed that the Zviadists and the Gudauta separatists, as they are labeled by the Tbilisi authorities, are cooperating to a certain extent, since they have a common objective, to discredit Eduard Shevardnadze's policies. These policies have enjoyed—and continue to enjoy—considerable support in the West, from the United Nations, the CSCE, and other international organizations. But it seems to me that a [illegible] of priorities in Georgian policy is now taking [illegible] toward the CIS. Today it was stated yet again that Georgia intends to join the Commonwealth and accede to the CIS's collective security system, which would help the country to defend its territorial integrity.

In my view, another fundamental change affects relations with Russia. Unlike on previous occasions, there was not a single accusation levelled against Russian troops. It was stressed that the Russian side can do a very great deal to protect road and rail links which are vitally important to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Finally, Ambassador Valerian Advadze stressed that Georgia is no longer strong enough to defend its own borders. Therefore, it is counting on assistance from Russia and Russian troops.

[Korotkov] Yes, Eduard Shevardnadze himself has appealed to Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to send troops to protect lines of communication.

[Shirokov] That is vitally important now.

Envoy Supports Joining CIS

LD2010165793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1107 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—"We need to ensure our safety and to defend our borders," Georgian Ambassador to Russia Valerian Advadze told a press conference here today. "But this is impossible without the stay of the Russian army in Georgia," he added. Advandze also noted that 120 Georgian MPs now wanted their country to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, while only 112 votes were needed to adopt such a decision. Hence, he believes, Georgia has only to make official its membership in the CIS."

The Russian troops, in his opinion, could help deblock the country's transport routes without interfering in the conflict between the Georgian army and the Zviadists. "This," the ambassador said, "is necessary to ensure food supplies to the population."

Human Rights Leader Comments

LD2010170093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1119 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS—"Urgent talks with the Abkhazian leadership are absolutely necessary," Chairman of the Georgian Human Rights and Minorities Committee Sandro Kavsadze told a press conference here today. "There is no other way but to open talks with these people, even though they have launched a genocide in Abkhazia," he added.

Kavsadze noted that he was in Geneva a short while ago, where he had a series of meetings with personal representative of the U.N. Secretary General Edward Brunner. They discussed the situation in Abkhazia and possibilities for settling the conflict.

Kavsadze believes that several preliminary terms should be fulfilled before talks with Abkhazian leadership could open—"the world community and the United Nations must condemn the genocide and the ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia." It is also necessary "to seek new forms of statehood", i.e. to resolve the problem of Abkhazia's sovereignty, but within the frameworks of Georgia. The Abkhazian leadership and the former pro-Georgian leaders of the autonomous republic, who are guilty of bringing the conflict to a head, must resign. A joint or possibly international commission, discharging the functions of a provisional administration, could govern Abkhazia during the transition period.

First Vice-Chairman of the Abkhazian Council of Ministers Ramaz Sichinava, who took the floor next, stated that the decisions of the Abkhazian Parliament were now illegitimate, because a quorum of two- thirds could not be mustered at present. "Hence," he noted, "it is necessary to return the refugees to Sukhumi and to arrange democratic elections."

Adzharian Chief Adopting Militant Neutrality in Talks

LD2110085793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0630 GMT 21 Oct 93

[Text] Our correspondent Vladimir Mezentsev has come on the line urgently. Good morning.

[Mezentsev] Good morning. Currently in the residence of Adzharia's Supreme Soviet Chairman Aslan Abashidze, intensive talks are under way for the purpose of preventing fresh bloodshed in Georgia.

As ever, adopting a position of militant neutrality, Abashidze is acting as mediator between the combatant sides. Vakhtang Kobalia is continually on the telephone line to the military command of the Russian troops in the Transcaucasus and the Tbilisi leadership. Parliamentarians from Adzharia are being sent to various parts of Georgia.

However, the Tbilisi declaration naming Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Vakhtang Kobalia as state criminals and the order signed for the arrest of their active supporters have not left any opportunities for holding further talks. That declaration is seen by Abashidze in the current situation as premature and erroneous, to put it mildly.

In addition, reports of Lanchkhuti being surrendered by the Zviadists are at variance with reality. On the contrary, the supporters of the president have taken possession of Tskhaltuba and other population centers. Fighting is under way on the approaches to Kutaisi.

Alas, Abashidze's peacemaking mission is receiving no support from either of the combatant sides. It has been learned that Kobalia is profoundly indignant at Shevardnadze's appeal to the Governments of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for help in guarding communications. The same formula was used by Tbilisi to bring troops into Abkhazia a year and one-half ago.

Abashidze said Kobalia is humane in his treatment of captives taken during the fighting. One of the first batches has been set at liberty and unarmed soldiers have been sent by barge to Batumi. A captive officer has been allowed to keep his pistol [passage indistinct].

According to journalists reporting from Poti, the situation in the town is quiet. Kobalia's army is combating looting and banditry. Criminals are shot on the spot. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, speaking recently at a rally in Lanchkhuti, said he is for fresh presidential elections in which his opponents, including Dzhaba Ioseliani, could take part.

Warrants Issued for Arrest of Gamsakhurdia, Others

LD2010201893 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] The Georgian Procurator's Office has issued warrants to arrest ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Loti Kobalia, and their supporters, other criminals.

As we have already reported, existing records make it clear that unlawful armed gangs created by ex-President Gamsakhurdia and his supporters, in some regions of Western Georgia, have been carrying out large-scale criminal activities directed against the country and its population, thus creating a threat to the country's territorial integrity, its security, defense capacities, and independence.

UN To Send Human Rights Group to Abkhazia, Tbilisi

AU2010211093 Paris AFP in English 2042 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Geneva, Oct 20 (AFP)—The United Nations is sending a three-person commission to investigate human rights violations in the breakaway province of Abkhazia in northwestern Georgia, the UN said in a statement Wednesday.

Commission chairwoman Helga Klein and her colleagues will leave for Abkhazia Thursday and are expected to arrive in its capital Sukhumi the following day, the spokesman added.

"Further to consultations with the parties concerned, the secretary general (Butrus Butrus-Ghali) has decided to send a fact- finding mission to Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, in order to undertake an impartial and objective investigation into allegations of major human rights violations," said the statement.

A member of the UN centre for human rights here, Klein will also visit the Georgian capital Tbilisi in the commission's 10-day trip.

Abkhazia has been the scene of a year-long, secessionist war which culminated late September with the rout of Georgian government troops.

The Tbilisi government sent forces into Sukhumi in August 1992 after the Abkhazia provincial assembly unilaterally proclaimed independence. The separatists regrouped in the hills and, according to the Georgian government, received support from elements in the Russian armed forces.

Estonia

Foreign Minister Velliste Pays Visit to India

WS1510130193 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0755 GMT 15 Oct 93

[From 15 October RAHVA HAAL, p 1]

[Text] Friday, October 15—Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste met President of India Shankar Dayal Sharma and Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh yesterday. Their discussions especially concerned the situation in Russia, the Foreign Ministry press service announced.

The Indian leaders supported the troop withdrawal from Estonia. Both sides remarked the success of India and Estonia in economic reforms and discussed cultural and economic cooperation. The Foreign Ministry announced that cooperation in the exchange of students, training of diplomatic personnel and cultural exchange can be started at once. A declaration on cooperation principles was signed.

Velliste is to meet Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee, and Social Development Minister Artun Singh, as well as Indian businessmen in New Dehli and Bombay. Estonian Honourary Consul in India Kastur Lal Vig is to take part in the meetings.

Returns From Trip

WS1910133293 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1929 GMT 18 Oct 93

[Text] Tallinn, October 18—Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste returned from an official visit to Portugal and India.

"The main aim of the visit was to establish contacts with two important countries with which we have thus far had no high-level ties," Velliste told a news conference at the Tallinn airport.

Both countries are important to Estonia politically as well as economically, Velliste said.

Portugal is a member of the European Community and can influence Estonia's possible acceptance in the future, Velliste said.

"We could persuade them and Portugal fully supports us." Velliste said while saying the country has certain reasons not to be interested in quick enlargement of the community.

Estonian Foreign Ministers considered meeting his Portuguese counterpart the highlight of his visit. "Portugal expressed strong support to us in our demand for the Russian troop withdrawal," Velliste said.

Also in India, where Velliste met the President, Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers, he considered meeting Foreign Minister as most important.

Laar Discusses Cooperation With NATO Officials in Brussels

WS2010144993 Tallinn BNS in English 1910 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Excerpt] Brussels, Oct 19, BNS—Representatives of the NATO Council expressed content with the local elections in Estonia and said they were glad that the country's Russian community had begun integrating into local life through democratic elections, said Tiit Pruuli, aide to the Estonian Prime Minister.

Pruuli was commenting on Prime Minister Mart Laar's meetings with the ambassadors at the NATO Council and with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner in Brussels Monday.

He said the NATO diplomats also showed interest in a number of other issues concerning Estonia. The British ambassador, for instance, wanted to know more details about the arms deal between Estonia and Israel.

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner at a press conference later in the day said Estonia was one of NATO's most active cooperation partners among countries of Central and Eastern Europe. "We are having better relations with no other country than with you," Woerner said.

The NATO leader at talks with the Estonian prime minister spoke about NATO programs connected with Estonia for the near future. The North Atlantic alliance during the next half year will hold a number of seminars and training courses on military issues in Estonia. [passage omitted]

Government Signs Free Trade Protocol With Finland

WS1210130793 Tallinn BNS in English 1428 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Helsinki, Oct 08, BNS—The leaders of Estonian and Finnish delegations signed a free-trade protocol Friday [8 October] on trade of agricultural produce.

The protocol regulates trade in agricultural raw materials, farm products, fish and fish products and sweets. It lists duty-free products and goods traded at reduced tariffs.

The agreement allows Estonian products freer access to the Finnish market in comparison with the current regulations.

The agreement, reached after seven months of negotiations, goes into effect following approval notices by the two countries.

Interior Minister Expresses Support for Russian Counterpart

WS2010153693 Tallinn BNS in English 1420 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Tallinn, Oct 20, BNS—Estonian Interior Minister Lagle Parek in a letter to her Russian counterpart Viktor Yerin expresses support to efforts aimed at protecting the democratic reform in Russia.

Estonia is interested in a stable and democratic neighbor country, Parek says in the letter.

"The Interior Ministry, like the whole Estonian community, observed with attention the events that occurred in Moscow at the beginning of October. Already when clashes between democratic and pro-Communist forces began, the Estonian Interior Ministry and I personally held the conviction that reactionist forces won't succeed in seizing the power. We are glad that in those difficult days the Russian Interior Ministry was able to prevent the spreading of unrest all over Russia, which was one of the aims of the reactionists," the letter reads.

The Estonian minister tells her Russian counterpart that the Estonian Government, at once after the conflict began, took a "negative position" toward the actions of the reactionists.

Parek offers her condolences on human victims and expresses the conviction that the organizers of mass unrest and those guilty of the deaths of peaceful residents will not escape prosecution.

Official Says Estonia Has No Territorial Claims on Russia

LD2010195193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1635 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Vosboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Russia believes that its border with Estonia "is clearly determined," and that the Estonian side can have no territorial claims on Russia. The present border between Russia and Estonia is what used to be the administrative and territorial border between the Russian Federation and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. This statement was made on Wednesday in an interview with Interfax by the chief Russian negotiator at the talks with Estonia, Vasiliy Svirin.

Commenting on the statement made by Estonia's new Nationalities Minister Peeter Olesk, that the answer "the border problem between Russia and Estonia should be based on the peace treaty signed in Tartu in 1920," Svirin said: "Russia does not recognize the provisions of that treaty, since it lost its force in 1940, when Estonia ceased to be an independent subject of international law."

According to Svirin, the fact that the Estonian minister "actually voiced territorial claims on Russia" can only add "complications" to relations between the two countries.

According to another prominent Russian diplomat interviewed by Interfax's correspondent, "the Estonians evidently got encouraged" after President Yeltsin's visit to Japan, and decided to "raise the territorial problem" too.

Nevertheless, Interfax's interviewee sees "no analogy with the problem of northern territories, since everyone recognizes that the territories Estonia owned, rather accidentally, between 1920 and 1940 inherently belong to Russia."

As he said, "the lands Estonia suddenly began to claim did not even belong to the Province of Estland which was a part of the Russian Empire before 1917."

Sweden Sends Aid Consignment for Defense Forces

WS1410124793 Tallinn BNS in English 1932 GMT 13 Oct 93

[Text] Tallinn, Oct 13, BNS—Two Swedish warships carrying an aid consignment for the Estonian Defense Forces arrived Wednesday [13 October] in Tallinn.

The afternoon presentation ceremony was attended by Swedish and Estonian representatives.

The consignment included several vehicles, field kitchens, 5,000 winter uniforms, 2,000 bicycles and equipment for two field hospitals.

A Swedish military attache, Colonel Lindman, estimated the cost of the aid consignment at 8 million Swedish kronor. The sum does not include transportation and loading.

Defense Forces Chief of Staff Ants Laaneots said the consignment will be distributed among the Defense Forces, the Defense League, the Border Guard Department and the Rescue Service.

He attached particular importance to the two field hospitals that go to the Viru and the Kuperjanov battalions. Swedish specialists arrive in November to train Estonians on their use.

Lindman noted at a press conference after the ceremony that a decision on the possible sale of weapons to Estonia rests with politicians. The current Swedish foreign policy excludes giving or selling arms to the Baltic states.

"Sweden doesn't, at present, have a surplus of suitable arms to give away," the attache said.

"We don't want to give away the old weapons we have, since it would be somewhat dangerous.

"Sweden may have suitable arms in a couple of years," he said. "I believe that politicians will, by then, have changed their position on this issue."

Kaitseliit Aims To Become 'Military' Organization

PM1410104793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Oct 93 p 1

[Valeriy Gromak report: "Kaitseliit Swaps Civvies for Uniform"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Kaitseliit voluntary organization, which formed part of Estonia's defense forces, has carried out a routine exercise in which over 700 people took part. Spending on the "war" totaled over 12,000 kroon.

Major Johannes Kert, head of Kaitseliit, was pleased with the exercise. He also said that the organization plans to change its regulations and internal structure. During the reform the intention is to turn it "into a military rather than a public organization."

Finance Ministry Says 1994 Budget Balanced

WS2010145193 Tallinn BNS in English 1034 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Tallinn, Oct 20, BNS—Estonia manages to keep its state budget for 1994 in balance despite the shortage of money, Tiit Saat, deputy chancellor at the Finance Ministry, said in a press conference.

In the course of the discussion of the draft budget in the parliament, planned investments and expenditure on capital repairs underwent the biggest cuts. Local governments and ministries, according to the draft, receive only about 102 million kroons for those purposes, against nearly one billion they had applied for.

"Because of the money shortage, expenditure was curbed everywhere," Saat said. He added that hardest hit was evidently the sector under the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

"To the national railway, 27 million kroons were allocated, but the repairing of one kilometer of railway costs about one

million kroons, and the Estonian Railway Company itself has got no such resources," he said.

Saat said also farmers had announced plans to picket the parliament building when the draft budget is first discussed by the legislative body Thursday [21 October]. The Finance Ministry deputy chancellor explained that Estonia was lacking the possibilities to support the farm sector, since the country had no successful and "money-producing" sector.

Farmers are demanding bigger sums in supports and subsidies from the state budget, referring to the farm sector income law.

"The actual situation in the Estonian economy was not taken into account when the farm sector income law was adopted," Saat said.

Latvia

Yeltsin Invites Legislators To Observe 12 Dec Elections

WS2010144693 Tallinn BNS in English 1034 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Riga, Oct 20, BNS—President Boris Yeltsin invited representatives of the Latvian parliament to participate as international observers in Russia's Dec. 12 parliamentary election.

The invitation was delivered to the deputy speaker of the Saeima [parliament], Aivars Berkis, by Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Rannikh. Rannikh said that the international observers could monitor the elections in Moscow or in other regions of Russia.

Yeltsin Thanks Ulmanis for Support During 'Crisis'

LD2010082993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2047 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] The Latvian president's press service informs that Russian Ambassador to Lithuania, Aleksandr Rannikh has handed in to Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis a letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin expressing his gratitude to the friendly states and international organizations which had supported Russia during the Moscow crisis and a note approving of the Latvian president's decision to visit the Latvian community in Russia on Monday.

According to the press service, during the meeting the issue on one of the Russian three military and strategical facilities in Latvia (the radio station in Skrunda which Russia intends to keep for several years after its troops are withdrawn) was discussed. Rannikh pointed out that Russia estimated the facility as "indispensable" and recommended that the Latvian president visit it to see the reasons.

The ambassador emphasized that Russia was concerned over establishment of a similar facility on its territory. However, this will require several years.

Ulmanis demanded that Russia officially condemn and recognize invalid the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the occupation of Latvia by the USSR, the press service points out.

Ulmanis Objects to Russian Use of Radar Base After Pullout

LD2010214693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1619 GMT 20 Oct 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] President Guntis Ulmanis said that Latvia objected to Russian defense forces using the Skrunda radar station after the withdrawal of Russian troops, scheduled for the end of 1994.

He also told Latvian military personnel in the town of Cesis that if Latvia agreed, then Russia would be willing to withdraw its military units from the country as soon as possible. Then, Ulmanis thinks, all other issues regarding troop withdrawal, such as the Liepaja navy port and the "Zvyozdochka" (Little Star) space intelligence station, could be resolved within weeks.

The president thinks that a compromise must be worked out. However, he reminded his audience that the occupation of Latvia started with deployment of several Russian military bases.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Ulmanis and Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Rannikh discussed the Skrunda radar station yesterday. The diplomat said that his government viewed the station as "irreplaceable" and invited the president to visit it to see this for himself. Missile launches from U.S. territory can be detected by the station. Russia is making the pullout of its troops from Latvia before the end of 1994 contingent upon maintaining the Skrunda radar station until 2003.

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian right-wing opposition leader Vytautas Landsbergis told Ulmanis in Riga Tuesday that, according to sources in the Council of Europe, Russia and the U.S. had concluded a secret agreement to the effect that if Russia closed down its Skrunda station, the U.S. would phase out "one of its most important military bases."

Ulmanis Says NATO Membership Not Priority Issue

LD2010214893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1619 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] The creation of a union of Baltic states, the development of contacts with other countries of the Baltic region and normal relations with Russia are Latvia's top foreign policy priorities, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis said in an interview with the Estonian newspaper HOMMIKULEHT Wednesday.

The president said that Latvia's membership of NATO is contradictory and he would not like to refer to it as a priority issue. Latvia's joining the Council of Europe and cooperation with the European Community are more topical, he said.

Ulmanis believes that the United States is important economically and morally but it is unable to solve Latvian problems with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

The Latvian president described the present state of the Latvian-Russian talks as a six-month deadlock which could be broken only by a summit political solution. I would like the summit to take place as early as possible and expect Russia to let us know what possibilities there are to solve the problem, said Ulmanis.

Regarding possible military cooperation between Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the president said that the system of European collective security must play the main role in providing security for the three Baltic states. If the Baltics become members of the Council of Europe, the European Community and the CSCE, said Ulmanis, they will need the armed forces only in extreme circumstances or in local conflicts. In view of this the Baltic states must have a single concept and defense system, said the president.

President Ulmanis Discusses First 100 Days in Office

PM2010131993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 93 First Edition p 4

[Interview with President Guntis Ulmanis by correspondent Irina Litvinova in Riga; date not given: "Guntis Ulmanis: It Is Hard for Me To See Hostility of Russians and Latvians; Latvian Republic President Answers IZVESTIYA Correspondent Irina Litvinova's Questions"]

[Text] Riga—[Litvinova] Mr. Ulmanis, your first 100 days in your eminent state post have elapsed. In a short period, sociologists assert, you have succeeded in outstripping all the republic's politicians in the popularity ratings. What has helped you in these crucial months? They say that the genes of your renowned ancestor, the last president of the Latvian Republic, Karlis Ulmanis, had an effect?

[Ulmanis] Undoubtedly my grandfather's brother, Karlis Ulmanis, remains an example to e in many ways. But in our destructive times, when both individuals and society as a whole have suffered, it is probably very hard to become as representative as a president should be in just 100 days.

[Litvinova] You have managed it.

[Ulmanis] I disagree slightly with your assessment. For me these three months have been very difficult and I myself am far from satisfied. I am trying to look into more quickly—I do not say "resolve"—the problems which have to be resolved. But I am not completely clear on many questions.

I try not to be dogmatic with regard to the constitution, which in our country is called the "Satversme." I am guided by the principle that "everything that is not banned is permitted." I believe that if I interfere in any business with good ideas and good intentions I can allow myself to do this on questions which are not envisaged by the constitution.

[Litvinova] What particularly perturbs you now as Latvian president?

[Ulmanis] Consensus in society above all. And how could it be otherwise if there is a contradiction between general human feelings and national feelings. These are the consequences of the tragic events since 1940. But there are other problems. Pensioners have found themselves in a serious plight. People have somehow started to meet and communicate less with each other and they smile less. I think this is connected with today's economic situation. And there is a third element: We must all define ourselves now as states—that applies to the Baltic countries, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine.

[Litvinova] Mr. Ulmanis, at your first press conference after your election you noted that you consider a priority task in foreign policy to be relations with Russia. It is no secret that so far they are not taking shape very smoothly. Talks on the withdrawal of Russian troops are marking time because of the impossibility of finding a compromise. Some politicians do not conceal their anti-Russian feeling. There are also hostile notes in the press. And Russia is constantly expressing concern at steps by Latvian politicians—most often this applies to the position of national minorities. Over these three months has the political emphasis outlined at the outset—the emphasis on putting relations with Russia in order—changed for you?

[Ulmanis] My emphasis in that sense has not changed. Russia and Latvia are destined to remain neighbors through the ages. The time has come, after many agonizing years, to normalize our relations.

Here, of course, we must consider the fear of losing our national independence. That makes politicians cautious, obliges them to play safe. I admit frankly that I too—particularly at the time the communist system fell— have sometimes felt bitter: Russia, the Russians, the Communists were for us psychologically one and the same thing. Although I do not think that when I am calm...

Let's put everything in its place. There was an attempt to colonize Latvia. They constructed plants, they came here from Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. And no one told people they would live in the national state of the Letts. On the contrary, they were told it was their common motherland—the Soviet Union. As a result there now exists a contradiction between the indigenous nationality, the Letts, and the group of people who were artificially drawn to our territory.

It would be dishonest if I were to fail to admit that I am a profoundly national man and the problems of the Lettish people are very painful to me. But it is hard for me to see mutual hostility between Russians and Letts. We politicians must seek a way of reducing its level.

[Litvinova] Mr. President, sometimes you say in your speeches that you will defend the interests of "the people of Latvia," sometimes you speak of the interests of the "citizens of Latvia." As we know, Russians comprise the majority of residents who are not citizens. At present their political, economic, and social rights differ substantially from the rights of "citizens" alongside whom they have lived and worked for many years. To what extent can these people count on your support?

[Ulmanis] As far as citizenship is concerned, the Sejm will decide. They will not all be able to receive citizenship. As regards human rights I shall insist that they be equal for all inhabitants, whether they are citizens or not. Citizenship is after all only the right to be elected or to elect. The only difference between citizens and noncitizens.

[Litvinova] In general far more differences between citizens and noncitizens are enshrined in legislation. I do not mention the self-assumed power of officials locally.

[Ulmanis] Tell me what they are and I will say whether I agree or not.

[Litvinova] Noncitizens do not have the right to own land. They were considerably impoverished when privatization certificates were issued for state property. Their rights to create joint stock comapnies and to own and manage capital have been curtailed. The constitutional law says that only citizens can be accepted for state service. Citizens can use firearms for self defense, noncitizens can use only gas weapons...

[Ulmanis] The land question is a vexed one. I think that with time changes will be made to this practice. About state employees. My wife said to me recently: Do you know that you have two Russian women working in your kitchen? I do know, but so what?

[Litvinova] But a law is about to be adopted on state service giving preference to citizens—what then?

[Ulmanis] The law is the law, it must be observed. But there will probably be jobs in the state service which can be treated in different ways. For instance, making citizenship compulsory for responsible state posts is normal. Perhaps some way out will be found in these situations.

[Litvinova] It has just become known that Latvia cannot count on being admitted to the Council of Europe at the fall session. This question can be examined only after the Latvian sejm has adopted the law on citizenship. How do you assess the versions of this law submitted by the parliamentary factions? Do you intend to come out with a legislative initiative on this issue yourself?

[Ulmanis] I believe that the sejm has been delaying the solution of this question for an unforgivably long time. Today four versions of the law on citizenship have been submitted to the sejm. I have my own view of its various provisions but I shall not come out with a legislative initiative: A legal service is necessary to produce a document and I do not have a legal service—I have only a few advisers.

But I can say that I shall not remain indifferent if this law is as I see it unacceptable from the viewpoint of international assessments. It is not out of the question that this important question could be resolved with the aid of a nationwide poll.

[Litvinova] Mr. Ulmanis, the concept of the coalition now in power includes a model of Latvia as a national state. How, in your opinion, will the so-called Russian-speaking population, which makes up nearly half the republic's inhabitants, fit into the state which is being created?

[Ulmanis] I think that some will accept the rules, laws, and conditions which the Latvian state suggests. Some of these people will receive citizenship, others will not, but all human rights will be ensured for them. And a third group of the foreign language-speaking population will leave Latvia. But we do not intend to drive anyone out. That is out of the question.

[Litvinova] In Latvia today according to the law it is impossible to receive higher education in the Russian language at state expense. High-ranking officials and parliamentarians have asserted that the state will also stop financing secondary education in the languages of national minorities. That worries non-Latvians. Are their concerns justified?

[Ulmanis] I venture to say that in the very near future the state will continue to finance secondary education in Russian. We cannot leave the 40 percent of Russian speakers without the opportunity to give their children secondary education. I fear that radical steps in this direction would push us toward the creation of a two-community state. That cannot be allowed. Those 40 percent work here, create the national income, pay taxes—they have earned the right for their children to receive secondary education. But higher education is another matter.

[Litvinova] Mr. President, at the end of our talk let us turn to the economy. Specialists argue whether Latvia is closer to the Eastern or the Western shore. Could you tell IZVESTIYA readers your view on this score?

[Ulmanis] It is too late for us to choose a shore: We are on the Baltic shore and we cannot change that now. If it is advantageous for us to cooperate with Eastern countries then we will cooperate. If the quality of our goods allows us to sell them advantageously to the West, we will trade with Western countries. I shall merely note a small detail: Those fields of the economy which tie us hand and foot politically should be such that at a contentious moment they do not prevent us from being free. We must not count only on Russian energy because then at the first slightest dispute they can immediately cut off a gas pipeline or electricity line to us... Nonetheless, as regards normal economic free trade—with time Latvia will have no problems with Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine. I say once again: Neighbors are like parents, you do not choose them.

[Litvinova] Thank you for the interview, Mr. President.

Lithuania

Brazauskas Views German Support for Integration Into Europe

LD2010134793 Hamburg DPA in German 0932 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Vilnius (DPA)—Lithuania is hoping for help from Germany in the process of integrating the Baltic republic into Europe. In anticipation of the visit by German President Richard von Weizsaecker to Vilnius on 21 October, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas said in an interview with the German Press Agency (DPA) today: "We are counting on support from Germany In our efforts to become an associate member of the European Community."

Brazauskas described Germany as a "leading guarantor" of the security of Lithuania and Europe. Bonn is more than just an economic and political partner for the Baltic republic: "For the reborn Lithuania, Germany is an example of the transition to democracy and Western character and the development of a state based on the rule of law."

Brazauskas announced relaxations of customs regulations to create better conditions for East-West transit. Lithuania is greatly interested in German investment in trade and tourism, as well as in other economic sectors.

Brazauskas attached great importance to the German president's two-day visit. "We know Mr. von Weizsaecker not only as head of state, but also as the moral leader in Germany and an important international politician," the Lithuanian president said. In addition to Brazauskas, Weizsaecker will also meet Adolfas Slezevicius, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Ceslovas Jursenas, chairman of the Supreme Council.

Brazauskas Nominates Linkevicius Defense Minister

LD2010214393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1619 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] According to the LIETUVOS RYTAS newspaper, President Algirdas Brazauskas and Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius asked Linas Linkevicius, a parliament deputy of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) which has a parliamentary majority, to take over the position of land defense minister.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Linkevicius, 32, graduated from the Kaunas Polytechnic Institute, was an official in the Young Communist League Central Committee, and later in the DLP machine. Elected to parliament on the DLP ticket, he is deputy chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee. He heads the Lithuanian parliamentary delegation in the North Atlantic Assembly and is a member of the Baltic Assembly presidium. He served three months in the army.

The nominee, the newspaper article suggests, advocates incorporation of Lithuania into European security structures and closer cooperation with NATO.

As reported earlier, Audrius Butkevicius tendered his resignation from the position of land defense minister following a recent incident with members of the volunteer land defense force. Butkevicius also said he was willing to take a six month training course in Britain.

Brigade Leaders on Fall Draft, Problems With Reenlistment

WS2010152293 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 6 Oct 93 No 194 p 4

[Interview with Colonel Lieutenant Audronis Beisys, chief of staff at the "Iron Wolf" brigade, and its deputy, Colonel Juozas Meidus by Ona Mickeviciute; place and date not given: "The Army and Future Soldiers"]

[Excerpts] On 1 October, we witnessed the beginning of the Lithuanian Army's fall draft. I have spoken with the officers for whom this issue is particularly pressing—Colonel Lieutenant Audronis Beisys, chief of staff at the "Iron Wolf" brigade, and his deputy, Colonel Juozas Meidus.

[Mickeviciute] **Approximately how many young men will be drafted and dismissed from the Lithuanian Army this year?**

[Beisys] We will draft 2,000 and dismiss 1,200. All of these men will reinforce field battalions in different parts of Lithuania.

[Mickeviciute] **How many servicemen, officers, and warrant officers intend to reenlist? If there are no such people, what are the reasons for this?**

[Beisys] Only a few servicemen intend to reenlist. The reason is not those alleged horrors constantly described in the press, but very definite living conditions. Between 20 and 30 officers and warrant officers could reenlist each year, but the Army cannot offer them even the most modest living conditions. [passage omitted]

To have a good Army, we must create at least reasonable conditions for officers and warrant officers, so that they were interested in their work and service. Moreover, their salaries are among the lowest in the country.

[Mickeviciute] **Why is that so? Has the National Defense Ministry already spent all money allotted to it?**

[Beisys] We do not ask for anything additional from the state. However, we have not yet received what we were assigned from the budget. [passage omitted]

[Mickeviciute] **In your opinion, why do young people not want to go into the Army?**

[Beisys] First of all, the negative opinion about the former USSR Army still prevails. Second, the press and other mass media notice and expose only bad aspects. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian Army is very young and is developing. [passage omitted]

Former Military Chief Comments on Mutiny by Volunteers

WS1210120093 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 28 Sep 93 No 188 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Captain Juras Abromavicius, former chief of the Kaunas territorial defense headquarters, by Virginija Vanagiene; place and date not given: "Raking of Hot Coals"]

[Text] After the Volunteer National Defense Service [SKAT] mutiny in Kaunas, I visited Captain Juras Abromavicius, the chief of the Kaunas territorial defense headquarters. His office was sealed, even though he was still in his post that day.

[Vanagiene] **Why were you removed from your office?**

[Abromavicius] I was not removed from my office, but I wrote a report myself and left. They would have hardly dismissed me, because there was no serious ground for such action. I left for other reasons—I imagined the Lithuanian Army differently. I supposed that such developments are impossible. I thought that if such things were to occur, they would result in an appropriate reaction, and the people who violated the statute would be dismissed. It turned out that all this is not only tolerated but even encouraged. I regret this incident in our Army and I do not think that it will be possible to change anything in the near future.

[Vanagiene] **Why?**

[Abromavicius] Because no conclusions were drawn from all this, and attempts were only made to find some culprits and punish them.

[Vanagiene] **Conclusions may still be drawn in the future.**

[Abromavicius] I doubt this, because the behavior of certain people in this situation was really quite dishonest.

[Vanagiene] **You stayed in the commander's office during the attack. You also mentioned in KAUNO DIENA that SKAT people have become puppets in the hands of certain politicians....**

[Abromavicius] I saw politicians come and bring declarations.

[Vanagiene] **Who, in particular?**

[Abromavicius] A. Patackas, along with J. Maskvytis, corrected declarations brought from Vilnius and later sent them back. I understand that the volunteers' demands are correct. All these problems must be addressed. However, the chosen method is not good, and its further development is completely unsuitable. Everything might have been resolved in a civilized fashion, without inciting emotions and attacking the commander's office, if politicians had not interfered. All these issues could be and had to be settled by the national defense minister. The latter did try to resolve them. At one time we had the impression that all the problems had been resolved. Volunteers had only to lay down their arms and go home. However, political forces butted in again. They played for time and split the armed group so that part of it became very close to them, while others remained strangers. The outcome was the officers' arrest, fighting, disarming, and the announcement of readiness for action.

I am convinced that any exercise held by headquarters is treated as an act of war. Thus, it must evoke a relative response. We did not expect an attack. We had reached an agreement with N. Medvedevas that the volunteers would leave the woods around 1700. N. Medvedevas called me half an hour later and said that they had already left for the base; they did not have to come to the headquarters because their arms were not taken from here. There was no tension. Suddenly, a group of armed men forced their way into my office. Aiming their firearms at me, they demanded my gun. Since I knew all of them—they were my subordinates—I began to question them about the purpose of their action. The first accusation thrown at me was that I am Butkevicius' man. I explained that I serve the National Defense Ministry and observe the minister's instructions. This is self-evident, because otherwise this work would be senseless. Another accusation was that we are allegedly deceiving them. I asked for definite names. The men became reflective. Noting their confusion, I said that they could stay in the occupied office and I would leave. I left freely, taking my gun with me, although guards were standing everywhere, and the Seimas deputies and Air Force Commander Colonel Z. Vegelevicius saw what was happening.

Finding myself on the street, I understood that the headquarters were occupied, and I began to act in accordance with instructions meant for such situations. I informed E. Bickauskas, announced my readiness for action, and set up reserve headquarters. Employees who were inside brought out the standard. The mutineers probably did not expect this. Taking advantage of the mass media, I reported to the radio station M-1 that the arms were not yet laid down and that another criminal action had been committed.

[Vanagiene] **How could this have ended?**

[Abromavicius] This event could have ended in the following way: Having occupied the headquarters and prevented my withdrawal, the mutineers could have raised the entire Kaunas volunteer force and presented even greater demands. That was quite possible. The Kaunas volunteer group has about 2,000 armed men. No one knows how other groups might have reacted. Some of them, most probably, would have joined the mutineers. A large group of armed men can blackmail a state. It can then demand the resignation of ministers or the government and the dissolution of the Seimas. One can negotiate with 50 armed men, eventually isolate them or apply force. A large armed group can cause a serious political crisis through blackmail.

[Vanagiene] **In your opinion, who would have been interested in such an outcome?**

[Abromavicius] Definitely not the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, which can adopt decisions by a majority vote. Opposition hotheads might have thought that they could achieve their goals in this manner.

[Vanagiene] **Was not this action planned in advance?**

[Abromavicius] If it had been prepared in advance, it would have been a success. However, the occupation of the headquarters was totally amateurish.

Someone must have expected that the occupation of the headquarters would be followed by an uncontrolled process that would spread through the greater part of Lithuania. Then, events could have been interpreted as a people's revolution, and forces that had inspired them would have remained aloof. Usually, orders are executed in an army, but the responsibility rests with those who issue them. This time, they were scared of the responsibility.

[Vanagiene] **What will you do next?**

[Abromavicius] The recent events have disappointed me greatly. I have realized that my demands in line with the statute are not approved. The SKAT leadership stated that there had been no occupation of the headquarters. However, I saw myself how arms were taken away and people beaten; those people's heads are still bandaged today. Thus, it is absurd to deny the occupation. I saw the military hold a rally at the Kaunas Officers House and curse officers of all ranks in violation of the statute and the requirements of the officers' code of conduct. These people have remained in top positions. I regret this incident in the Lithuanian Army. Since the Russian Army is no longer here, I can find a job according to my profession with a clear conscience. I am a radio engineer.

[Vanagiene] **Is it true that someone here was drinking when the mutineers invaded?**

[Abromavicius] A farewell party for some employee was going on in one office. I think that there is a nice tradition in most offices to bid farewell to a person who is leaving. Still, there were no drunk men or women. The party was held in the counterintelligence section, which is not subordinate to me. I spent the entire day in my office.

However, the most piquant detail is that two days after the invasion, one company chief came round and told me that he had received an order to shoot me in one of the basements at the commander's office. I wondered why it was he who had to carry out that order. He answered that he

had received such an order. I have a witness who heard our conversation. Most probably, I got in someone's way. If the execution of service duties and the observance of the statute is viewed as interference, there is no place for me in this Army.

Seimas Leader Views Results of 'Preventive Detention' Law

WS1310123093 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 21 Sep 93 No 183 p 4

[Interview with Seimas Deputy Chairman Egidijus Bickauskas by Rytas Staselis; place and date not given: "Power Must Be Implemented, Not Acted"]

[Text] As of 13 September, there were 132 people detained and 13 criminal indictments under the provisions of the Law on Preventive Detention. Another 111 people were detained by directly applying criminal measures to them. Seimas [parliament] Deputy Chairman Egidijus Bickauskas, one of the authors of the Law on Preventive Detention, spoke with RESPUBLIKA correspondent Rytas Staselis.

[Staselis] **Are you satisfied with this law and the results achieved by law enforcement bodies?**

[Bickauskas] I understand perfectly well that this law is rather drastic, but it was not adopted because of "a good life." It was adopted for the actual struggle against organized crime rather than for political repression, as some people have tried to claim. The results achieved by law enforcement institutions demonstrate that this law has had a positive impact. First of all, law enforcement bodies have begun to work more effectively. In recent years, their staff had practically lost heart and were not even implementing the measures available to them.

[Staselis] **However, can the police and the prosecutor's office work only after the adoption of radical laws?**

[Bickauskas] The law on preventive detention was a good impulse to have more trust in one's own strength. To a certain extent, this trust was expressed in advance. The community's trust in the police and the prosecutor's office is growing. I think that in this sense a breakthrough has already occurred or is occurring right now. This is obvious when remembering how recently law enforcement institutions were heedlessly accused of real and imaginary sins. Sometimes these bodies worked less and yielded more to the political situation. On the other hand, one should not expect one single law—even though it does provide substantial powers to law enforcement officials—to change the situation radically. The key goal is to at least stabilize it. I suppose that the criminal situation is stabilizing in Lithuania.

[Staselis] **Can we already speak of stabilization? The community often says that the detained racketeers, whose photos fill the newspapers, are only "small fish," while the bosses of organized crime remain undisturbed.**

[Bickauskas] Did we see the pictures of even "small fish" in the papers before? The situation is really becoming more stable. We familiarize ourselves with the results of police and prosecutors' activities every week. We maintain direct contacts with provinces and people who were harassed by criminals. I agree that thus far we have largely dealt with the "executive" chain of criminal groups. Thus far, we have seldom "hit upon" important personalities whose reputation is familiar to us. Everything comes in its own time.

[Staselis] **You have said "we." Who else is directly performing this work, aside from you?**

[Bickauskas] A presidential decree has established a group for operative reaction to the criminal situation. This group includes the interior minister, the prosecutor general, the president's national security adviser, and myself. There is no doubt that those ordinary people, who work in the organized crime departments, are the most important people in the Prosecutor's Office and the Interior Ministry.

[Staselis] **In your opinion, where in Lithuania have law enforcement officials been able to reach leaders of criminal groups?**

[Bickauskas] The court alone can establish whether such groups are criminal or not. In my opinion, this has happened in Palanga, and partially in Panevezys. It is difficult to reach heads of criminal "families," not only in Lithuania but throughout the world. Such people do not engage in racketeering or harassment. They usually participate personally, or through intermediaries, in the privatization of state property with success, pull the strings controlling "small fish," and act as intellectual leaders. I admit that it is ridiculous to believe that great results may be achieved through extreme legal measures alone. Additional laws are necessary, maybe more economic ones, which would restrict and control corruption and protectionism, and limit opportunities for "laundering" dirty money. It is extremely strange that top state officials often lack the enthusiasm and desire to adopt such laws.

[Staselis] **According to the Law on Preventive Detention, a person can be kept under arrest for up to two months. This deadline is likely to end soon for the people who were the first to be detained....**

[Bickauskas] Criminal proceedings have been instituted against the majority of those people. I predict, however, that not all detentions will end in this manner. We are talking about preventive detention, that is, about ways of preventing crime. If we achieve this, it will be a real success. In the future, the police and the prosecutor's office should not be afraid of a certain risk: Having reliable information, they must begin criminal proceedings immediately and transfer them to the courts. Certainly, some people may be acquitted. Thank God that the innocent ones will be acquitted.

[Staselis] **Do you have any information that the Law on Preventive Detention was applied with the purpose of defeating rivals or undesirables, that is, without any grounds?**

[Bickauskas] There might have been certain mistakes made. I am convinced, however, that if such mistakes occurred, they were committed without any evil intentions. The law was applied with the knowledge of definite criminal activities of certain people. Moreover, another goal is being pursued—the detention of suspected criminals means a painful break of relations with the criminal world and a befuddling of most operational information, often including that of "family" heads. This issue is no less important. Thus, I do not see it as tragic if not all the people who, in my opinion, should be behind bars, find themselves in court right now.

[Staselis] **Do you expect any more urgent action?**

[Bickauskas] It may happen that big money will be allotted to discredit the government's struggle against crime. Thus, intentions will also be serious. One should not fully reject the possibility that criminals will try to cause chaos in the streets and resort to acts of terrorism against government institutions and officials. By the way, the community's reaction will be of great importance then. We do not intend to give up because otherwise we would have to state that we lost our war with the criminal world.

[Staselis] **Are there any more serious suspicions that criminal structures are expanding their influence over the Seimas and the government?**

[Bickauskas] Not yet. However, such attempts are possible. One should not expect that such things will be accomplished roughly, if ever: The Seimas and the government can be influenced through third or fourth parties.

[Staselis] **However, there is a possibility that the Constitutional Court may soon begin debating the legality of the Law on Preventive Detention....**

[Bickauskas] Of course, no matter what its decision might be, we will have to obey it. I suppose, however, that the wheels of the entire machine have already gained full momentum. The police and the prosecutor's office have already realized their chances, and the revocation of one law will not have any essential influence. The law on preventive detention is not a panacea. A more important issue today is how courts will engage in the process of stabilizing crime. Both the police and the prosecutor's office have proven that they can work. I would like to believe that lawyers will have enough courage and adherence to principle. On the other hand, a debate in the Constitutional Court is important for me personally, because I want to understand which particular people have rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Moreover, the public will be curious to find out who will inspire a debate in the Constitutional Court on preventive detention.

[Staselis] **In your opinion, has a breakthrough occurred in the minds of top officials?**

[Bickauskas] I think that recently we experienced a serious threat to the future of our state. Businessmen, voluntarily or by force, have been paying "taxes" to criminal structures with more care than to the state. Their argument that bureaucrats are not worth supporting if they cannot guarantee even some elementary order is understandable from the human point of view. This clearly defines the current situation: Organized criminal groups have begun to compete with the state for influence. I hope that the government has fully realized this threat. Power must be implemented and not acted.

Security Committee Head Explains Resignation

WS1810113093 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 1 Oct 93 No 191 p 5

[Interview with Gediminas Kirkilas, LDDP deputy chairman and former chief of the Seimas National Security Committee, by Aldona Svirbutaviciute; place and date not given: "Another Small Confession"]

[Text] This is a story about how Gediminas Kirkilas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDDP] and former National Security Committee chairman, does not intend to revenge himself on colleague V. Petkevicius and his group of comrades.

Gediminas Kirkilas is an extraordinary personality. It is this alone that causes many contradictory assessments. After certain facts discrediting the National Security Committee chairman and the LDDP deputy chairman have been made public, we can evaluate him differently as a personality. However, it will make the most sense to hear everything first hand. My interlocutor is Gediminas Kirkilas.

[Svirbutaviciute] **I was unable to catch you anywhere for a day and a half. Rumor had it that National Security Committee Chairman G. Kirkilas had... shot himself.... However, you have not done this, and I congratulate you....**

[Kirkilas] Thank you. Withdrawing from politics is a prerogative of weaklings. I am not one of them. The whole fuss is more troublesome to my family than me. I feel that I am innocent and am calm. I was not in Vilnius for a day and a half because I went to Kaunas to meet with our party members. We are preparing for an LDDP Council meeting that will address self-government problems. Thus, I was busy with party affairs.

[Svirbutaviciute] **Gediminas, why do you smoke a pipe? When did you begin smoking it?**

[Kirkilas] I tried to smoke it several times. A good friend of mine gave me a beautiful pipe with an even lovelier tobacco pouch. On the whole, I have noticed that Europeans like to smoke pipes, and I have picked up this habit.

[Svirbutaviciute] **You have resigned from the post of the National Security Committee chairman. Was the conflict with the volunteer service only a pretext to leave it with dignity?**

[Kirkilas] You see, Aldona, we are old acquaintances, and I think that your knowledge of politics is not lesser than mine. However, this is not only politics, but also human relations. The key problem is that I held two important positions—in the committee and the party. I am one of those people who do several jobs at the same time. I thought that I would be able to reconcile them. Reality has proven that this is impossible. The current situation in the LDDP is very complicated, and I must visit its local sections. Many people are impatient today, primarily our party members. They need an explanation.

The National Security Committee is also experiencing difficult times. I can say that my concept differed in principle from that of my deputies. I could take today's event—the appointment of the Army commander—as an example. You see, V. Petkevicius explains that this is the same as appointing a Lithuanian Bank chairman. I suppose, however, that a military commander should be appointed differently. This is the president's prerogative, and the candidate himself must want to become a commander. Thus, I would not question this issue. John may think that Peter is better, and vice versa. If we assess this way, we should consider priorities. Otherwise, we will not adopt any decisions as equal Seimas [parliament] deputies. This is the case in many instances. For example, my attitude toward the defense minister's activities differs from that of others. His

activities are multiple, and contain both achievements and shortcomings. Assessing anyone's actions, however, I try to see the entire context. I disagree with certain colleagues in principle.

[Svirbutaviciute] **Two publications by your colleague V. Petkevicius in OPOZICIJA try to assess your activities in the LDDP and the National Security Committee. Would you try to respond?**

[Kirkilas] I think I will ponder this and produce a written reply. I would not like to assess my colleagues, mock them or attach labels. I suppose that in the future we will have normal parties and professional politicians who will try to resolve internal problems inside a party. We can caricature our opponents or make them look grotesque. However, to do this with our own colleagues is politically incorrect. But this is V. Petkevicius' business. He devoted more space to himself in those articles. Judging by them, one may think that he alone is right, while others are only unsuccessful musicians, philosophers, and mediocrities. We can argue, but let us not overstep the limit. Unfortunately, those articles have even gone beyond the limits of politeness.

[Svirbutaviciute] **I would like you to comment on the LDDP slogan—work, concord, virtue.... I would particularly like to stress virtue, because last weekend's RESPUBLIKA accused you of certain vices.**

[Kirkilas] The questions put forward by RESPUBLIKA were paraphrased slogans from my electoral program. The questions concerning A. Klimaitis were nonessential. I will repeat once again: I have defended and will continue to defend him, because the claims against him were untrue. We did everything possible then—held pickets and wrote statements to the president, most of which I signed. Some LDDP members had the impression that I showed a personal interest in this. Yes, I defended A. Klimaitis. Then, an assumption was made that my behavior reflected my alleged interest in this affair. A certain sum was indicated later. Presently, I am trying to unravel this story mixed with rumor.

The model for generating rumors is one of the key problems. The political elite is not safe from rumors and intrigues that excite emotions. I can present a mechanism for discrediting journalist Aldona Svirbutaviciute. What would I do? I would study her family and find some businessman or banker. I would have little difficulty in proving that she defends the interests of some corporation in her paper. This would resemble the truth, even though it might turn out that she does not maintain any contacts with her relatives....

[Svirbutaviciute] **Is it true that your son-in-law works at the Express Bank?**

[Kirkilas] Yes, it is, and he is one of this bank's stockholders. The circulating myth about my interest in this affair is only an attempt to discredit or accuse me. I think that my son-in-law and brothers or sisters have the right to be stockholders. This does not mean, however, that they may prevent me from being a Seimas deputy. I have no stock in any bank, if this is of interest to anyone. I suppose, however, that Seimas deputies may also be bank stockholders.

[Svirbutaviciute] **All this has a simple name—a Lithuanian kind of envy....**

[Kirkilas] Yes. I fully agree with writer R. Gavelis who assesses current life as living in a schizophrenic environment. There is confusion everywhere—in politics, personalities, and the market.

[Svirbutaviciute] **I have heard rumors that you will become the head of the Common Affairs Ministry that is to be established. Is this true?**

[Kirkilas] I have heard many rumors about myself. It is said that I have a house in the Old Town, but I am always short of time to see where it is located. Someone used to claim that I wanted to become a defense minister. A new post has been created again. I can state that I have no intention of assuming any position.

[Svirbetaviciute] **How are you going to explain to your party members all the fuss around you?**

[Kirkilas] I do not intend to make any explanation. Those who think that I am right will trust me. There is a presumption of innocence, while everything else is fiction, intrigue, and rumor. Only weak people fear losing positions. I do not consider myself as such.

[Svirbutaviciute] **Some apologists from the right wing opposition mention four names in fear that the LDDP is going to deal with its leaders—A. Brazauskas, A. Slezevicius, J. Karosas, and G. Kirkilas.... What is your view?**

[Kirkilas] I would like to compliment the right wing. Its progress is becoming obvious. I would behave the same if I were on their side. This is an attempt to provoke a conflict, so that the clearing up of internal relations will halt our pace, and that we devote more time to emotions rather than to serious work. Our people who demand more resolute action are halting progress themselves. One cannot hide behind good intentions alone in politics. One must always ask oneself about ways to resolve a given problem.